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ABSTRACT
The constitutional right to privacy has, gradually and 
precariously, become ingrained in the American legal land­
scape. Recognized as a fundamental individual right, the 
right to privacy naturally coincides with the political 
philosophy of Western democracy. Owing to men like Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke, the basis of power in society was 
conceptually converted to the people; specifically, to the 
individual. The Founding Fathers, in laying down the foun­
dations of American society, pursued the political philoso­
phy of the predominance of the individual in society.
Herein lies the legal justification of the right to privacy 
as a constitutional guarantee.
Although the right to privacy is not actually enumer­
ated in the Constitution, over a century of common law 
precedent and judicial interpretation has authorized certain 
personal activities as being outside the scope of governmen­
tal regulation. The constitutional defense of such freedoms 
have been regarded as Fourteenth Amendment due process 
guarantees to life, liberty, and property. It was not until 
1965 that the 'right to privacy' invalidated an intrusive 
state stutute on its own merit. In Griswold v. Connecticut,
ii
the Supreme Court ruled that proscribing the use of contra­
ceptives to married couples was unduly burdensome. As 
interpreted, contraceptive regulation violated personal 
privacy protected by certain express guarantees within the 
Bill of Rights including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments. These constitutional protections 
create 'zones of privacy' through association and emanation. 
The judicial acknowledgment of the right to privacy invited 
further challenges which involved intensely personal situa­
tions and choices, the most controversial of which is the 
right to choose abortion. Roe v. Wade was the precedent 
setting case which granted women the right to choose abor­
tion based on Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. A 
succession of subsequent cases made their way to the Supreme 
Court which clarified the degree of state regulation and in 
the process expanded the right to privacy and reproductive 
choice. The most recent cases, however, changed that trend 
allowing states greater latitude in regulating abortion. 
Hence, is the volatile nature of the constitutional right to 
privacy.
iii
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THE UNKNOWN CITIZEN 
(To JS/07/M/378)
This Marble Monument is Erected by the State
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint, 
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War till the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc.
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The press are convinced that he bought a paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way. 
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured, 
And his Health-card shows that he was once in the hospital but left 
it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Installment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he 
went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his 
generation,
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their 
education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd;
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.
W.H. Auden 
March 1939
INTRODUCTION
We live in a continual competition with 
society over the ownership of ourselves.
Arnold Simmel, 
"Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom"
Society is a guardian and is responsible for fostering 
the general moral, intellectual and emotional framework of 
its citizens.1 In order to endure, the government must be 
able to indoctrinate a political covenant among its members. 
Thus, licensed obstetricians welcome us into state regulated 
hospitals; we are fed FDA approved baby food so that we may 
grow up and mandatorily attend an educational institution 
which is run by local authorities in accordance with state 
programs following provisions suggested by the federal 
Department of Education. In effect, the government sys­
tematizes nearly every aspect of our lives. This is the
^ee, for example, Plato's Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974), in which Socrates 
promoted strict discipline and education of youth through compre­
hensive state-run instructional programs to make the young good 
citizens. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also advanced the notion of 
societally-sponsored education, because all citizens "have equally 
a need for guidance. [They] must be taught what it is they will. 
From this increase of public knowledge would result . . . harmony 
. . . and the highest power of the whole." See, Rousseau, The
Social Contract, trans. Charles Frankel (New York: Mafner
Publishing Co., 1947), 35.
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function of all governments: to maintain an operative, 
peaceful, cohesive and lasting society. We, in turn, live 
in an environment which is most conducive to our individual 
survival, providing security, private property and com­
panionship .2
So where do we, as individuals, find the latitude to 
just be ourselves? To establish and maintain intimate 
relationships, to think and create and develop our intellec­
tual and spiritual natures requires a sphere of privacy 
apart from society, even though we are products of society. 
While "no man is an island unto himself," neither is he an 
open book for all the world to see. Society must allow its 
members repose from the demands and challenges of being a 
public person. However, society often exceeds its sphere of 
propriety, for not only are human beings persistently in­
quisitive (and intrusive) creatures, but what is more impos­
ing, the government, and its attendant surveillance squads, 
assumes it has a vested interest in the private activities
2John Locke reasoned that security and private property are 
the only reasons why mankind joins into a political society: ".
. . though men when they enter into society give up the equality, 
liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature into 
the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legis­
lative as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only 
with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his 
liberty and property . . . "  See, Locke, Treatise of Civil 
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End 
of Civil Government, ed. Charles L. Sherman (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1937), 85.
of its citizens —  sometimes justifiably so; sometimes 
not.3
For example, do the state and local governments that 
legally prohibit consensual homosexual relations have a 
vested interest in the sex lives of these individuals? 
Homosexuality is culturally taboo, and therefore unaccept­
able in the eyes of most legislators. Isn't the federal 
Constitution designed to protect the individual rights of 
unpopular or misunderstood social minorities? Many would 
argue that the AIDS epidemic has changed the private nature 
of sexual relations, both homosexual and heterosexual, and 
therefore regulation is not overly intrusive.4
Americans love their liberties, but those liberties are 
not absolute. Even in a society which boasts individual 
freedom above all else, such freedom must maintain a sense 
of social responsibility. While
[i]nsufficient freedom will subdue the spirit of 
enterprise and resolution on which so much of civilized 
progress depends . . . unbridled freedom will clash 
inexorably with the life of others.5
3For example, see Morton H. Halperin and Daniel N. Hoffman, 
Freedom v. National Security; Secrecy and Surveillance (New York: 
Chelsea House Publishers, 1977), Senator Edward V. Long, The 
Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), Myron Brenton, The 
Privacy Invaders (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1964), and Edward 
A. Shils The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 
1956) .
4See, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed below 
in Chapter Four.
5John B. Young, "Introduction: A Look at Privacy," in Privacy, 
ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1978,), 1.
inexorably with the life of others.5
The debate over the right to privacy is one of individ­
ual rights versus societal order, and is particularly con­
troversial in democratic America. Because our society is 
comprised of a melting pot of staunchly held opinions and 
beliefs, our political and legal representatives are often 
embroiled in debate over the unbalanceable scales of in­
dividual and societal interests. Unfortunately, in most 
circumstances one interest must be sacrificed for the exist­
ence of the other; individual privacy and public policy are 
often at odds.
History has shown that an excessive zeal for a par­
ticular ideology or institution causes a despotic and 
uncompromising mentality which could result in economic and 
social stagnation,6 fascism,7 and in the most extreme cir­
5John B. Young, "Introduction: A Look at Privacy," in Privacy, 
ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1978,), 1.
6Maria Hirszowicz writes that "most observers of Communist 
societies believe that the economic development of these countries 
is seriously impaired by the dictatorial forms of their governments 
" See, Hirszowicz, Coercion and Control in Communist 
Society: The Visible Hand in a Command Economy (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1986), 1. See also, Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic 
Leviathan (New York: New York University Press, 1980) .
7Italian fascist, Alfredo Rocco exhorts that fascist dogma 
does not "accept a bill of rights which tends to make the in­
dividual superior to the state and to empower him to act in 
opposition to society. Our concept of liberty is that the 
individual must be allowed to develop his personality in behalf of 
the state. . . " Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in
Readings on Fascism and National Socialism (Denver, Colorado: Alan
Swallow Paperbacks, no date), 36.
5
cumstances, genocide.8 History has also shown that the ab­
sence of governmental regulation, and a lack of communal 
cohesiveness likewise subjugates individual liberty. Too 
much freedom incites the masses into a state of chaos and 
private warfare: "wherein men live without other security, 
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them withal."9 One could argue, as Thomas Hobbes 
did, that the life of man is no better when the government 
is oppressive, than when there is no government, or when the 
governing body is ineffective.
Proponents of the right to privacy would argue that if 
the intruder is the government, then oppression has the 
stamp of legitimacy which few people, if any, could fight 
back and win. A government with unlimited sovereignty, the 
acquiescence of a passive or intimidated people, and the use 
of coercion, is far more a threat to individual liberties 
than the madman with an ax. Censorship of thought and 
action and too rigid a surveillance of individual beliefs 
and conduct, moreover, invites underground conspiratorial 
attitudes and a deep mistrust of government. The spirit of 
a people cannot be repressed for too long without eventual 
resistance to the government and subsequently, as Arnold
aArendt Hannah recounts the principles and consequences of 
fascism and the reign of terror which resulted from the racist 
philosophy of "total domination," in The Origin of Totalitarianism 
(Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Co., 1966).
9Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. and intro, by Michael Oakeshott 
(Oxford, Great Britain: A.R. Mowbray & Co. Limited, 1955), 82.
6
Simmel points out, towards each other.
Opposition to freedom raises the issue of freedom.
If there were no opposition to freedom, it would 
have to be invented. . . A vital society continues 
to question it, and to keep it in flux. But with­
out it, there would not be a society, no basis for 
any claims, no freedom, no privacy, no boundaries, 
no individuals —  but only the war of each against 
all.10
A good example of the internal conflict caused in a 
society when the government disregards individual rights to 
free thought and beliefs is the Red Scare led by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s. The exaggerated specter 
of communism had neighbor spying on neighbor and browbeating 
Congressmen leading legislative inquests against blameless 
citizens.11 Those who subscribed to a leftist philosophy, 
belonged to a labor union, or associated with suspected 
communists were liable to be blackballed from their chosen 
professions and even to serve prison sentences.12 In hind­
10Arnold Simmel, "Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom," in 
Privacy: Nomos XIII. eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman 
(New York: Atherton Press, 1971,), 87.
nThe United States Supreme Court eventually declared this to 
be an unconstitutional infringement of individual rights. See, for 
example, Watkins v. Unitfed States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), overturned 
a "contempt of Congress" conviction as "necessarily invalid under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." See also, Sweezv 
v. New Hampshire. 354 U.S. 234 (1957), where the Court invalidated 
state legislative contempt convictions based on the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment.
lzFor example, see Thomas C. Reeves, ed., McCarthvism (Malabar, 
Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1989), Peter L.
Steinberg, The Great "Red Menace": United States Prosecution of 
American Communists. 1947 - 1952 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1984), and Kenneth O'Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans: 
The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
Temple University Press, 1983).
sight, was the government justified in employing "Big 
Brother" tactics against its people? Did it serve a greater 
cause? If not, then, perhaps with some foresight, the 
greater Leviathan will learn to respect the private acts and 
beliefs of its members unless there is imminent danger that 
the whole or any of its parts will in any way be harmed.13
This thesis represents an effort to vindicate a right 
to privacy for the American people. It attempts to explain 
why privacy needs are a significant component of Western 
democratic ideals and expectations. Chapter One looks at 
both the personal and societal importance of privacy, and 
how it is consistent with the American concept of ordered 
liberty deeply entrenched in the history of our nation. 
Chapter Two examines the actual constitutional framework of 
a right to privacy. From its roots as a tort remedy in 
trespass and defamation cases, to search and seizure and 
self-incrimination considerations, to the very controversial 
rights to autonomy, there is no doubt that privacy protec­
tions have come a very long way. The discussion in Chapter 
Three will narrow the general focus of privacy to the con­
stitutionally protected areas of reproduction, contracep-
13See, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. Representative Government. 
The Subjection of Women. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933), 
14-15. In On Liberty. Mill explains the "Harm Principle" in 
representative democracies, that is, "the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering 
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self­
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightful­
ly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others."
tion, and abortion, in a case-by-case analysis of Supreme 
Court decisions. Finally, Chapter Four will consider the 
future of a right to privacy in light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions limiting the constitutional safeguards of 
certain types of privacy decisions.
CHAPTER ONE
EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
An American has no sense of privacy. He 
does not know what it means. There is 
no such thing in the country.
George Bernard Shaw 
This chapter will examine different aspects and inter­
pretations of the concept of privacy, and why it plays a 
significant role in the lives of human beings. There have 
been psychological examinations for why the individual 
psyche needs its space/1 moral considerations,2 cultural 
variations,3 social explanations4 and political5 and legal
^or example, Roger Ingham, "Privacy and Psychology," in 
Privacy, ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 
1978), 35-55.
2For example, Charles Fried, "Privacy," in Law, Reason, and 
Justice: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Graham Hughes (New York: 
New York University Press, 1969), 45-69.
3For example, Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, 
Atheneum Publishers, 1967).
4For example, Stephen T. Margulis, "Conceptions of Privacy: 
Current Status and Next Steps," in Journal of Social Issues 33, no. 
3 (1977): 5-21.
5For example, Carl J. Friedrich, "Secrecy versus Privacy: The 
Democratic Dilemma," in Privacy: Nomos XIII, eds. J. Roland Pennock 
and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), 105-120.
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justifications6 are all comprised within this seemingly 
familiar affair. Thus, we begin with the definition of the 
very word itself.
Defining Privacy
Privacy/ (prl - vs - se) 1 a: the quality or state 
of being apart from company or observation: SECLU­
SION b: freedom from unauthorized intrusion (one's 
right to -) 2 archaic: a place of seclusion 3: 
SECRECY.7
Privacy, as defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dic­
tionary, is described in three relatively simple concepts: 
seclusion, freedom and secrecy. Yet, one scholar describes 
privacy as "a confusing and complicated idea."8 Another 
asserts that there is no definable way to describe privacy 
". . . perhaps, because it is undefinable. Like the grand
concepts of liberty and equality, privacy may be too large 
to be clearly identified."9 Perhaps a better understanding 
of the right to privacy is possible if the definitions of 
privacy, as put forth by Webster, are examined separately.
6For example, Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of 
human dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser," in Philosophical
Dimensions of Privacy, ed. Ferdinand D. Schoeman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 156-202.
7Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 197 9 ed., s.v. 
"privacy."
aForeword by C. Herman Pritchett in David M. O'Brien Privacy, 
Law, and Public Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), vii.
9Philip Kurland, "The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy 
and the Constitution," in Taking the Constitution Seriously: 
Essays on the Constitution and Constitutional Law, ed. Gary L. 
McDowell (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1981), 
294.
11
The ensuing analysis proposes to clarify that the concept of 
freedom is what is meant by the right to privacy.
Seclusion
I never said, "I want to be alone."
I only said, "I want to be left alone."
Greta Garbo
Definitions la and 2 describe privacy as a being-apart- 
from others, and thus akin to loneliness, alienation, isola­
tion and ostracism. Is this what is meant when one speaks 
of the right to privacy, that is, the right to be lonely? 
Privacy is not a negative state-of-being, says Michael 
Weinstein, who asserts that several variables must exist for 
someone to be in the state of privacy.
[PJrivacy appears in consciousness as a condition of 
voluntary limitation of communication to or from cer­
tain others in a situation, with respect to specified 
information, for the purpose of conducting an activity 
in pursuit of a perceived good. The variables of 
choice, limited communication, relevant others, a 
situational context, activity, and a good to be at­
tained must all be present in the full construction of 
privacy.10
Privacy is not loneliness since loneliness is an un­
wanted condition which is thrust upon an individual who in 
fact seeks social contact or affection. Privacy is not 
alienation since alienation is a state of unrelatedness from
10Michael A. Weinstein, "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, " 
in Privacy: Nomos XIII, 94.
12
one's social context or oneself. Isolation is not privacy 
since isolation is a term which refers to complete aloneness 
while privacy permits one to enjoy the company of relevant 
others in a more intimate context. Finally, privacy is not 
ostracism since the latter is a condition of involuntary 
banishment and the former is always voluntary withdrawal.
Privacy is, in short, a positive human condition.
While some forms of being-apart-from-others can be negative­
ly construed, privacy is desirable. It is an affirmation of 
freedom and self-determination. It allows people to assem­
ble and share ideas and affords to individuals the freedom 
they need to achieve goals and flourish as human beings.11
Secrecy
Definition 3 asserts that privacy is a synonym for 
secrecy. While both secrecy and privacy involve the with­
holding of information, secrecy is more compelling and more 
orchestrated, or as sociologist Edward Shils declares,
SECRECY IS PRIVACY made compulsory. With more severe 
sanctions for the disclosure of information, more 
emphatic demands for its withholding from persons 
authorized to receive it, secrecy appears to be an
11Westin affirms that privacy is a basic human need: 
"Anthropological studies have shown that the individual in 
virtually every society engages in a continuing personal process by 
which he seeks privacy at some times and disclosure and companion­
ship at other times. . . The reason for the universality of this
process is that individuals have conflicting roles to play in any 
society; to play these different roles with different persons, the 
individual must present a different "self" at various times. 
Restricting information about himself and his emotions is a crucial 
way of protecting the individual in the stresses and strains of 
this social interaction." Westin, Privacy and Freedom. 13.
13
extension of privacy. It is privacy with higher more 
impassable barriers. Yet secrecy is the enemy of 
privacy.12
Secrecy is used against individual privacy. It is a 
tool employed to manipulate and control information, while 
privacy is protective and selective over the disclosure of 
information. Secrecy denotes sneakiness, deviousness, or 
underhandedness; when someone has to do something on the 
sly, then that person is secretive. Privacy, on the other 
hand, refers to autonomy or the freedom to choose to do 
something without that action becoming public.
When a government quashes the right of people to act 
privately, then the defiant citizenry must act secretly.
For example, in the Soviet Union, people who wanted to 
worship had to do so secretly. However, with the allowance 
of glasnost and the more tolerant attitude toward religious 
beliefs, individuals are now allowed to worship private­
ly.13 "Privacy is the voluntary withholding of information 
reinforced by a willing indifference," explains Shils. 
"Secrecy is the compulsory withholding of knowledge, rein­
12Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, above, 201.
13In the Soviet Union, prior to "glasnost," religion existed
by implication, says Alec Nove. However, in 1988, religious
attitudes began to change. Glasnost began to bring the church into 
the more open society. For example, "the word 'God' could not, for
decades, be spelt with an initial capital letter. Only in most
recent years has this become possible, and it is now commonplace.
. . Recordings of church choirs have now become available. . . [A] 
televised discussion [was] held in March 1988 on different 
[religious] world views. . . " See, Nove, Glasnost' in Action
(Boston, Massachusetts: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 118-119.
14
forced by a prospect of sanctions for disclosure."1'1
When secrecy is associated with the function of govern­
ments, it is granted more legitimacy than when an individual 
or a private group acts secretly. Much to the dismay of 
First Amendment advocates who see freedom of the press as a 
means to keep the American government and its representa­
tives from acting secretly, the Supreme Court has found a 
sound constitutional basis for governmental secrecy. In 
United States v. Nixon.15 the Court found executive privi­
lege to be functionally licensed in the operation of govern­
ment. Some find it ironic, however, that the President of a 
democracy is rendered the constitutional justification to 
act secretly, while a general right of privacy is considered 
a substantive and precarious constitutional right. Philip 
Kurland asserts:
[l]f the Supreme Court can find a constitutional basis, 
made up of whole cloth, for executive privilege, which 
is a secrecy proposition, it should more readily find 
in the Constitution the basis for an expansive privacy 
doctrine. The latter —  individual privacy —  is 
consistent with the Constitution's primary function of 
limitation of arbitrary governmental power. The former 
—  government secrecy —  is not; indeed, it is incon­
sistent with it.16
14Shils, The Torment of Secrecy. 26.
15United States v. Nixon. 418 US 683 (1974) . The Supreme Court 
ruled that executive privilege (i.e., the right to withhold 
information, documents, or testimony from congress or the courts) 
does have limited constitutional basis. The Chief Executive must 
reasonably show that disclosure of information could imperil the 
national interest.
16Philip Kurland, "The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy 
and the Constitution," 297.
15
Furthermore, a more sophisticated international mili­
tary network tacitly requires that the national government 
become all the more impenetrable at the expense of individ­
ual liberties. Official secrets and industrial activity, in 
accordance with the nuclear arms race, are becoming uncom­
fortably close. The price of system maintenance and nation­
al security is the lessening of individual privacy, notes 
-a,''’ Carl Friedrich.
The need for official secrecy has, under the heading of 
security, been extended at the expense of private 
secrecy (privacy) as investigatory activities, prying 
into the private lives of individuals, have become ever 
more aggressive."17
If individual privacy becomes too endangered by govern­
mental secrecy, then, as in totalitarian regimes such as 
Nazi Germany, individuals will resort to secrecy. The 
difference between privacy and secrecy, therefore, is the 
extent to which external constraints force their will upon 
independent human beings.
Freedom
I think I am free when I can do what I 
want; this tiny protoplasmal center of 
radiant energy demands that alien im­
pacts shall not thwart its insistences 
and self-assertions.
Judge Learned Hand 
When one speaks of the right to privacy, then defini­
tion lb is the corresponding interpretation, that is, free-
17Carl J. Friedrich, "Secrecy versus Privacy: The Democratic 
Dilemma," 112.
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dora from unauthorized intrusion. Generally, four variables 
are present when defining an individual's right to privacy: 
(1) the individual elects to limit access to his thoughts, 
actions, and so forth. This suggests an individual is free 
to make rational choices; (2) the individual temporarily 
chooses to sever communication and information from certain 
others or society; (3) the individual's privacy serves a 
desired purpose; (4) privacy is an individual prerogative 
and an inherent human liberty.18 These variables are sig­
nificant characteristics to the American love of liberty and 
freedom. It is, thus, surprising that a constitutional 
right to privacy has fared as dubiously as it has in the 
United States. It is, perhaps, because of the negative 
connotations, just discussed, that accompany the right to 
privacy; it engenders fears of an unmanageable and alienated 
America. The right to privacy is significant in still other 
ways, as the next section will examine.
Evaluating Privacy
The Social-Psychological Significance of Privacy 
We are, in a sense, always alone, in a world of fleet­
ing events and images. Not meant despairingly, yet realist­
ically, each of us moves on to meet new companions, new 
challenges, and new ideas in a way unique to ourselves. 
Contrary to the ancient Greek philosophy which maintained
18David M. O'Brien, Privacy. Law, and Public Policy, 4.
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that the individual is teleologically a part of the larger 
whole,19 natural rights philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke, approached the theory of the individual in 
society as "all being free, equal and independent."20 It 
is therefore necessary that the individual be prepared for 
the vicissitudes that life offers, for only within the 
individual mind are the resolutions accommodating life to be 
made. Sociologists and psychologists agree that privacy
allows the individual the time and space required to recruit 
and redefine himself and his social situation. Privacy, in 
a world of social tensions and high expectations, is the 
outlet in the pressure cooker of life. Individuals instinc­
tively create "self-boundaries," within which "our own 
interests are sovereign, all initiative is ours, we are free 
to do our thing, insulated against outside influence and 
observation. "21
Being human means spontaneity, originality, and at 
times, even irrationality. Being a member of society means
19For example, Aristotle professed that "the polis is prior in 
the order of nature to the family and the individual. The reason 
for this is that the whole is necessarily prior [in nature] to the 
part." See, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6.
20John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government: An Essay Concerning 
the True Original. Extent and End of Civil Government, above, 63.
21Arnold Simmel argues that the desire for privacy is different 
in different cultures. Because the individual is the central value 
in the United States, the felt need for privacy is greater here 
than in other societies. See, Simmel, "Privacy Is Not an Isolated 
Freedom," above, 72.
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standards of conformity and contempt for noncompliance. 
Privacy acts as the resolution between these opposing 
forces. It allows individuals their mortal indiscretions 
without being branded as iconoclasts, perverts, or eccen­
trics by their peers. The dichotomy of existence is the 
public face and the private I. The separation between 
actual self and social self is functional, notes Michael 
Weinstein,
because the person can invisibly transgress social 
norms and thereby keep up appearances in his social 
relations, undertake consumption which is disapproved, 
enact unorthodox postures, and, most important, relax 
after encounters with unbearable people with whom 
relations are necessary.22
The ability to act privately, therefore, is the power 
to be master of the identity that one creates in the world. 
This gives the individual in society the sense that he is 
not an impotent entity in an impersonal universe. It allows 
people some modicum of control over their immediate environ­
ment; an environment that includes body, mind and heart.
The inner sense of privacy, and mutual respect for it, 
may be a mechanism that helps to secure the conditions 
for living fraternally in a world where men are not 
gods, where to know all is not to understand and for­
give all.23
Critics of the right to privacy allege that all the ado 
over the claims for personal autonomy is degenerating the
22Michael A. Weinstein, "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, "
23Paul A. Freund, "Privacy: One Concept or Many," in Privacy: 
Nomos XIII. 195-196.
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need for law and order within society. They suggest that by 
promoting the individual above all else, the foundation of 
community fellowship is being sacrificed, and that anti­
social behavior is being fostered.24 Because of the "ME" 
attitude, individuals are losing touch with society, and 
values, and the general feeling of self-worth that comes 
with a healthy affiliation with others. Hence, privacy, 
argue the critics, is the psychosis of the post-modern, 
liberal era.25
The Moral Significance of Privacy 
When critics argue that privacy is producing the de­
cline of values within society, it is important to appre­
ciate what these values are. If people in the United States
24A vociferous attack on privacy was made by H.W. Arndt: "The 
cult of privacy rests on an individualist conception of society, 
not merely in the innocent and beneficial sense of a society in 
which the welfare of individual is conceived as the end of all 
social organization, but in the more specific sense of 'each for 
himself and the devil take the hindmost' . . .  An individualist of 
this sort sees 'the Government' where we might see 'the public 
interest.'" See, Arndt, "The Cult of Privacy," Australian 
Quarterly XXI, no., 3 (September 1949): 69, 70-71.
25The modern era advanced the predominance of the individual 
over society. The classical liberal philosophy will be explained 
in greater detail later in Chapter 1. One philosopher, Richard 
Wasserstrom, argues that cultural hang-ups and taboos are what 
cause the individual to go into hiding. It is societal qualms that 
are inducing the 'cult of privacy.' "We have made ourselves 
excessively vulnerable . . . because we have accepted the idea that 
many things are shameful unless done in private. . . Indeed our
culture would be healthier and happier if we diminished substan­
tially the kinds of actions that we now feel comfortable doing only 
in private, or the kinds of thoughts we now feel comfortable 
disclosing only to those with whom we have special relationships." 
See, Wasserstrom, "Privacy: Some arguments and assumptions,"
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, 330-331.
were asked what they value most, a plethora of different 
answers would be given. Some value family, marriage, love, 
money, education, freedom, and so on. These values are 
present in varying degrees of intensity, among different age 
groups and ethnic groups, and within the disparate expanse 
of the country. If an individual prefers a private life of 
education and religious meditation, would it be right to 
accuse that individual of being a decadent factor in the 
decline of the institution of marriage and family?
Throughout history individual values have been debated, 
weighed, fought over, and even killed for, and no one single 
value has infinitely prevailed.26 There is one constant 
regarding values and morality, however, and that is toler­
ance and understanding. As Charles Fried discerned it,
the principle of morality, far from representing a 
complete system of values, establishes only the equal 
liberty of each person to define and pursue his values 
free from the undesired impingement of others.27
Equal deference to individual values is important because it
is telling the person that he has worth as a freethinking,
rational, and intelligent human being.
26Such historical events inspired Thomas Jefferson to comment 
that "[mjillions of innocent men, women, and children, since the 
introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured, fined, 
imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity. 
What has been the effect of coercion? To make one half of the world 
fools, and the other half hypocrites." See, Jefferson, "Query 
XVII," in Writings (New York: Literary Classics of the United
States, 1984), 286.
27Charles Fried, "Privacy," 50.
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The philosophy of paternalism, on the other hand, says
that authority, governmental or religious, is charged with
guiding the morality and mentality of the people, since "the
people" are generally unable to act morally on their own.28
For most legal scholars, and Americans in general, this
proposition amounts to blasphemy. H.L.A. Hart explains why
freedom is the primary value:
The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice 
may be held as a value in itself with which it is 
'prima facie' wrong to interfere; or it may be thought 
valuable because it enables individuals to experiment 
—  even with living —  and to discover things valuable 
both to themselves and to others. But interference 
with individual liberty may be thought an evil requir­
ing justification for simpler, utilitarian reasons; for 
it is itself the infliction of a special form of suf­
fering —  often very acute —  on those whose desires 
are frustrated by the fear of punishment.29
Experimenting with life and its consequences has been
the moral lesson. Many times the voice of authority was
wrong; not infrequently, it was ethically outrageous and
morally bankrupt, designed to serve one purpose which was to
promote and maintain the power of the man or institution.
28Some legal paternalists include Lord Devlin, James Fitzjames 
Stephen and Edmund Burke. They exhort the necessary existence of 
a stringently enforced moral code among all members of society, 
regardless of whether their offense is detrimental to society. A 
paternalist, for example, would contend that an individual must be 
protected from himself, and that this a necessary role of law. See, 
for e.g., Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1959), Stephen, Liberty. Equality. Fraternity 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), and Burke, Reflec­
tions on the Revolution in France (New York: Arlington House,
1955) .
Z9H .L .A. Hart, Law. Liberty, and Morality (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1963), 21-22.
22
There are no absolutes, as many people have discovered, 
thus, the iniquities of life are the restrictions and op­
pressions falsely established. If privacy is necessary to 
psychologically or physically free the individual from 
culturally imposed restraints, then it is hard to see how 
the right to privacy destroys the values of a nation; par­
ticularly a country so fervent about individual freedoms.
The Political Justification for the Right to Privacy 
American political culture is premised on the words of 
Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all 
Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.- 
That to secure these Rights, Governments are institu­
ted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the 
Consent of the Governed.-
According to the dictates of reason, and to the docu­
ment that set us free as a nation, no one may be a master 
over others unless it is by consent. The American form of 
limited sovereignty declares that "the people" created a 
government to protect individual liberties against encroach­
ment from men in general, and from the government in partic­
ular. The governed are subject to the laws of government, 
not subjugated to the whims of authority. Freedom, equal­
ity, and independence are entitlements endowed upon human 
beings prior to the creation of government. Conditionally, 
however, individuals must refrain from certain actions which 
would enslave free men. "He who may intrude upon another at
23
will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a 
primary weapon of the tyrant."30
The American political system can be described as a 
series of fortresses; walls exist everywhere separating 
church and state, the three branches of government, the two 
houses of Congress, federal and state government, individual 
liberties from arbitrary governmental encroachment and, 
finally, criminal and civil laws separating one citizen from 
the other. This was designed not only to counteract a 
concentration of power, but also to preserve a large measure 
of autonomy whereby institutions and individuals could carry 
out their affairs.31 If, for instance, the President could 
interfere with the duties of the legislative or judicial 
branches, then we could reasonably expect to live in fear of 
despotism. Or, if popular religion were to infiltrate our 
governmental institutions, we could hardly expect freedom of 
conscience and belief to endure.32 And, if the private 
domain were to be permeated by intruders at random, then we
30Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: 
an answer to Dean Prosser," 165.
31See, for example, James Madison who, expounding on the ideas 
of Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, advanced the principle of 
separation-of-powers.' Madison stated "that where the whole power 
of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a 
free education are subverted." Madison, "Essay #47," in James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers 
(New York: New American Library, 1961), 304.
32See, John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Charles 
L. Sherman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937) .
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are by no means equal.
Francis Bacon aptly asserted that "knowledge . . .  is 
power."33 Hence, ill-begotten information about ourselves, 
our thoughts and our actions arms the possessor of such 
information with the power to discredit our names and repu­
tations and to deprive us of a future of freedom and auton­
omy. Information about private conduct can be distorted and 
disclosed, misinterpreted out of context and used against us 
making us slaves to the past and prisoners of the pres­
ent.34 Certainly, this was not intended for a politically 
free people, or meant by a political philosophy which, above 
all else, exalts the individual.
The individual in Western democracies plays an impor­
tant role in the political system by holding representatives 
accountable. The ballot is the means whereby citizens have 
their say in government; they state their choice by marking 
the box next to the politician or proposition. The privacy 
of their choice is the one way that the voter is assured 
that he could be true to his personal and political convic­
tions. Community pressures and other intimidations cannot
33Sir Frances Bacon, Religious Meditations: Of Heresies, in The 
Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert Ellis and 
Douglas Heath, vol. 14 (Boston, Massachusetts: Brown and Taggard, 
1969), 95.
34Data banks are primarily responsible for invading individual 
privacy. Hyman Gross asserts that data Banks are an "offense to 
self-determination. We are subject to being acted on by others 
because of conclusions about us which we do not know and whose 
effect we have no opportunity to counteract." See, Gross, "Privacy 
and Autonomy," in Privacy: Nomos XIII, 174.
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reach the privacy of the ballot box.35
Freedom of convictions in a democratic society keeps 
the system dynamic and the political process open and com­
petitive :
Only an individual free to shape his own life and that 
of his immediate human relations is capable of fulfil­
ling the vital function of a citizen in a democratic 
community, and thus privacy becomes the corollary of 
democracy.36
If there were no individual privacy, if we lived in an open 
communal society, differences of opinion would eventually 
languish away under the weight of public opinion, fear of 
ostracism, or loss of esteem. If there were no variety of 
views or differences of opinion there would be no need for 
democracy. The tyranny of popular morality and opinion was 
a quandary that our Founding Fathers sought to avoid through 
various channels designed to protect the rights of minor­
ities.37 Though these impediments (e.g., passing laws only 
with the consent of both houses of Congress, the Senate 
filibuster, judicial review, etc.) may make our political
35See Carl J. Friedrich, "Secrecy versus Privacy: The Demo­
cratic Dilemma," 115.
36Ibid.. 116.
37James Madison, for example, strove to remedy the problem of 
the tyranny of the majority in "Essay #51" of the Federalist 
Papers, 324. "Whilst all authority in it [the federal republic of 
the United States] will be derived from and dependent on the 
society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, 
interests and classes of citizens, the rights of individuals, or 
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested com­
binations of the majority. In a free government the security for 
civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights."
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system complex, slow, and at times counterproductive, it is 
a system aimed at compromise and it necessitates tolerance. 
Because we are able to bend with the diversities of in­
terests and opinion, our government will not break as a 
result of being unable to adjust to the changes which will 
eventually confront all societies.
The most powerful argument for the right to privacy in 
Western democracies is, thus, the right of every individual 
to self-determination. It is every citizen's right to vote 
his conscience, or belong to a political organization, if he 
in fact chooses to be political at all. It is every citi­
zen's right to choose between Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Buddhism, atheism, ad infinitum, as his belief system. 
Individual self-determination must not be laid in the lap of 
a disinterested bureaucracy whose records care nothing about 
justice or circumstance; nor must it be manipulated by a 
malicious political foe whose warped sensibilities seek only 
the downfall of his opponent; nor should one's decisions be 
sacrificed to self-righteous religious groups whose secular 
odyssey tolerates only one course of conduct. Contrary to 
totalitarianism where the individual is thought to exist for 
the institutions and where individual values are determined 
by the institutional superstructure, liberal democratic 
thought credits its citizens with the rationality to create, 
maintain, amend, and advance the political and economic 
society in which they live.
27
Ideological Origins of 
the Right to Privacy
As with all laws and political principles, the right to 
privacy evolved as a result of historical, philosophical, 
and political circumstance. The intellectual ferment which 
preceded and influenced the men who framed our system of 
government advanced a revolutionary form of governing based 
on a new way of understanding mankind. No longer was man 
considered a mere pawn of kings, enthroned by "blue blood" 
and "divine right." The Enlightenment revealed to thinkers 
that vassalage was exploitive and erroneous; reason showed 
philosophers that life could be more free, equal, and 
productive.
The time was the Seventeenth Century; an era of radi­
cal change. Continental tradition was being challenged by 
the inevitability of science, industrialization, and capi­
talism. Feudalism was undermined because of the mass migra­
tion of serfs into urban areas. A large concentration of 
wage laborers in cities such as London, and poor purchasing 
power because of high prices manifested themselves in scores 
of people living at or under the poverty line.38 Such an 
assemblage of unpropertied indigents posed a potential 
threat to the propertied class. The English Civil War was
38Christopher Hill writes "that in this period England was 
' relatively' overpopulated - that the population was greater than 
the economy as then organised could absorb." See Hill, The Century 
of Revolution, 1603 - 1714 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1980), 18.
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imminent.39
The face of religion was changing as well. While the 
conservative Church of England (Episcopalian) frowned upon 
the profit-making incentive of the marketplace, the up-and- 
coming prominence of the theological left (including Pres- 
byterianism, Puritanism, and Calvinism) was encouraging a 
much more liberating ideology. They urged that to work 
assiduously, and to make the best use of one's talents, was 
to earn God's favor. Their promotion of effort, industry, 
study, and a sense of purpose, also led to the scientific 
quest.
The diligence with which men were now applying their 
labor and conscience fostered a new skepticism. Instead of 
accepting the heavens as taught in the church, men were 
inspired to study the heavens for themselves and, therein, 
find the laws of the universe. With each new discovery, a 
previously held belief was shattered. The scientific method 
thus caused the deterioration of authority in the Seven­
teenth Century. From the Pope of Rome to the astronomer 
Ptolemy, authorities once taken at their word were ques­
tioned and frequently rejected. Historian Christopher Hill 
writes:
The initial challenge to authority came from the
Protestant appeal to the individual conscience. . .
39The Civil War was to last from 1642-1649. It was also called 
the "Puritan Revolution" because of the social consequences of 
Puritan thought, for example, individualism, materialistic 
initiative, etc. Ibid., 63ff.
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Economic individualism in society (the breakdown of 
village community and gild, the rise of capitalism) 
combined with individualism in religion to produce 
quite a new authority, that contained within each man's 
breast.40
Europe was in a state of flux. Its intellectual, 
moral, and economic composition was being torn down in order 
to rebuild, and men, as dynamic as the times, were there to 
record their empirical observations. Scientific, religious, 
and political revelations began to emerge, most of which 
concentrated on the individual human being and his environ­
ment . . . and then came Thomas Hobbes.
Thomas Hobbes
Wisdom is acquired not by reading of 
books, but of men.
Leviathan
Why would a man of learning and privilege, a man bred 
to walk with the aristocracy and the intellectual elite 
conclude that "the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short?"41 Hobbes' incisive observations in­
variably led him to his cynicism, for what he saw were 
paupers fighting to survive, a middle class (yeomen, in­
dustrialists, etc.) laboring to advance their lot and an 
aristocracy manipulating to keep and further their fortune. 
And in all of these affairs of men, from prince to pauper, 
Hobbes saw that men were equally capable of each others'
40Ibid., 78.
41Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, above, 82.
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undoing. This, alas, was the problem.
Man's relative equality of body and mind, as well as 
his infinite appetites and aversions, consequently, make 
foes of mankind. In a pre-governmental state, or a state of 
nature where everything is for the taking, our neighbors are 
but bothersome hindrances, frustrating our personal goals 
and desires. There is no private property or industry, for 
one's ability to protect the fruits of his labor and his 
possessions is uncertain. Man in this type of society is 
doomed to a life of struggle and competition, endeavoring 
"to destroy or subdue one another."42
Hobbes then took a fundamental understanding of human 
nature, that is, that man is primarily self-interested, and 
asked why men would want or need a government when, without 
government, man is in his most sovereign state. In the 
state of nature, man has unfettered liberty to do what is 
necessary to preserve and improve his condition; that is to 
say, he has 'natural rights.'43
However, reason, and again self-interest, urge mankind 
to abide by natural laws in order to secure his state and 
estate in a ruthlessly competitive world. If mankind in 
general agrees to "do not that to another, which thou would-
42Ibid.. 80-84.
43Natural rights or 'jus naturale' is "the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation 
of his own nature . . . and consequently, of doing anything, which 
in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest 
means thereunto." Ibid.. 84.
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est not have done to thyself," then men are appealing to the 
' law of nature.'44 Three fundamental precepts, according 
to Hobbes and the natural law, will abet peace among men: 
first, "that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as 
he has hope of attaining it, "45; second, "that a man be 
willing, when others are so too . . .  to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against 
other men, as he would allow other men against himself, "46; 
and third, "that men perform their covenants made."47
Hereafter, man, who before the covenant had complete 
liberty, relinquishes his natural rights to a sovereign, one 
or an assembly possessing absolute power, created to keep 
the peace and to execute the law for that purpose. After- 
all, "covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no 
strength to secure a man at all."48 Free men authorize the 
sovereign who will thereafter subject them to his omnipotent 
rule.
Hobbes' influence on the right to privacy seems pre­
carious enough, since he was a political positivist in the
44Natural law or 'lex naturalis' is a "precept or general rule, 
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which 
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving 
the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best 
preserved." Ibid.
45Ibid., 85.
46Ibid.
41Ibid., 93.
48Ibid., 109.
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most literal sense of the word; his theory of the state was 
based wholly on the command theory of law. However, it is 
important to consider that Hobbes required popular consent 
to legitimate the authority of the sovereign. The indi­
vidual had to be a responsible moral agent, at one point, 
for it is individually that men reason and covenant the 
state into existence. Thus, the public sphere was derived 
from the private sphere. The private man did not go un­
noticed by Hobbes. After the covenant, private interaction 
is regulated.49
Moreover, Hobbes wrote during a time which regarded 
natural law precepts, or the rules for ethical behavior, and 
man's natural rights, as the same thing. Philosophers 
throughout the Middle Ages believed that natural rights were 
derived exclusively from natural law —  the moral law.50 
By distinguishing the two, Hobbes conceptually relieved the
49"In this way Hobbes is able to identify natural man with 
private man, and so present a view of society as based on and 
reducible to relationships between private individuals as part of 
the natural order of things." Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights 
in Liberal Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986),
60.
50For example, St. Thomas Aquinas professed the divine 
dispensation of the law. Natural law was an objective plan 
realized by divine revelation; man was to adjust his life to the 
tenets thereby laid down. See, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1 
(New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 993-1119. Other
philosophers who united natural law and natural right were William 
Ockham and Jean Gerson. For further discussion, see Richard Tuck, 
Natural rights theories: Their origin and development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979) .
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individual from the restraints of the church.51 The fact 
that Hobbes attributed to human beings natural rights with­
out the traditional moral overtones seems to indicate that 
he believed individuals are capable of, and indeed at times 
require, the freedom to act autonomously.
"The greatest liberty of subjects," asserts Hobbes, 
"dependeth on the silence of the law."52 This is Hobbes' 
concession of negative liberties, after the covenant, as a 
further source of autonomous action. Negative freedoms are 
those unrestricted activities which have been pretermitted 
by the sovereign, and involve most day-to-day social and 
economic action, including
the liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise contract 
with one another; to choose their own abode, their own 
diet, their own trade of life, and institute their 
children as they themselves think fit; and the like.53
‘ A consequence of negative libertarianism is that it
requires mutual tolerance among the members of society for
those activities for which the law does not speak. For
instance, if there is no law determining the volume at which
one may play a musical instrument, he may play very loud.
51"The exact moral status of these natural laws is complex and 
elusive, but in one important respect, Hobbes stands traditional 
natural law arguments on their heads...all recognized the existence 
of some relationship between natural right and law, such that 
natural rights were either derived from natural law or at least 
limited by it." See, Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal 
Theory, 42.
52Hobbes, Leviathan. 143.
5 3 Ibid., 139.
34
In the state of nature, his neighbor might be disposed to 
destroy the trumpet and/or trumpeter. However, in the 
state, the law forbids assault, murder, and the destruction 
of private property. Thus, everyone subject to the law must 
acquire tolerance.
The sovereign is established to regulate and protect 
individual interaction as they privately pursue personal 
goals. As each individual subjectively, though legally, 
endeavors to advance his lot, typical of human nature, the 
larger social sphere likewise benefits. Hobbes' laissez- 
faire attitude toward economic, familial, and religious life 
contributed to the classical liberalist approach to soci­
ety .54
John Locke
[I]t will be very difficult to persuade 
men of sense that he who with dry eyes 
and satisfaction of mind can deliver his 
brother unto the executioner to be burnt 
alive, does sincerely and heartily con­
cern himself to save that brother from 
the flames of hell in the world to come.
A Letter Concerning Toleration 
Locke, like Hobbes, professed that men existed, equal-
54Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 62. 
Frank M. Coleman asserts that Hobbes is the father of American 
constitutionalism: "In Hobbes's philosophy the only possible source 
of public authority is the private need of independently-situated 
political actors, each of whom is vested with a prior, if not 
necessarily superior, right to act according to self-defined 
standards of conscience and interest. Public order is, by nature, 
artificial." See Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis of American 
Constitutionalism," Polity VII (Fall 1974): 65.
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ly, in a state of nature before the creation of government. 
He also theorized that the creation of government was engen­
dered as a result of self-interest; the protection of pri­
vate property was Locke's primary purpose of the state. 
However, Locke diverged from Hobbes in several important 
respects.
For Hobbes, once the people accepted natural law pre­
cepts as the most rational way to coexist, mankind renounced 
their natural rights to an absolute sovereign until that 
sovereign was no longer able to keep the covenant. Accord­
ing to Locke, there are three fundamental flaws with this 
statement: first, that natural laws and rights exist con­
currently and continually before and after the creation of 
civil society; second, that mankind cannot consent to a 
government more power than they themselves possess, for this 
is contrary to the laws of nature; and third, that the 
government is accountable to the people, who may alter or 
abolish the commonwealth when it acts contrary to their 
natural rights.
True to the Cartesian passion of his day, Locke as­
serted that all knowledge, including moral knowledge, begins 
within the confines of the human mind. Man is instilled 
with reason and the ability to act freely upon his environ­
ment with the use of his labor and his intelligence. Even 
in the state of nature, man is capable of employing his 
moral intuition in his daily, unfettered existence. As
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Locke averred,
[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, 
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another 
in his life, health, liberty or possessions.55
Transgressors of the law of nature are defectors of the 
universal order and deserve just punishment for their 
crimes; thus, "every man hath a right to punish the offend­
er, and to be executioner of the law of nature."56 What 
mankind is in need of, being in the state of nature, is a 
common judge to adjudicate without the subjective passion 
characteristic of an injured party. For this reason, and 
for codification and protection of the law, men join to­
gether into civil society. Herein, men consent and sanction 
representatives of the people and of the natural law.
Locke denounces absolute sovereignty, for this arbi­
trarily puts a single individual in a favorable position to 
transgress the laws of nature.57 Natural rights are in­
trinsic to mankind and are inherently safeguarded by its 
possessor; hence, according to Locke, the Hobbesean sover­
eign is a potential defector of the law of nature. Locke
55John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (An Essay 
Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government). 
6 .
56Ibid. . 8.
57"This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the 
state of nature, wherein they had the liberty to defend their right 
against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force 
to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in a 
combination." Ibid., 92.
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endorses separating the powers of sovereignty (executive, 
legislative, judicial) and making them accountable to the 
people. While Hobbes legitimated the sovereign with just 
the initial covenant, Locke maintained that consent is a 
continual and never-ending process. The legislation of 
representatives must win the consent of the majority of the 
commonwealth before it is legitimate. Legislation is ille­
gitimate when it fails to do what it was created to do/ that 
is, to protect the natural rights of the people and to 
protect the people from the self-interest and passions of 
all the members of society, and, in particular, to preserve 
private property.
Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress 
this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambi­
tion, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp 
themselves or put into the hands of any other of an 
absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates 
of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the 
power the people had put into their hands . . . and it 
devolves to the people, who have the right to resume 
their original liberty. . . 58
The basis for all rights is private property. Property 
is appropriated by man through his industry and labor.
Man's ability to shape something out of nature into a crea­
tion of his own is a gift granted by God, says Locke, and 
thus can never be expropriated legitimately without man's 
consent. Property resides in one's talents and reason, in 
one's labor and strength, and allows man to be master of 
himself and of all he could dominate from his earth. Pro-
58Ibid. . 148.
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tection of property is what brings men together into the 
commonwealth.59
The right to privacy essentially grew out of Locke's 
conception of private property. It was thinkers such as 
Locke who fostered the legitimacy of society on natural 
rights instead of Machiavellian might. Appropriating prop­
erty is the basic autonomous action bestowed upon man by 
God; henceforth, an individual's estate is inviolable.
Another guarded sphere of autonomy for Locke was in­
dividual conscience. Reason unfolds the divinity of God and 
the natural law, therefore the relationship of man to his 
God, if he has one, is entirely exclusive. Intolerance of 
one's religious beliefs is insupportable, particularly if it 
is governmental in nature.60
[T]he care of souls is not committed to the civil 
magistrate, any more than to other men . . . because it 
appears not that God has ever given any such authority 
to one man over another, as to compel any one to his 
religion.61
To Locke, and many others of his generation, the most 
fundamental actions and assets of mankind are those veiled
59"The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property. . . " Ibid., 82.
60In the seventeenth century, religious institutions played a
burdensome role in individual lives. Church attendance was 
mandatory —  absences were punishable by law. Payment of tithes,
one-tenth of an individual's produce or payment, was given to a
clergyman at random. Church courts were common, as were charges of 
heresy, sexual misconduct, etc. See, Hill, The Century of 
Revolution, 1603-1714. 63ff.
61John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 172.
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by the need for autonomy. Both Hobbes and Locke believed 
that the individual is the basis for all legitimate rights. 
However, Locke instilled these rights with a more lasting 
effect, once the government had been established, than did 
Hobbes. Locke asserts that natural law can determine the 
negative freedoms of citizens by limiting government, where­
as with Hobbes, individual freedoms are those disregarded by 
the sovereign. Locke was less suspicious of the motives of 
mankind and urged greater tolerance and acceptance of the 
great bounty of human reason. Because of his approach, and 
respect for reason and liberty, Locke has been considered 
the inspiration of contractarian political theory.62 More­
over, when Locke placed moral and civil limitations on 
governments as a consequence of the axiomatic principles of 
natural law, he also enlivened the quest for creating the 
ideal limited government, which lay in wait a continent 
away.
The Influence of Classical Liberalism 
on the American Social Contract
It is clear that John Locke, among other modern politi­
cal theorists,63 provided the men undertaking the great
“ "Contractarian theory is a natural way to express the 
underlying political conception of the moral sovereignty of the 
people, which links democratic theory with a larger moral concep­
tion of respect for persons." David A.J. Richards, Toleration and 
the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986), 
101.
63For example, Francis Hutcheson, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and of course, Thomas Hobbes, et al.
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American experiment with substantive normative background 
principles.64 For example, Thomas Jefferson included Locke 
as among "the three greatest men that have lived, without 
any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those 
superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and 
Moral sciences..."65 Indeed, Jefferson's Declaration of 
Independence was criticized as being an emulation of Locke's 
treatise of civil government.66 Although Jefferson denied 
the charge, he did admit to attempting to incorporate 
Locke's views of epistemology and government with those of 
his own and of other political theorists.67 In an extract
64See, John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America 
in the eighteenth century," Political Obligation in its Historical 
Context (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press,
1980). Dunn recounts: "The Adamses and Jefferson, Dickinson and
Franklin, Otis and Madison, had come to read the Two Treatises with 
gradually consolidated political intentions and they come to it to 
gather moral support for these intentions," 75.
65The other two men Jefferson referred to were Francis Bacon 
and Isaac Newton, in a letter "To John Trumbull, Paris, Feb. 15, 
1789, on Bacon, Locke, and Newton," Writings, 940.
66Morton White relates how Richard Henry Lee, one of 
Jefferson's contemporaries, charged that Jefferson "copied from 
Locke's treatise on government," in The Philosophy of the American 
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 64.
67Writing about the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson 
stated: "Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, 
nor yet copied from any previous writing, it was intended to be an 
expression of the American mind. . . All its authority rests then 
on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in 
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary 
books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c." 
In a letter "To Henry Lee, Monticello, May 8, 1825, on the object 
of the declaration of independence," Writings, 1501.
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on a recommendation for instruction at the University of 
Virginia, moreover, Jefferson declared:
Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Board that 
as to the general principles of liberty and the rights 
of man, in nature and in society, the doctrines of 
Locke, in his "Essay concerning the true original 
extent and end of civil government," and of Sidney in 
his "Discourses on government," may be considered as 
those generally approved by our fellow citizens. . .68
One need only look at the similarities between Locke's 
treatise on government and the Declaration of Independence 
to understand how Richard Henry Lee came to the conclusion 
that the declaration was copied. As a "self-evident" prin­
ciple, as Jefferson asserts, or one otherwise based on 
reason, it is understood that "all men are created equal; 
that they are endowed by their creator with inherent and 
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, & 
the pursuit of happiness."69 This concurs almost identi­
cally with Locke's epistemology:
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to 
perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all 
the rights and privileges of the law of nature equally 
with any other man . . . hath by nature a power . . . 
to preserve his property —  that is his life, liberty, 
and estate. . . 70
While the terminology may be different, for example,
68"Report to the President and Directors of the Literary Fund," 
March 4, 1825, ibid., at 479.
69The original draft of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 
included the words that are underlined. Ibid., 19-24.
70Locke, The Second Treatise of Government. 56.
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between 'the pursuit of happiness' and 'estate', it is clear 
that the significance of human life, for both, is to possess 
the means through which man has and may further prolong his 
life and livelihood, and this no one may rightfully take 
from him. Those who violate this fundamental rule of soci­
ety, particularly if it is the government, warrant admonish­
ment, for "there remains still in the people a supreme power 
to remove or alter the legislature"71 exceeding its author­
ity, " . . .  and to institute a new Government . . .",72 
conducive to their natural rights.
When James Madison proposed his amendments to the 
Constitution to protect individual liberties and to alle­
viate fears of those who would support the Constitution with 
further guarantees of their civil rights against the federal 
government, he too followed a natural rights based philos­
ophy. In his speech to the House of Representatives of June 
8, 1789, Madison declared that first and foremost, an amend­
ment guaranteeing that "all power is originally vested in, 
and consequently derived from, the people," be prefixed to 
the Constitution. He argued,
That Government is instituted and ought to be exer­
cised for the benefit of the people; which consists in 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of 
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing
71For Locke, the legislature was the branch of government 
primarily responsible for enacting the laws necessary for the 
preservation of property and the peaceable coexistence of the 
people. Ibid.. 100.
72Quoted from Jefferson's Declaration of Independence.
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and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, 
and indefeasible right to reform or change their 
Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate 
to the purposes of its institution.73
Locke and the Founding Fathers believed in inherent
natural rights, evident to those who possess the reason by
which to discover the rules of the universe. A written
Constitution assumes that there is a system of fundamental
laws and principles that can prescribe the functions and
limitations of a government.74 Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, et al. believed, along with Locke, that individuals
must be fundamentally free to worship and believe. Thus,
the First Amendment to the Constitution was established,
securing a separation between church and state, freedom of
religion, speech, press, and assembly. The Framers reasoned
that an individual's property was inviolable and enacted the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.75
Most importantly, through generations of observation and
73Marvin Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the 
Political Thought of James Madison (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1973), 215.
74This was the argument of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson and countless statesmen and philosophers urging 
limited government including Locke, Montesquieu, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, et al.
75James Madison introduced a bill of rights to the Constitution 
to appease the states who feared that the federal government would 
assume the powers of a monarchy. Of the twelve amendments that 
were proposed by Madison, ten were ratified by the states which 
went into effect in 1791. These amendments, thus, were enacted to 
protect individual rights from usurpations of power only by the 
federal government.
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experience, they realized that power corrupts and needs to 
be limited. Thus, the Framers created a system where the 
people are an everpresent reminder that statesmen are dis­
pensable, and split up governmental power, with a built in 
checks and balances, to insure against the natural progres­
sion towards tyranny.76
The principle of a right to privacy shares similar 
characteristics with the principles of liberty and freedom. 
First, it is a means to individual happiness since it allows 
one to choose and act upon situations in his life. Second, 
it encourages private property by setting proper boundaries 
between 'yours' and 'mine'. Third, it fosters the general 
well-being of the community by providing the space which 
individuals require to reflect upon daily life. Like lib­
erty and freedom, the qualities of privacy cannot be cap­
tured in one contained definition. Nevertheless, the
76Thus, the Constitution created three branches of government. 
"Article 1" provides for a Legislature to be split into two houses: 
the House of Representatives provides representation by population, 
representatives are elected by the people every two years, and they 
control appropriations; the Senate accomodates equal representation 
among the states, senators are elected by the people (courtesy of 
the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution) every six years, and 
they control revenue. Both houses must concurrently pass laws. 
"Article 2" provides for a separate Executive, the President, 
elected by the people every four years, and is responsible for 
executing the laws enacted by the Legislative branch. He may check 
the congress through his power of the veto (which the congress may 
override). "Article 3" created the Judiciary, the mediating branch 
of government, which is responsible for interpreting the laws of 
the congress, and thereby safeguarding the Law of the Land. They 
serve for terms of good behavior, are appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. Hence, are just few of the examples 
of the self-imposed limitations of the United States government as 
established by the Constitution.
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Supreme Court has tried to fit privacy rights into a coher­
ent Constitutional context. Chapter Two will recount the 
history of the Constitutional justification for a right to 
privacy in the United States.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom.
Justice William 0. Douglas 
The right to privacy as a legal concept arose out of 
the common law's commitment to individual property rights. 
Prior to 1890, before Warren and Brandeis wrote their semi­
nal article, "The Right to Privacy,111 a viable legal ra­
tionale for the right to privacy was virtually nonexistent.
Legal precedents for the right to privacy did not begin to
appear until the Twentieth Century; before this, protection 
of privacy was mentioned as a matter of political and judi­
cial philosophy and authoritative pronouncements.2 Warren 
and Brandeis were, however, able to extract existing Eng­
lish and American tort law, classified under property, con­
tract, or implied trust, and to compose a new tort infringe-
^amuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to 
Privacy," Harvard Law Review IV (15 December 1890): 193-220.
20'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, above, 5. See, 
generally, Edward Shils, "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicis­
situdes," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (1966): 281-306. Shils 
traces the social and political evolution of privacy in the United 
States from the end of the nineteenth century. See, specifically, 
William M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law," ibid., 
253-271.
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ment, that is, the violation of the right to privacy —  the 
right to be let alone.3
Reportedly, Warren and Brandeis wrote their article out 
of sheer frustration with the intrusive journalistic tactics 
of their day. A prominent Boston family, the social ac­
tivities of the Warren household were frequently depicted by 
the press. Freedom of the press being a fundamental Ameri­
can value, Warren and Brandeis had to show why the right to 
be let alone was as legally valuable, and as philosophically 
indispensable, as the First Amendment guarantee. Hence, 
they cited case law which had established that one's image, 
thoughts, actions and possessions belonged exclusively to 
the possessor to disclose or not to disclose.
For example, in Prince Albert v. Strange.4 the private 
etchings of public figures Queen Victoria and Prince Albert 
were acquired by defendant Strange who attempted to obtain a 
profit from the plaintiff's artwork. Both the public figure 
issue and the property issue (copyrights) came before the 
equity court. Concerning the first matter the Vice Chancel­
lor Knight Bruce stated:
[t]he author of manuscripts, whether he is famous or 
obscure, low or high, has a right to say of them, if 
innocent, that whether interesting or dull, light or 
heavy, saleable or unsaleable, they shall not, without
3Judge Thomas Cooley was the first to introduce the legal 
concept of privacy, as well as the phrase the "right to be let 
alone," in Torts 2d. ed. (1888), at 91.
‘Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 694, cited in
Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 202-205.
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his consent, be published.5
The property issue was also decided in favor of the
plaintiff. Copyright statutes protect all of the author's
profit arising from publication. Common-law protects the
author against the appropriation of his work for publication
against his will. Thus, the Vice Chancellor asserted that
[u]pon the principle . . .  of protecting property, it 
is the common law, in cases not aided or prejudiced by 
statute, shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought 
and sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the 
author to remain not generally known.6
The inviolability of private property was applied to 
intangible possessions of thoughts, sentiments, and emo­
tions. The Strange case also protected the right of the 
author against vivid published descriptions of his artwork. 
The Vice Chancellor ruled that a detailed account of an 
artist's work had the same effect as appropriation or repro­
duction, and violated the artist's right to property both in 
terms of tangible profit, and in his right to privacy.7
Two other cases cited by Warren and Brandeis establish-
5Ibid., note 6, at 199.
6Ibid.. note 3, at 200.
7"A copy or impression of the etchings would only be a means 
of communicating knowledge and information of the original, and 
does not a list and description of the same? The means are 
different, but the object and effect are similar; for in both, the 
object and effect is to make known to the public more or less of 
the unpublished work and composition of the author, which he is 
entitled to keep wholly for his private use and pleasure, and to 
withhold altogether, or so far as he may please, from the knowledge 
of others." Lord Cottenham in Prince Albert v. Strange. 1 McN. & 
G. 23, 43 (1849), quoted in Warren and Brandeis, note 1, 202.
ed that breach of contract or confidence was likewise a 
violation of private property. Yovatt v. Winvard8 and 
Abernathy v. Hutchinson9 are two early nineteenth century 
cases where the court found for the plaintiffs' right to 
property in their ideas and compositions. Neither case 
involved a public personage whereby the defendant could 
claim a compelling social interest defense. In Yovatt. the 
court found that Yovatt's medical formula, the recipe of 
which had been obtained by a former employee and later 
competitor, was protected under Yovatt's right to property 
in compositions or ideas. An additional legal precedent had 
been established by the court in regard to breach of trust 
or confidence between employer and employee —  a contractual 
obligation not to be violated by the indiscretion of the 
latter. In Abernathy, it was held that an instructor's 
medical lectures remained his property despite an eager 
student's attempt to copy down and publish them.
Tuck v. Priester10 and Pollard v. Photographic Co.11
BYovatt v. Winvard. 1 J. & W. 394 (1820) , cited in Warren and 
Brandeis, at 212.
9Abernathv v. Hutchinson. 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825), cited in
Warren and Brandeis, at 207.
10Tuck v. Priester. 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887), cited in Warren and 
Brandeis, at 208. Plaintiff's property, a picture, was reproduced 
by the defendant with the instructions to make only a specified 
number of copies. The defendant exceeded the allowed quota and
sold them for a lesser price than the plaintiffs. The Lord 
Justices unanimously ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to an 
injunction, and damages for breach of contract.
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are private property cases in which decisions protecting an 
individual's name or likeness were rendered by the court.
The basis for these claims actually relied on maintenance of 
trusts and contracts, but they did serve as precedents in 
forging a new perspective on the right to privacy. Shortly 
after Warren and Brandeis published their article, two 
noteworthy cases involving the appropriation of an indi­
vidual's name or likeness were decided which focused on the 
right to privacy by means of property rights.12
Warren and Brandeis argue that not only are property 
rights infringed upon in cases where one's thoughts, ac­
tions, and likeness are being unwillingly exposed, but more 
importantly, the inviolate personality. The individual has 
an inherent right not to have to suffer humiliation, fear, 
or the loss of property, both tangible and intangible, at
nPollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div 345 (1888) , ibid.
A woman's photograph was enjoined from being sold commercially by 
the photographer who took the photograph. The court ruled that 
this was a breach of contract since the plaintiff did not permit 
nor anticipate that her photograph, taken under ordinary cir­
cumstances, would become the object of a commercial venture.
12Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 
442 (1902). The picture of a particularly pulchritudinous woman was 
taken of her without her consent, and was later distributed on a 
circular by the milling company with her picture under the 
advertisement. While the New York Court of Appeals rejected the 
privacy claim (for lacking a common-law history), the state 
legislature passed an act prohibiting appropriation of name or 
likeness, for commercial purposes, without consent. In Pavesich v. 
New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), the 
Georgia Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiff whose picture 
was used in an ad without his consent, on the basis of violating 
one's right to privacy. Thus, this was the first court to 
recognize the right to privacy.
51
the mercy of unscrupulous swindlers. Thus, the counselors'
legal opinion is also a moral conclusion as they attest
that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact 
nature, are not rights arising from contract or from 
special trust, but are rights against the world. . . 
the principle which protects personal writings and any 
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, 
is the right to privacy, and the law has no new prin­
ciple to formulate when it extends this protection to 
the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal 
relation, domestic or otherwise.13
Warren and Brandeis claim that any and all uninvited 
and unwanted intrusions on one's person should have a legal 
remedy covered under one tort —  the protection of the right 
to privacy. However, William Prosser contends that this 
very abstract appeal is the very reason that the legal right 
to privacy is likened to "that of a haystack in a hurri­
cane."14 In an analytical attempt to clarify the right to 
privacy, Prosser maintains that rather than just one tort, 
there are four distinct torts dealing with violations of 
personal privacy.
The four privacy interests that Prosser distinguishes
13Warren and Brandeis, 213. The 'judicial contructionist' 
debate over the right to privacy was alive at its conception. 
Warren and Brandeis insisted that "[t]he application of an existing 
principle to a new state of facts is not judicial legislation. To 
call it such is to assert that the existing body of law consists 
practically of the statutes and decided cases, and to deny that the 
principles (of which these cases are ordinarily said to be 
evidence) exist at all. It is not the application of an existing 
principle to new cases, but the introduction of" a new principle, 
which is properly termed judicial legislation." Ibid., note 1.
14Prosser quoting Judge Bigg describing privacy in Ettore v. 
Philco Television Broadcasting Co.. 229 F. 2nd 481 (3rd Circuit 
Court, 1956), in "Privacy [A legal analysis]," Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy, above, 117.
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are:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli­
tude, or into his private affairs. Intrusions of this sort 
must be shown to have caused mental distress. Included are 
trespass,15 eavesdropping or wiretapping,16 and nui­
sance17. In all circumstances, the intrusion must be upon 
something that is private in nature.
2. Public disclosure of private facts. The disclosure 
must be made public, and not mere gossip among a small group 
of individuals. Moreover, the facts disclosed must be 
offensive and injurious to the ordinary person of reasonable 
sensibilities.18
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eve. Violations of this kind include 
publicity attributing to the plaintiff an opinion or ut-
15For example, DeMav v. Roberts. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146
(1881). The defendant intruded upon the plaintiff during child­
birth. The court granted recovery to the plaintiff, but did not 
specify the ground (which was either trespass or battery).
16The gravamen in this circumstance is the "intentional 
infliction of mental distress." Prosser, 108.
17For an intrusion to qualify as a nuisance, the offense must 
be overt, and not just minor disturbance in a quiet place. The 
nuisance must be "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man." 
Ibid.
18The commanding case here is Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App. 
285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931). The plaintiff, at one time a prostitute 
and a defendant in a popular murder trial, attained a life of 
respectable obscurity. Years later, her original name and her 
story would be used in a motion picture. The court held in favor 
of the plaintiff based on the violation of her right to privacy.
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terance not made,19 or use of the plaintiff's picture in an 
article, book, etc., with which he has no consensual connec­
tion.20 The false light need not be a defamatory one, but 
it must be objectionable to a man of ordinary sensibilities. 
The interest protected is reputation, and the rewards are 
based on degrees of mental distress.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of 
the plaintiff's name or likeness. The appropriation must 
actually identify the plaintiff (as opposed, for example, to 
the use of a mere name like John Smith), and it must be 
shown that the defendant profited from the appropriation 
(usually a pecuniary advantage). The interest protected is 
a proprietary one (i.e., the exclusive use of one's name or 
likeness), and not one based on mental distress.
Prosser's legal analysis was hailed by many who thought 
the right to privacy was a vague and subjective legal con­
cept. Warren and Brandeis' conception of privacy as a legal 
entity in itself was virtually analyzed out of judicial 
existence by Prosser. Edward Bloustein, however, waged a 
sharp rebuttal on Ptosser's narrow legal and philosophical
19For example, in Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. 
Rep. 851 (1816), the plaintiff succeeded in enjoining the circula­
tion of a poem, which he thought was inferior, from being at­
tributed as his work.
20For example, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. See 
text at note 12 above.
insight.21 Bloustein's attack focused on Prosser's inabil­
ity or unwillingness to accept the general principle of 
privacy upon which Warren and Brandeis relied, but were 
unable to state in concrete legal terms during the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. The principle, as Bloustein 
understands it, is that individuals are legally protected 
against intrusions which are "affronts to personal dignity." 
Freedom, in the traditional sense of Western culture, means 
personal control over the external circumstances affecting 
daily life. Bloustein's intention, as he himself states, is 
"to propose a general theory of individual privacy which 
will reconcile the divergent strands of legal development - 
which will put the straws back into the haystack."22 His 
refutation retraces Prosser's categorization of the four 
distinct torts and attempts to demonstrate how the general 
theory of privacy underlies each of Prosser's claims.
1. The intrusion cases. Prosser maintains that, as in 
the case of DeMav v. Roberts.23 the gravamen of the wrong 
was the infliction of mental distress. Bloustein argues 
that whether or not mental distress was inflicted, the 
intrusion constituted the debasement of individuality. The 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was created to protect
21Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity:
An answer to Dean Prosser," Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy.
156-202.
22Ibid., 156.
23The childbirth case. See text at note 15 above.
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individual liberties, asserts Bloustein, without which 
individual dignity would be unmercifully crushed under the 
weight of intrusive government surveillance and/or public 
opinion.24
2. The public disclosure cases. Prosser contends 
that, if private facts, which are offensive to the reason­
able man of ordinary sensibilities, are publicly exposed, 
the interest which has been violated is that of reputation. 
Bloustein, on the other hand, argues that, as was the case 
in Melvin v. Reid,25 to disclose facts of an individual's 
past life is an affront to the inviolate personality. To 
open up the private life to public scrutiny is to blatantly 
disregard the limits of human decency, says Bloustein, and 
violates the individual's expectation of privacy.26 Defa-
24The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures emanates supplementary individual privacy 
protections. See, for example, Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); United
States v. Lefkowitz. 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 
225 U.S. 298 (1921); Bovd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); 
see also, Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 
438 (1928) : "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred as
against the government, the right to be let alone —  the most 
comprehensive of all rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men." Bloustein states, "these cases represent . . .  a recognition 
that unreasonable intrusion is a wrong because it involves a 
violation of constitutionally protected liberty of the person." 
Bloustein, 165.
25See text at note 18 above.
26See, for example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) . The Court ruled that the petitioner, Katz, had a reason­
able expectation of privacy, even though he was placing a call in 
a see-through glass public telephone booth. First, the Court said, 
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id., at 361. 
Secondly, a person using a public telephone booth "is surely
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mation involves injury to reputation,and, as Warren and 
Brandeis confirm, the laws of slander and libel offer suffi­
cient protection in the spreading of falsehoods.27 The 
right to privacy, however, "implies the right not merely to 
prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to prevent 
its being depicted at all."28
3. The use of name or likeness. According to Prosser, 
when a plaintiff's name or likeness is appropriated for the 
defendant's advantage, the interest violated is a proprie­
tary one. Again, Bloustein proclaims that this is an af­
front to human dignity for the same reasons the Georgia 
Supreme Court held in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co. :
The knowledge that one's features and form are being 
used for such a purpose and displayed in such places as 
advertisements are often liable to be found brings not 
only the person of an extremely sensitive nature, but 
even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a 
realization that his liberty has been taken away from 
him, and so long as the advertiser uses him for these 
purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the 
fact that he is, for the time being, under the control 
of another, and that he is no longer free, and that he 
is in reality a slave without hope of freedom, held to 
service by a merciless master; and if a man of true
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world," id., at 352. See also, 
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505 (1961): "was not the wrong . . . done when the
intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed? The 
depth of the penetration of the electronic devise —  even the 
degree of remoteness from the inside of the house —  is not the 
measure of the injury." id., at 513.
27Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 197-198.
28Ibid., 218.
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instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one 
can be more conscious of his complete enthrallment than 
he is.29
4. The false light cases. Bloustein agrees with 
Prosser that by falsely attributing to the plaintiff an 
opinion or utterance, one's reputation is thereby violated, 
but adds that the "[s]lur on reputation is an aspect of the 
violation of individual integrity."30 To attribute to an 
individual a false endorsement or derogatory characteriza­
tion, not only violates his freedom of choice, but also 
casts him in an unfair light in the eyes of his peers the 
society at large. Not only is his reputation at stake, but 
subsequently his right as an individual to present himself 
to the world as he feels is proper has been infringed.
The inviolate personality is not a tabula rasa lying in 
wait for unsympathetic publishers, et al. to indiscrimin­
ately impose their impressions. As Warren and Brandeis and 
Bloustein attempted to convey, the right to privacy is a 
fundamental human necessity. The right to privacy facili­
tates the concomitant ideals of liberty and freedom which 
are the inheritance of a rich history of western political
29Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. See text at note 
12 above.
30Bloustein, 179. See, for example, Gill v. Curtis 
Publishing Company. 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952). A
photograph of a couple shown hugging in a public place was randomly 
taken. In a published article, their picture was displayed, 
without consent, with a caption under the photo reading that this 
was the "wrong kind of love." The court ruled that the use of a 
photograph, taken in a public place, is not an offense in itself 
unless a false or derogatory comment is attributed to it.
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theory.
Fourth Amendment Privacy Protection
Acknowledging the potential intrusiveness of the ways
of authority, the Framers, at the outset, restricted the
prerogative of government to exceed its boundaries:
AMENDMENT IV: The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio­
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic­
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.31
The security of all Americans, according to the Fourth 
Amendment, lies in their fundamental immunity from the whims 
of their government and the frequent temerity of those in 
positions of power. Personal privacy probably gains the 
range of its protection from the appreciation private prop­
erty has been afforded throughout history, and in particu­
lar, from the modern political philosophy of men such as 
John Locke. The sanctity of the home has long been recog­
nized as more commanding than kings, as was expressed by 
William Pitt, the Elder:32
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all
the force of the Crown. It may be frail —  its roof
may shake —  the wind may blow through it —  the storm
may enter —  the rain may enter —  but the King of
England cannot enter —  all his force dares not cross
31The United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment to the Bill 
of Rights.
32William Pitt (1708-1778) was the first Earl of Chatham, in 
Great Britain.
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the threshold of the ruined tenement.33 
Although the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was 
adopted in 1791, the Supreme Court did not link privacy and 
the amendment until 188 6 in Bovd v. United States.311 In 
this case, the first liberal reading of the Fourth Amendment 
was given. The Court held as unconstitutional a statute 
allowing the government to mandate the accused to produce 
shipping invoices of allegedly illegally imported goods. 
Justice Joseph Bradley argued that such a statute violated 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy rights of the peti­
tioner; such rights are fundamental and should not be de­
prived of their effects.
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property should be liberally construed. A close 
and literal construction deprives them of half of their 
efficacy, and leads to gradual deprecation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in sub- 
• stance.35
As a result of Justice Bradley's ruling, the police 
could only confiscate the actual contraband of a crime, 
whereas before they could seize an individual's papers as 
mere evidence of a crime. The Bovd ruling assisted the
33Frank v. Maryland. 359 U.S. 360, 378-379 (1959). Quoting
Pitt's Speech on the Excise Bill.
3llBovd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). There was an
1877 case, Ex Parte Jackson. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), which held
that Congress could not authorize the postal service to invade the
privacy of mail. However, the first discussion of the relationship 
took place in Bovd. See, O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 
41.
35Bovd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
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concept of individual privacy as a right, backed by con­
stitutional amendments, outweighing police procedure.
However, in Olmstead v. United States.36 a majority of 
the Supreme Court held in favor of the government in a 
Fourth Amendment challenge. Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft ruled that the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause ap­
plied only to physical trespass and not to evidence obtained 
through the use of a device (a wiretap) which traces com­
munication conveyed to "telephone wires, reaching to the 
whole world from the defendant's home or office." Ignoring 
Justice Bradley's advice in Bovd, the Court gave an unduly 
literal reading to the Fourth Amendment, and held that the 
evidence was admissable.37 Thus, Justice Brandeis was com­
pelled to write one of the most famous dissents in Supreme 
Court history.
Remaining true to his article, "The Right to Privacy," 
Brandeis declared his fealty to the inviolate personality.
He reminded the Court of the Framers' intention when draft­
ing the Constitution, that is, to enhance the freedom and
3601mstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The peti­
tioner was convicted of importing and selling liquor in violation 
of the National Prohibition Act. The incriminating evidence was 
seized as a result of a wiretap placed in the defendants' homes and 
offices. A U.S. Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument 
that the evidence was a result of an illegal search and seizure. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
37In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme 
Court established the exclusionary rule, which dismisses illegally 
obtained evidence from a criminal trial.
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happiness of individuals by limiting the power of govern­
ment, even though the government is operating under the 
auspices of law and order.
Experience should teach us to be on our guard to pro­
tect liberty when the government's purposes are benefi­
cent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel 
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroach­
ment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under­
standing.38
Brandeis feared that the advances in technology were 
becoming an ever-present threat to the individual's 'right 
to be let alone.' He contended that the Court was contra­
dicting the precedent laid down in Ex Parte Jackson.39 
which proscribed authorities from tampering with mail cor­
respondence, by condoning the intrusion of telephone conver­
sations. In fact, explained Brandeis,
[t]he evil incident to invasion of the telephone is far 
greater than that involved in tampering with the mails. 
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the 
persons at both ends of the line is invaded.40
The psychological oppression which results from the legit­
imacy of this sort of governmental action is simply not what 
the makers of the Constitution had in mind:
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They 
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis­
factions of life are to be found in material things. 
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
3801mstead v. United States. 277 U.S. at 479.
39See text at note 34 above.
4°01mstead v. United States. 277 U.S. at 475-476.
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They conferred, as against the government, the right to 
be let alone —  the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men.41
Brandeis' influence on the right to privacy, and the 
inviolate personality, was not recognized until several 
Fourth Amendment cases later.42 In Katz v. United 
States.43 the area under electronic surveillance was not a 
private home, hotel room, or office, but a public telephone 
booth. The evidence was obtained from the telephone booth, 
through a wiretap. The Government argued that since the 
evidence was obtained from an area generally considered 
'public', it was legally seized. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the evidence was inadmissible based on a new conception 
of exactly what it is that the Fourth Amendment protects. 
According to Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the major­
ity,
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend­
ment protection. . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as
41Id. at 478.
42See, Goldman v. United States. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Incrimi­
nating evidence, obtained by government agents placing a sensitive 
microphone against the wall of an adjoining office, was upheld by 
the Court as legally obtained under the language of the Fourth 
Amendment. In light of the Olmstead decision, it was clear that 
the Court was allowing all evidence seized, short of an actual 
physical trespass. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 
(1961), the Court held evidence, obtained by installing a spike 
microphone through the wall of the adjoining house, inadmissible 
based on the trespass ground. In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Douglas demonstrated allegiance to the Brandeis conception of the 
right to be let alone. See text at note 2 6 above.
43Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
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private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.44
The Katz decision introduced a measuring stick for 
deciding whether or not an individual's "reasonable expecta­
tion of privacy" has been violated under the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Thus, it overturned the physical trespass 
requirement in Olmstead and Goldman, thereby expanding the 
concept of privacy. However, Justice Stewart's analysis of 
privacy has opened up a plethora of legal questions. For 
example, what are the circumstances under which the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and their privacy? How can it be 
shown that an individual "justifiably relied" upon his 
sphere of privacy? —  When the individual relied upon keep­
ing incriminating evidence private?45 Furthermore, if ex­
pectations of privacy are inordinately subjective then can a 
legal framework be fashioned around the Katz ruling? Sub­
jective interpretation of expectations of privacy could 
engender an abyss of determinations from individual, to 
police and to the courts.
Justice Stewart has been criticized on many counts that 
his reading of the Fourth Amendment has been too liberal. 
Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurrence attempted to 
clarify what the Court meant by "reasonable expectations of
44Id. at 351-352.
45See O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 57-63. See, 
in particular, Note, "From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A 
Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection," New York 
University Law Review 43 (1968): 968, 976-77.
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privacy" as a twofold requirement: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is expected
to recognize as 'reasonable.'"46 But, if an individual's
expectation of privacy is also in reference to his basic
social situation, the protection of the Fourth Amendment is
a relative concept, and therefore weakened, when interpreted
according to the Katz rule. As Anthony Amsterdam discerned:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously 
has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a 
theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can 
neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an 
individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If 
it could, the government could diminish each person's 
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing 
half hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced 
by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed 
under comprehensive electronic surveillance.47
The Katz ruling attempted to secure the inviolate
personality, or the right to be let alone, when the Court
announced that the Fourth Amendment protects persons. Like
Justice Brandeis, Justice Stewart wanted to encase the
individual in a personal sanctuary which intruders could not
penetrate without invitation or, at least, probable cause.
However, the legal principle proved to be too abstract in
actual practice and subsequent court cases relied primarily
upon a strict application of the Fourth Amendment to privacy
46Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. at 361.
47Anthony Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment," 
Minnesota Law Review 58 (1974): 349, 384. See also, O'Brien,
Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. 60-61.
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claims.48
The constitutional principle for a right to privacy has 
relied not only on the Fourth Amendment's protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but also on the 
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
Many pro-privacy advocates have argued that the inclusion of 
these constitutional provisions forcefully indicates that 
the Founding Fathers wanted the individual to maintain a 
sense of autonomy from government intrusion into the per­
sonal lives of its citizens.49 Although, concurrently, the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments would seem to signify the right 
to privacy in principle, the government has been able to 
elude the full effect of these Amendments when taken sep­
arately. The next section demonstrates how the protection 
against self-incrimination has been interpreted to overlook
48See, for example, United States v. White. 401 U.S. 745
(1971). Incriminating evidence, obtained by a radio transmitter 
placed on an informant, and overheard by government agents who had 
to testify in lieu of the absent informant, was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. Justice Byron White pronounced: "Our problem, in 
terms of the principles announced in Katz. is what expectations of 
privacy are constitutionally ' justifiable' —  what expectations the 
Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant. So far, 
the law permits the frustration of actual expectations of privacy 
by permitting authorities to use the testimony of those associates 
who for one reason or another have determined to turn to the 
police, as well as by authorizing the use of informants. . ." Id.
at 752. Accurate and probative evidence, espoused Justice White,
should not be ignored because of substantive constitutional
barriers.
49See Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which he explained how several 
of the protections in the Bill of Rights create a zone of privacy, 
discussed below.
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the privacy premise inherent in its goal.
Fifth Amendment Privacy Protection 
The Fifth Amendment enumerates five procedural guaran­
tees; the third guarantee protects the criminally accused 
from incriminating himself during any part of his detainment 
by the government (from arrest and examination to indictment 
and trial).50 Protection from self-incrimination, or nemo 
tenetur seipsum prodere (no one is bound to accuse himself), 
precedes English common-law,51 and is considered one of the 
truisms of the law of nature. For example, in the early 
eighteenth century, Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert wrote, 
in his Law of Evidence, that, while the best evidence of 
guilt is a confession,
this Confession must be voluntary and without Compul­
sion; for our Law in this differs from the Civil Law,
• that it will not force any Man to accuse himself; and 
in this we do certainly follow tht fsic) Law of Nature, 
which commands every Man to endeavour his own Preserva­
tion; and therefore Pain and Force may compel Men to 
confess what is not the truth of Facts, and consequent-
50,,No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of 
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." (Emphasis added) The United States Constitution. 
Fifth Amendment to the Bill of Rights.
51Leonard Levy has traced the right not to accuse oneself to 
ancient Jewish Talmudic Law, an encyclopedic compilation of laws 
based on the five books of Moses. See, Levy, Origins of the Fifth 
Amendment (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 433-441.
67
ly such extorted Confessions are not to be depended 
on.52
The right not to give evidence against oneself is 
upheld as one of the primary constitutional guarantees of 
the right to privacy; that is to say, it offers an indivi­
dual the prerogative to withhold information about himself, 
whether incriminating or not, from the government. However, 
the manner in which the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted 
renders its privacy protection as superficial speculation.
In 1896, the Supreme Court ruled that grants of immunity 
offset one's right not to testify about oneself in a court 
of law, since the sole purpose of the amendment is to "se­
cure the witness against criminal prosecution."53 The 
Court's interpretation narrowly construed the Fifth Amend­
ment's protection to merely self-incrimination; that is to 
say, if there is no possibility of a legal prosecution, 
regardless of whether information one is being compelled to 
testify may jeopardize life, liberty, or property outside 
the courtroom, the individual must relinquish his Fifth
52Levy, quoting Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, at 327.
53Brown v. Walker. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Grants of immunity
were first upheld under the Federal Constitution, reasoning that 
the Fifth Amendment could not be "construed literally as authoriz­
ing the witness to refuse to disclose any fact which might tend to 
incriminate, disgrace, or expose to unfavorable comment." .Id. at 
596. See also, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52
(1964), which reaffirmed Brown's immunity decision, but held that 
immunity must provide protection against both state and federal 
prosecution. By 1956, the Court was declaring that grants of
immunity "[have] become part of our constitutional fabric," in
Ullman v. United States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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Amendment privilege. Indeed, a refusal to testify, after
being granted immunity from prosecution, may result in a
contempt of court conviction. Thus, the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against self-accusation, immunity, and privacy do
not legally mix. According to Robert McKay:
Even though protection against certain harmful conse­
quences is assured through a sufficient grant of im­
munity, the privacy interest is relinquished upon 
disclosure compelled in return for a grant of immunity. 
Moreover, there is no way to protect against the re­
lated damage to reputation. It is not easy to square 
the privacy interest (which arguably is) a prime pur­
pose of the privilege with immunity statutes that 
require surrender of privacy.54
To further weaken the privacy of individuals faced with 
bearing information against themselves, the Supreme Court 
upheld a policy distinction which maintains that the Fifth 
Amendment protects testimonial evidence, but not physical 
evidence. For example, in Schmerber v. California.55 a 
policeman ordered a physician to take a sample of blood from 
the accused, over Mr. Schmerber's objections, in order to 
secure evidence needed to secure a conviction of driving 
while intoxicated. Like Breithaupt v. Abram.56 but unlike
540'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, quoting Robert 
McKay, at 99. See also, Robert McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the 
New Privacy," in Supreme Court Reporter, ed. Phillip Kurland 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), 209, 230.
55Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Blood obtained
from an unconscious party in a fatal auto accident used to convict 
the defendant was upheld by the Supreme Court since the means to 
extract the blood was reasonable, that is, "under the protective 
eye of the physician."
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Rochin v. California,57 Justice William Brennan asserted 
that the privilege against self-incrimination, as binding on 
the states,
protects the accused only from being compelled to 
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State 
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, 
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analy­
sis in question did not involve compulsion to these 
ends.58
The dissenting Justices (Black, Fortas, Douglas, and 
Chief Justice Warren) objected on the grounds that compelled 
blood samples violate the individual's right to privacy, 
based on Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connec­
ticut .59 In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas contended: 
"No clearer invasion of the right to privacy can be imagined 
than forcible bloodletting of the kind involved here."60
While the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the 
principle of the Fifth Amendment, Leonard Levy argues that 
American law is ignoring the history of the amendment.
57Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the accused
swallowed pills, which the police officers saw near his person, to 
be rid of the evidence. Officers immediately took the accused to 
a hospital where they ordered a physician to pump his stomach. The 
Supreme Court rejected evidence being obtained this way, since 
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience."
58Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. at 761. Similar analysis 
was also rendered in United States v. Dionisio. 410 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(voice samples); United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(compelled police lineups); and, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 
263 (1967) (handwriting samples).
59The right to privacy is based upon emanations of certain 
rights in the Bill of Rights, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), discussed below.
60Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. at 779.
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The right not to be a witness against oneself imports a 
principle of wider reach, applicable, at least in 
criminal cases, to the self-production of any adverse 
evidence, including evidence that made one the herald 
of his own infamy, thereby publicly disgracing him.
The clause extended, in other words, to all the in­
jurious as well as incriminating consequences of dis­
closure by witness or party. But this inference drawn 
from the wording of the clause enjoys the support of no 
proof based on American experience, as distinguished 
from English, before the nineteenth century. Clearly 
. . . to speak merely of a right against self-incrim­
ination stunts the wider right not to give evidence 
against oneself.61
Privacy and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment
The due process clause was established to secure citi­
zens from arbitrary deprivation, by government, of life, 
liberty, and property. Due process established the prin­
ciple, in the Fifth Amendment,62 and reestablished in the 
Fourteenth Amendment,63 that both the federal and state 
governments have limited and express powers. There are two 
kinds of due process. Procedural due process, as defined by 
Daniel Webster, is procedure "which hears before it con­
61Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. 427.
62The fourth provision of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution commands: "No person shall...be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Applies 
only to violations of procedure by the federal government.
“ Section 1 of the Fourteenth of the United States Constitution 
protects "[a]11 persons born or naturalized of the United States," 
including citizens of the several states, to due process of law; 
that is, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law."
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demns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial."6,5 To be sure, a defendant's rights 
have been violated when the legal treatment he received is 
considered "shocking to the sense of justice of the civi­
lized world."65; substantive due process is used by the 
Court to strike down arbitrary or unreasonable legislation 
and executive acts, or acts and legislation that improperly 
oversteps governmental authority. In privacy cases, the 
Court has exercised substantive due process.66
Traditionally, the Court has rendered legislation 
arbitrary or unreasonable when it is considered to infringe 
upon fundamental (natural law) values. Such values are not 
readily traceable to constitutional text or historical
“Quoted in Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American 
Political Dictionary. 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1979), 66.
“Justice Benjamin Cardozo set forth criteria for the Court to 
determine whether a state has violated rights protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Palko v. Connecticut. 
302 U.S. 319 (1937). In this case he ruled that the double
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Rights so protected are 
"essential to a fair and enlightened system of justice." An 
example of a violation of due process is Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86 (1923), It was ruled that defendants could not receive a fair 
trial because of mob influence over judge, jury, witnesses, and 
defense counsel, and was thus determined violative of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
66In particular, decisional privacy cases. That is, in 
circumstances where private individuals must resolve to do 
something fundamental in accordance to their own conscience and 
well-being. As compared to, privacy involving the withholding of 
information.
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example. In Mever v. Nebraska.67 the Supreme Court re­
versed a conviction of a teacher for teaching German; he 
violated a state law which prohibited the teaching of a 
foreign language to young children. The Court ruled that 
this statute unduly infringed upon the parents' or guard­
ians' right to oversee and cultivate the education of their 
own children. Justice James C. McReynolds laid the basis 
for a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of 
personal "liberty":
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from 
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual 
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es­
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.68
This decision advanced the impetus for granting per­
sonal liberty under court-sponsored substantive due process. 
Thus, the right to privacy was granted the germ of legal 
validity; personal rights that can be deemed to be "funda­
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"69 
are included in the guarantee of personal privacy.70 Among
67Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
68Id. at 399.
69Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See text at note
64 above.
70Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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these rights are activities relating to marriage,71 contra­
ception,72 procreation,73 family relationships,74 and 
child rearing and education.75 Consequently, the right for 
women to have an abortion was also deemed fundamental, based 
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
71Lovinq v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court invalidated 
a Virginia miscegenation statute on the basis of the Due process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief 
Justice Warren declared: "The freedom to marry has long been recog­
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men." JEd. at 12.
72Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972), struck down a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraception 
to unmarried individuals based on the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brennan, J.,: "If the 
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child." JEd. at 453.
73Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942), invalidated
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, mandating compul­
sory sterilization after a third conviction for a felony. A 
precursor for special protection of some "fundamental interest" 
under equal protection.
74Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court
upheld a statute making it a crime for a girl under eighteen years 
to sell any newspapers, periodicals, or merchandise in public 
places despite the fact that a child of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
faith believed that it was her religious duty to do so.
75Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in­
validated an Oregon law requiring children to attend public 
schools. Under the view of protected rights stated in Meyer, 
supra. Justice McReynolods held that the law interfered "with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control." .Id. at 534-535.
76Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. The Supreme Court invalidated a 
Texas statute making it a criminal offense to "procure an abortion" 
except "by medical advice for saving the life of the mother."
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The problem with substantive due process is the absence
of textual authorization. While an individual's right to
this or that may seem fundamental, reasonable, indeed even
compelling, many critics are not satisfied with a natural
rights justification. It looks too much like judicial
legislation; substantive due process gives a majority of
Supreme Court justices, unelected and unaccountable, the
right to make social policy. Justice Hugo Black denounced
such judicial policy making, stating,
[i]f these formulas based on "natural justice". . . are 
to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or 
is not constitutional on the basis of their own ap­
praisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The 
power to make such decisions is of course that of a 
legislative body.77
Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist, similarly main­
tain that if a statute or law seems fundamental, but is not 
supported by constitutional text, than the political process 
will, or at least should, rectify the inequity.78
Blackmun, J.,: "This right of privacy, whether founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
77Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 511-512.
78Justices White and Rehnquist's dissenting sentiments are the 
same both in Roe, supra, and in its companion case Doe v. Bolton. 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). "I find nothing in the language or history of 
the Constitution to support the Court's judgement. The Court simply 
fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant 
mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, 
invests that right with sufficient substance to override most 
existing state abortion statutes. . . In my view its judgement is
75
Moreover, notes John Hart Ely, substantive due process 
may be wrong when considered in light of vague constitution­
al affinities, such as in the Lochner era,79 but it is 
downright insidious the way it applied in Roe. A woman's 
sacred right to control the functions of her body looks 
constitutional and sounds constitutional, but, says Ely, it 
smells of something else.
The problem with Roe is not so much that it bungles the 
questions it sets itself, but rather that it sets 
itself a question a Constitution has not made the 
Court's business. It looks different from Lochner —  
it has the shape if not the substance of a judgment 
that is very much the Court's business, one vindicating 
an interest the Constitution marks as special —  and it 
is for that reason perhaps more dangerous.80
Justice Douglas wanted to avoid the accusation that a 
right to privacy had no constitutional foundation, by at­
tempting to build an airtight structure encompassing many of 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thomas Jefferson 
said, in writing on the Bill of Rights, "[a] brace the more 
will often keep up the building which would have fallen with
an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial 
review that the Constitution extends to this Court." .Id- at 221- 
222.
79The Lochner era refers to a catalyst of cases involving 
economic substantive due process. The Supreme Court invalidated a 
series of state statutes instituting police powers of various sorts 
(e.g., setting maximum working hours) only to be struck down by 
judicial decisions upholding the liberty of contract between 
employer and employee. See for example, Lochner v. New York. 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), Coppaqe v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v. 
United States. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
80John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe 
v . Wade," The Yale Law Journal 82 (1973): 943.
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that brace the less."81 For Douglas, the brace of certain 
enumerated rights is the foundation for the palace of liber­
ties .
Zones of Privacy 
Justice Douglas reasoned in Griswold v. Connecticut82 
that guarantees of personal privacy are emanations from 
specific constitutional protections enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights. Penumbras83 of privacy exist, it was held, by 
virtue of certain express guarantees. For example, nowhere 
in the First Amendment does it state "Congress shall make no 
laws abridging the freedom of association," yet in NAACP v . 
Alabama,84 the Court did recognize that the right to or­
ganize and to join an organization for the advancement of 
beliefs is a supplemental right to freedom of speech, of 
peaceable assembly and petition, and to the free exercise of 
religious beliefs. Hence, the First Amendment creates a 
"zone of privacy" under which people may interact, choose, 
or believe.
Likewise, the Third Amendment, which prohibits the
81Writing to James Madison, March 15, 1789, on the conveniences 
of a bill of rights, in Jefferson's Writings, above, 944.
82Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidated a 
state statute criminalizing the use of, or assistance or counseling 
for the use of contraceptives.
83Penumbra is defined as an "outlying, surrounding region; 
periphery; fringe." The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language. 1973 ed., s.v. "penumbra."
84NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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quartering of soldiers "in any house" during peacetime 
without the consent of the owner, creates another zone of 
privacy, which, along with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 
"to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures," allots citizens with a 
citadel of privacy protections.85 The Fifth Amendment's 
protection against self-incrimination is but another buffer 
between the citizen and the government's attempt to confis­
cate incriminating evidence against him, and thus, protects 
the privacy of his knowledge and thoughts. Finally, the 
Ninth Amendment was cited by Douglas as proof that rights 
not enumerated are not necessarily excluded, but are con­
stitutionally retained by the people if it could be shown 
that they are fundamental, or at least in the ambit of 
constitutional protections. Justice Douglas proposes, as 
did Justice Bradley in Boyd, that constitutional provisions 
should be given full effect, for a niggardly interpretation 
would undermine centuries of revered mores.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill 
of Rights —  older than our political parties, older 
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together 
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and in­
timate to the degree of being sacred. It is an as­
sociation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a 
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
85,lWould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" 
asks Justice Douglas, indicating the Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection. "The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold v. Connecticut. 
381 U.S. at 485-486.
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an association for as noble a purpose as any involved 
in our prior decisions.86
Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold roused justifica­
tion of a right to privacy per se. Thus, while Douglas 
asserted that he had constructed an unenumerated fundamental 
right out enumerated fundamental rights, that is, the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, the constitu­
tional penumbra was again attacked as judicial legislation. 
In his dissent in Griswold, Justice Black accused the Court 
of adjudicating upon its own personal views of higher jus­
tice and insisted
that no provision of the Constitution specifically 
gives such blanket power to courts to exercise such a 
supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of legis­
lative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws 
which they believe unwise or dangerous.87
Robert Bork, the controversial scholar of original
intent, declared that Justice Douglas "performed a miracle
86Id. at 486.
87.Id,. at 512 (Black, J., dissenting). However, see Robert 
Dixon's rebuttal, accusing Justice Black of inconsistency. Dixon 
argues that Black's insistence on the "clear meaning" of the 
constitutional text does not coincide with some of his other 
interpretations. "It may not be too clear to some students of 
constitutional law why, under Mr. Justice Black's 'clear meaning' 
analysis, obscenity, group libel, and associational privacy are 
constitutional absolutes along with simple free speech, while 
marital privacy, in the Griswold context of access to birth control 
information, is no part of the due-process liberty which the 
fourteenth amendment applies to the states." See, Dixon, "The 
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of 
Privacy?" Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 209-210.
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of transubstantiation,1,88 that is, he modified substantive 
due process into the language of legitimate constitutional 
text. Privacy is too selective a right to be constitution­
al. Contends Bork:
Griswold . . .  is an unprincipled decision. . . We are 
left with no idea of the sweep of the right to privacy 
and hence no notion of the cases to which it may or may 
not be applied in the future.89
Since privacy is essentially legally undefinable there will 
be the further judicial bias of picking and choosing which 
individuals or groups are constitutionally protected by the 
right to privacy, and thereby allowing judges to impose 
their own moral predilections.90
On the other hand, while Black, Bork, and others argue 
against the right to privacy exclusively on the basis of its 
omission from the Constitution, others suggest that the 
Framers' constitutional philosophy should be the major con­
sideration for judicial interpretation. The historical 
documents of the Framers indicate their concern for the 
freedom and rights of the people, for religious toleration, 
and juristic fairness. Depending upon one's interpretation,
88Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems," Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971): 1-35. Reprinted in John
H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modern Constitutional 
Theory: A Reader (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1989), 
40-47.
89Ibid. . 45.
90Robert Bork, "Judicial Review And Democracy," Encyclopedia 
of the American Constitution, vol. 3, ed. Leonard Levy, et al (New 
York: Macmillan, 1986), 1061-64.
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the Ninth Amendment is the constitutional proof that fun­
damental rights, such as that of privacy, are included in 
the constitutional scheme of ordered liberty.
The Ninth Amendment 
James Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights, feared 
that by including a declaration of certain rights, other 
equally fundamental rights would be repudiated.91 This 
misgiving inspired him to create Resolution #4, as it was so 
announced to the House of Representatives in 178 9:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitu­
tion, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be 
so construed as to diminish the just importance of 
other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge 
the powers delegated by the Constitution. . . 92
This provision was subsequently shortened and became
the Ninth Amendment to the Bill of Rights:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.
91See, for example, his letter to Thomas Jefferson of October 
17, 1788, in which Madison states: " . . .  there is great reason to 
fear that positive declaration of some of the most essential rights 
could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." In, The Mind of 
the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, ed. 
Marvin Myers (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), 
205-6. Alexander Hamilton expressed similar thoughts in "Essay 
#84," The Federalist Papers, above, that a bill of rights would be 
dangerous.
92Speech to the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789. Here 
he introduced all the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
adding the fourth resolution to allay the fears of the delegates 
over government license with other rights of the people not 
specified. Myers, ed., The Mind of the Founder. 217.
In Griswold, the Ninth Amendment was finally appealed 
to at length. Justice Douglas mentioned it as one of the 
enumerated rights within the penumbra. However, Justice 
Arthur Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, upholds the 
Ninth Amendment on its own merit. An infinite number of 
natural rights belong to the people, and the Framers knew 
that not all of them could be immediately recognized during 
the initial ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. Realization of fundamental rights, when challenged 
by the legislative or executive acts, is thus left to the 
interpretation of constitutional rights by the judiciary.93 
In determining how judges are to undertake this momentous, 
life-giving task, Goldberg asserts that judges must look to 
the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" 
and discern whether a principle is "so rooted [there]. . . 
as to be ranked as fundamental," and "is of such a character 
that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamen­
tal principles of liberty which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions.'"94 Invading the con­
fines of the marital bedroom, an institution supported by
93Thomas Jefferson, responding to Madison's letter of October 
17, 1788, wrote: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of
rights, you omit one which has great weight with me, the legal 
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a 
body, which if rendered independent and kept strictly to their own 
departments, merits great confidence for their learning and 
integrity." Jefferson, Writings, 943-44.
94Justice Goldberg, quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97 (1934). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 487
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
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the state, and then dictating the conditions by which mar­
ried couples may interact, is a contradiction and a viola­
tion of their fundamental rights.
Once again, the fundamental rights thesis for upholding 
a right relating to privacy was criticized by those con­
stitutional literalists (Justice Black), die-hard democrats 
(John Hart Ely), and original intent advocates (Robert Bork) 
as not based on the reality of constitutional law. The 
route to finding a constitutional basis for the right to 
privacy has been anything but easy (and to Black, Ely and 
Bork, legitimate). The following chapter will examine what 
the right to privacy protects, focusing on those issues 
which constitutional literalists abhor most —  that is, 
substantive rights to contraceptive and reproductive 
autonomy.
CHAPTER THREE
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
I am concerned here with privacy as a 
constitutional right, recognized as 
eligible for some protection against 
official acts waving the banner of "pub­
lic good."
Louis Henkin 
"Privacy and Autonomy"
Privacy protections established by the various provi­
sions in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
(canvassed in Chapter Two) are not as firmly rooted in the 
legal landscape as are, for example, the rights of free 
speech and press. Lacking clear constitutional text, rights 
recognized as fundamental endure at the mercy of judicial 
interpretation, for "whoever so shall giveth may also taketh 
away." Regardless of the amplitude at which some may argue 
that the right to privacy exists in political principle,1 
the judicial powers that be, at the final appeal, are the
:See, for example, Justice Douglas' majority opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 480 (1965). "We deal with a right 
of privacy older -than the Bill of Rights —  older than our politi­
cal parties, older than our school system . . . "  _Id. at 486. Louis 
Henkin argues that the Constitution, by its very political nature, 
and the time of its conception (i.e., the Enlightenment), would 
implicitly grant a right to privacy: "The Constitution does not 
confer private rights; they are antecedent to and independent of 
the Constitution." See, Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," Columbia 
Law Review 74 (1974): 1412.
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ultimate decisive factors.2 Chapter Three will endeavor to 
recount and review the Supreme Court's treatment of the most 
precarious area within the right to privacy; that is, rights 
to autonomy.3
Privacy and Reproductive Autonomy 
There is not a more profound and intimate human affair 
than the decision over whether, when, and how one's body 
will bring into existence another human life. Yet, state 
legislatures throughout American history have persistently 
attempted to regulate reproductive freedom based on their 
responsibility to oversee the health, safety, welfare, and 
morals of its citizenry. Thus, for one reason or another, 
laws determining an individual's reproductive destiny have 
been a legitimate exercise of a state's police power. 
However, because of the fundamentally intimate nature of 
reproductive freedom, disputes over whether the state had
2Cf. the liberal Warren Court, the Court which per se recog­
nized the right to privacy, with the conservative Rehnquist Court. 
Only three members of the present Court, (Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun) consistently recognize that a right to privacy constitu­
tionally exists. I will analyze the current Court in Chapter Four.
3Rights to autonomy include freedom to choose one's lifestyle, 
and to decide, without government interference, upon intimate 
matters concerning reproduction and sexuality. Henkin notes that
". . . the Court has been vindicating not a right to freedom from 
official intrusion [such as that in search and seizure cases], but 
to freedom from official regulation [e.g., freedom from contracep­
tion or abortion laws]." Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," 1424- 
1425. Since the abortion decision is one that must be made with a 
third-party, that is, a physician and possibly a hospital staff, 
albeit confidentially, it has become more accurate to say that the 
right to choose and procure an abortion is a right to autonomy 
rather than a right to privacy.
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exceeded its bounds eventually made their way to the Supreme 
Court.
In 1927, in the case of Buck v. Bell.4 the Court
upheld the state's power to sterilize an individual against
her objection to prevent the procreation of, in Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' terminology, "imbeciles."5 Thus, so
long as the sterilization programs were conducted with
adequate procedural safeguards, the so-called mentally
deficient were harshly deprived of procreative rights on the
rationale that
[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting 
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or let them 
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.6
The decision rendered in Buck incited criticism as
being fundamentally immoral, if not 'anti-constitutional'.
It was not until 1942 that the highest court in the land
recognized reproductive rights in Skinner v. Oklahoma.7
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, struck down a
“Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
sThe degree of feeble-mindedness which designated both Carrie 
Buck and, later, her sister Doris for involuntary sterilization, 
would not be "considered mentally deficient by today's standards." 
See, S. J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton paperback ed.
1981), 336, referred to in Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 2nd ed. (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988),
note 15, at 1339.
6Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207. This decision continued to be
employed for nearly fifty years. Over 7,500 involuntary steriliza­
tions were performed in Virginia (where the case was challenged) 
between 1924 and 1972. See, Gould, The Mismeasure of Man. 335.
7Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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state statute which mandated the sterilization of individ­
uals convicted at least three times of "felonies involving 
moral turpitude." The Court based its decision on the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, since 
white collar criminals fared substantially better at sen­
tencing.8 However, the language of Justice Douglas' opin­
ion resounded of substantive due process, emphasizing the 
violation of a fundamental human right:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one 
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and pro­
creation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race . . . There is no redemption for
the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment 
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. 
He is forever deprived of his basic liberty.9
Justice Douglas acknowledged that one's reproductive
destiny ought to remain exclusively and autonomously with
oneself. While Justice Douglas ruled in behalf of the
petitioner on Equal Protection grounds, the right to privacy
rationale lingered in the background. Douglas' contempt for
government regulation in matters fundamentally intimate
would finally surface in the very controversial decision of
Griswold v. Connecticut.10
A Connecticut statute made it a criminal offense to
8Justice Douglas proposed that 'strict scrutiny' be applied 
because of the severity of sterilization laws lest "invidious 
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in 
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws." 
Id. at 541.
9Ibid.
10Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1963)
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either use birth control devices or to give information or 
instructions for their use. The General Statutes of 
Connecticut, sections 53-32 and 54-196, mandated respec­
tively :
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception 
shall be fined no less than $50 or imprisoned not less 
than 60 days nor more than one year or both fined and 
imprisoned.
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires 
or commands another to commit any offense may be pros­
ecuted and punished as if he were the principle of­
fender .
Appellants Estelle Griswold, Executive Director of the 
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Charles Lee 
Buxton, a licensed physician who served as medical director 
for the League at its center in New Haven, were arrested, 
convicted and fined $100 each for giving information, in­
struction and advice to "married persons" as to the means of 
preventing conception. On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of 
the Court, asserted that the appellants had standing to 
raise the constitutional rights issue of the married couples 
with whom they had a professional relationship,
Connecticut argued that it was exercising a legitimate 
and 'compelling' state interest; that is, by proscribing the 
use of birth control devices it was discouraging extra­
marital relations and preventing sexually transmitted dis­
eases. Justice Douglas denounced the public interest ra­
tionale put forth by the state and maintained that the
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statute egregiously encroached upon the sanctity and privacy 
of the marital relation —  a relation, argued Justice 
Douglas, which by its very nature merits a legal fortress 
against state interference.
Justice Douglas bypassed the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process argument,11 and introduced a ' de facto' constitu­
tional existence for the right to privacy. Like a right 
that had always existed and lay in wait only to be discover­
ed, Justice Douglas explained that there is a right to 
privacy by virtue of "specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights." These specific guarantees act as a penumbra for 
other related rights.12 Thus, as marriage is the autonomous 
association of free individuals, married couples are pro­
tected in their association by the First Amendment (though 
the First Amendment may not specifically mention the mar­
riage relationship or the activities and beliefs that take 
place within it).13 Moreover, as the Connecticut law must 
invade the privacies of the marital bedroom to be effective,
u "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the 
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions." _Ici. at 482.
12For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 7 6-80 above.
13Justice Douglas cited NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1958), 
explaining that the Connecticut contraception statute is in 
violation of the principle long upheld by the Court, that a 
"governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu­
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means 
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms," jLd. at 307, cited in Griswold. 381 U.S. at 
485.
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effective, it violates the Fourth Amendment.14
There could not have been a more representative case, 
nor a more activist Court,15 to establish the precedent for 
a constitutional right to privacy. Once the constitutional 
justification for autonomy had been made, the walls of 
governmental regulation began to tumble down. Soon, what 
the married couple had been given a private right to do in 
the sanctity of the marital chambers, unmarried couples had 
been given the same private rights to do anywhere (in 
private) .16
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,17 appellee Baird distributed 
contraceptives to the audience after delivering a lecture on
14Justice Douglas also cited the Fifth Amendment, as stated in 
Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as well as the Fourth 
Amendment, protecting "the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life" against all governmental intrusions, and Mapp v. 
Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to 
the states and further affirmed the fundamental character of the 
right to privacy.
15The [Earl] Warren Court (1953 - 1968) is notable for its 
disposition to overturn state statutes and government procedures 
and establishing judicially created guidelines for government 
procedure. This Court is most often accused of exercising substan­
tive due process.
16For an extensive discussion on the reactions of the Griswold 
decision, see the "Symposium on the Griswold Case (Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 85 S.Ct. 1678) and the Right of Privacy," Michigan 
Law Review 64 (December 1965) : Includes, Robert Dixon, "The
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of 
Privacy?", 197-218, Thomas Emerson, "Nine Justices in Search of a 
Doctrine," 219-234, Paul Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emana­
tions, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case," 
235-258, Robert McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations and
Intimations," 259-282, and Arthur Sutherland, "Privacy in Connecti­
cut, " 283-288.
17Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
90
overpopulation and contraception. A package of contracep­
tive foam was given to a single young woman. Baird was 
convicted in a Massachusetts state court for violating a 
Massachusetts statute which made it a crime to sell, ylend, 
or give away any contraceptive "drug, medicine, instrument 
or article."18 According to the law, only physicians were 
permitted to administer or prescribe contraceptive drugs or 
articles for married persons, and pharmacists were permitted 
to fill prescriptions for contraceptive drugs or articles 
only for married persons. The state's rationale for contra­
ceptive regulation, moreover, was to prevent the spread of 
'disease' and depravity, not to prevent pregnancy.19 
Baird's conviction was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was 
subsequently dismissed by the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts. The United States Court 
of Appeals, however, vacated the District Court's order and
^Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, section 21 provides 
a maximum five-year prison term for "whoever . . . gives away . .
any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the 
prevention of conception . . . "  except those authorized by section 
21A, including registered physicians who "may administer to or 
prescribe for any married person drugs and articles intended for 
the prevention of pregnancy or conception," and registered 
pharmacists who "may furnish such drugs or articles to any married 
person presenting a prescription from a registered physician." 
Cited in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. at 440-441.
19The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court maintained that the 
purpose of the law was "to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to 
encourage continuance and self-restraint, to defend the sanctity of 
the home, and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and 
virtuous race of men and women." Id. at 448.
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remanded the case with instructions to grant the writ dis­
charging the appellee. The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held 
that the prohibition on contraception conflicted with "fun­
damental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for four members of 
the Court (Powell and Rehnquist did not participate).
Brennan based his decision, in part, on the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause since,
[i]f under Griswold the distribution of contracep­
tives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on 
distribution to unmarried persons would equally be 
impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right to 
privacy in question inhered in the marital relation­
ship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent 
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an as­
sociation of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional make-up. If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ­
ual , married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.20
Moreover, the Court dismissed the compelling state 
interest argument put forth by Massachusetts: first, it held 
that the "deterrent to fornication" (or extramarital and 
premarital sex) rationale was not the purpose of the state 
statute since "[i]t would be plainly unreasonable to assume 
that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and birth of an
20Id. at 453. Reportedly, Justice Brennan used this opinion 
as a persuasive prelude to help Justice Blackmun with the constitu­
tional issue of an abortion decision rRoe v. Wadel which was 
pending (particularly the last sentence of the quote) . See, Bob 
Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York: Avon Books, 
1979), 193ff.
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unwanted child as punishment for fornication"21/ and sec­
ond, the prohibition of contraception to unmarried individu­
als would have only a "marginal" effect towards its stated 
objective. Furthermore, if the intent of the law was to 
protect the health of its citizens, would it not include all 
citizens both married and single? The statute, it was 
concluded, was both overbroad and discriminatory.
When, then, may a state regulate the health, safety, 
welfare, and morals of its citizens? Granting that consent­
ing married and unmarried adults have a fundamental right to 
be sexually active without state interference, does this 
apply as well to minors? Moreover, may the state attempt to 
insure the safety of contraceptives as a legitimate public 
health measure?
In Carev v. Population Services International.22 the 
Court answers these questions —  in part[s]. That is, seven 
members of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, 
agreed that a New York statute prohibiting the distribution 
of non-prescription contraceptives to adults, except through 
a licensed physician, was unconstitutional under the right 
to privacy protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amend-
21Eisenstadt v. Baird, 4 95 U.S. at 44 8.
22Carev v. Population Services International. 431 U.S. 67 8 
(1977) . Section 6811 (8) of the New York Education Law made it a 
crime (1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of 
any kind to a minor under 16; (2) for anyone other than a licensed 
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and 
(3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or 
display contraceptives.
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ment's Due Process Clause. However, there was no majority 
opinion by the Court invalidating the New York law as it 
applied to the distribution of non-prescription contracep­
tives to individuals under sixteen years of age.
The opinion of the Court was divided into five 
parts.23 Justice Brennan joined by Justices Stewart, Mar­
shall and Blackmun argued that minors have a constitutional 
right to privacy unless restrictions serve a significant 
state interest.24 In this instance, he maintained, the 
state failed to justify such an imposing statute. Justice 
Lewis Powell objected to "subjecting restrictions on the 
sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial re­
view, 1125 but he conceded that the states should have a 
broader reach in regulating the activities of adolescents.
He would also allow the state to encourage minors to seek 
the advice of their parents before engaging in sexual inter­
course. Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the statute 
violated due process by forcing minors who are sexually
23Parts I, II, III, and V, comprised the opinion of the Court. 
Parts II and III dealt with the issue of whether the state had a 
sufficient compelling interest in restricting distribution of 
contraceptives to persons over sixteen years. Part IV considered 
the ban on contraceptives to minors under sixteen years of age.
24Because of the ruling in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Brennan held that "since 
the State may not impose a blanket prohibition or even a blanket
requirement of parental consent on the choice of a minor to 
terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket 
prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is 
a fortiori foreclosed." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S at 694.
25Id. at 705.
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active to bear children.26 Justice White concurred with 
Stevens, asserting that the state had not demonstrated that 
the prohibition contributed to the deterrent purposes ad­
vanced by the state as justification for the restrictions. 
Both Justices Stevens and White rejected the argument "that 
a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives 
to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objec­
tions of both parents and the state."27 Chief Justice 
Warren Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented from the 
judgment of the Court, maintaining that the state does have 
a compelling interest in both regulating the distribution of 
contraceptives, and prohibiting the distribution of contra­
ceptives to minors under the age of sixteen years.
Carev extended Griswold and Baird by invalidating a 
state ban on commercial distribution of nonmedical contra­
ceptives, while still recognizing that the right to privacy 
is not absolute. A compelling state interest lurks behind 
all legislation, and is particularly forceful when fighting 
legal precedents with controversial constitutional support. 
Nevertheless, in the section that follows, it will be shown 
that a constitutional right to privacy fared surprisingly 
well in an area more intimate than any other, for a woman,
26"It is though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval 
of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets," argues
Stevens. "One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a 
motorcycle to characterize such a restriction as irrational and 
perverse." Ici. at 715.
27Id. at 703.
yet seemingly more compelling than the contraception issue 
—  the right to choose an abortion.
Privacy, Autonomy and Abortion 
The landmark case extending the right to privacy in 
decisions concerning whether or not to terminate a pregnancy 
is Roe v. Wade.28 The plaintiff, an unmarried pregnant 
woman, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the 
enforcement of a Texas statute making it a crime to procure
an abortion except for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother. The District Court held that the right to choose 
whether to have children was protected by the Ninth Amend­
ment and applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amend­
ment .
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court. In a very technical opin­
ion, legally, philosophically, and medically, Justice Harry 
Blackmun expressed the views of seven members of the Court, 
including the Chief Justice. The Court held that a con­
stitutional right to privacy, founded in the Fourteenth
_ Amendment's concept of personal liberty, was broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate a preg­
nancy.29 Hence, Texas' statute criminalizing abortion was
28Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29Justice Blackmun cited precedents which recognized a right 
of privacy or zones of privacy, including: Union Pacific Railway 
Co. V. Botsford. 141 U.S. 250 (18 91)(mandatory surgical examina­
tions violated personal privacy); Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557
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found to be in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
However, Justice Blackmun qualified this pronouncement: 
the state has a right to regulate abortions insofar as to 
assure that abortions are performed under circumstances that 
insure the maximum safety of the patient. To clarify this 
position, Justice Blackmun laid out guidelines indicating 
when a state's interest in regulating abortions becomes 
compelling.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of 
the first trimester, the abortion decision and its 
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of 
the pregnant woman's attending physician.30
(2) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end 
of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its in­
terest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, 
regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably re-
(1964) (First Amendment protects the right to privately possess 
obscene material); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (expectations 
of privacy are dependent on context and circumstance of individual 
activity); Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (government
cannot mandate the production of private shipping invoices); 
Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1963) (proscription of a
married couple's use of contraceptives violates zones of privacy); 
Id. at 486, (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Ninth Amendment protects 
privacy as a right reserved to the people) ; Mever v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages 
violates parents' and guardians' rights to oversee child's 
education); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(privacy in
choosing a spouse); Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (pro- 
creative privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(contra­
ceptive privacy); Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(pri­
vacy inherent in family relationships); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(privacy inherent in child rearing and 
education). See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 152-153.
30At this stage of pregnancy, it was determined, the mortality 
rate in abortion is less than the mortality rate in normal 
childbirth.
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lated to maternal health.31
(3) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State 
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human 
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and 
health of the mother.32
The two dissenters in this case, and in all subsequent 
abortion cases, were Justices White and Rehnquist. White, 
joined by Rehnquist, asserted that "nothing in the language 
or history of the Constitution" supported the Court's judg­
ment that women have the constitutional right to abortion. 
The Court, argued the dissenters, constructed a constitu­
tional right where none had previously existed, and thus 
indulged in "an improvident and extravagant exercise of the 
power of judicial review."33 Moreover, Justice White indi­
cated his doubts as to whether abortion is a fundamental 
right, depicting it as a frivolous feminine alternative.
At the heart of the controversy in these cases are 
those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatso­
ever to the life or health of the mother but are never­
theless unwanted for any one or more of a variety of 
reasons —  convenience, family planning, economics, 
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, 
etc.34
31For example, the state could regulate the qualifications of 
the doctor performing the abortion, the facility in which the 
abortion is to take place, etc. However, the state may not 
proscribe abortion at this stage.
32Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 164-165.
33Id. at 221-222 (White, J., dissenting). The dissents in Roe
apply also to Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973), discussed below.
34Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist further marked his disagreement with 
the Roe decision maintaining that, since a majority of the 
states have had statutes restricting abortion for at least a 
century, then, evidently, abortion is not "so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
fundamental."35 His strict constructionist view of the 
Constitution was clear in his criticism of the Roe Court's 
willingness to use substantive due process. The concept of 
liberty as used in the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to 
cases which deprive an individual of his or her liberty 
without due process of law; Justice Rehnquist did not ad­
judge a woman's proscription from terminating a pregnancy to 
be compelling enough to warrant such a restriction to be a
35Quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97 (1934), in 
Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This 
particular statement in his dissenting opinion seems to contradict 
hundreds of years of common law precedent which permitted abor­
tions. Abortion prior to quickening was generally allowable by 
law; abortions performed after quickening were punished as a 
misdemeanor. See, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe, 
where he relates the common-law and American law history of 
abortion laws. He concludes that "at common-law, at the time of 
the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout a major portion of 
the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under 
most American statutes currently in effect." See id. text at 133- 
141. See also, an article by Cyril Means, which asserted that 
abortion became a misdemeanor after quickening in the Seventeenth 
Century because of the religious zeal of jurist Sir Edward Coke who 
wrote a common law treatise used in law schools throughout the 
United States. Abortion laws in America gradually became more 
restrictive in the mid-Eighteenth Century as a measure designed to 
protect the health of women who died or were maimed because of the 
unsafe medical procedures of the day. See, Means "The Phoenix of 
Abortional Freedoms: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About 
to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a 
Fourteenth-Century Common Law Liberty?" New York Law Forum 14 (Fall 
1968), quoted in Marian Faux, Roe v. Wade (New York: New American 
Library, 1988), 300-302.
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deprivation of due process.36
The companion case of Roe was Doe v. Bolton.31 The 
plaintiffs, an indigent pregnant woman and nine physicians 
licensed in Georgia, challenged a Georgia law which pro­
scribed abortion except as performed by a duly licensed 
Georgia physician when necessary in "his best clinical 
judgment" because continued pregnancy would endanger the 
pregnant woman's life or injure her health; the fetus would 
likely be born with a serious defect; or, the pregnancy 
resulted from rape.38
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that 
this provision of the law was not unconstitutionally vague 
since the physician may exercise his judgment in light of 
all the attendant circumstances (physical, emotional, 
psychological, familial, and the woman's age). However, the 
Court invalidated three procedural demands of the Georgia 
law: (1) a provision which required that all abortions be
performed in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on
36Justice Rehnquist argued that "liberty [in the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] is not always guaranteed absolutely against 
deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally 
applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether 
or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a 
valid state objective." In this case, Rehnquist thinks that a 
woman's choice to abort a pregnancy should not fall within the 
meaning of liberty protected by due process, unless her life or 
health is threatened. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 173.
37Poe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) .
38Criminal Code of Georgia, sections 26-1201 and 26-1202. See 
appendix A to opinion of the Court, Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. at 202- 
203.
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Accreditation of Hospitals was held unconstitutional since 
the state did not show that only J.C.A.H. hospitals could 
meet its interest in protecting the patient, and because it 
required abortions in the first trimester to be performed in 
hospitals; (2) that the procedure be approved by the hos­
pital staff abortion committee was unconstitutional since it 
was unduly restrictive of the patient's rights already 
safeguarded by the physician; and (3) the requirement of 
concurrence by two other physicians was unconstitutional 
since it had no rational connection with a patient's need, 
and it infringed upon the physician's right to practice.
The landmark decision handed down in Roe created a 
landslide of anti-abortion emotion throughout the country so 
intense that state legislatures attempted to allay the full 
effect of Roe by enacting restrictions on the right to 
abortion. One such case was Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth.39 A challenge was made to the valid­
ity of a Missouri statute which set forth conditions and 
limitations on abortions and established criminal offenses 
for noncompliance.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun, 
the Court upheld: (1) a viability definition provision
defining "viability," asserting that an abortion may not be 
performed unless the fetus has not reached the stage of
39Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 
52 (1976).
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viability as certified with reasonable medical certainty by 
the attending physician, unless it is necessary to preserve 
the life and health of the mother40; (2) a pregnant woman's 
consent provision requiring that, prior to submitting to an 
abortion during the first twelve weeks, a woman certify her 
consent to the procedure to assure that her consent is 
informed and freely given; and (3) a recordkeeping and 
reporting provision imposing requirements upon health facil­
ities and physicians concerned with abortions regardless of 
the stage of the pregnancy, since it imposed no legally 
significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision 
or the patient/physician relationship.41
Speaking for six members of the Court,42 Justice 
Blackmun invalidated, as unconstitutional: (1) a spousal
consent provision, since a state cannot "delegate to a 
spouse a veto power which the State itself is . . . prohibi­
ted from exercising during the first trimester. . . "43;
40"Viability, " as defined by the Missouri statute, is "that 
stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be 
continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial 
life-supporting systems." This definition concurs with Justice 
Blackmun's definition in Roe, which defined viability as a fetus 
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with 
artificial aid." Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 160.
41Moreover, the recordkeeping provision was guaranteed to be 
strictly confidential, and to be for statistical purposes only.
42Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stewart, and 
Stevens.
43Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 
at 69. Justice Blackmun expressed the view that women must, 
necessarily, have the final say in incidents of pregnancy since she
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and, (2) a standard of care procedure which impermissibly 
required the physician to preserve the life and health of 
the fetus regardless of the stage of pregnancy.44
The majority vote dwindled to five4S when invalidating 
the following provisions: (1) a parental consent provision,
since a state cannot constitutionally impose a blanket 
parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried 
minor's (under eighteen years) abortion during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy for the same reasons given in the 
spousal consent provision. As it was emphasized in Roe.
"the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to 
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending 
physician"46; and, (2) a saline amniocentesis prohibition, 
a safe and commonly used abortion procedure, since the state 
failed to show this to be a reasonable protection of mater­
nal health, and was arbitrarily proscribed.47
physically bears the child. "The obvious fact is that when a wife 
and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the 
marriage partners can prevail." .Id. at 71.
44The Missouri statute further stated that any physician 
failing the attempt in preserving the life and health of the fetus, 
would be charged with manslaughter if the child's death resulted. 
However, since the punishment was not severable from the act (since 
the standard of care provision applied before the point in 
viability and was, therefore, overbroad) , the penalty was invalid. 
Id. at 83-84.
45Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Powell.
46Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 164.
47The Court felt that Missouri enacted this provision to 
discourage abortions altogether, even though other methods of 
abortion, to be used in place of the outlawed method, were more
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In a later case dealing with a parental consent stat­
ute, the Court could not produce a majority opinion.
Bellotti v. Baird48 concerned a Massachusetts statute re­
quiring parental consent before an abortion could be per­
formed on an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen, but 
provided that an abortion could be obtained under a court 
order upon a showing of good cause if one or both parents 
should refuse consent. Thus, the statute in this case, 
argued Massachusetts, was consistent with the decision in 
Danforth in that it offered an alternative means for the 
minor woman for obtaining an abortion should her parents 
refuse their consent.
In a plurality opinion by Justice Powell, and joined by 
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, 
the law was held invalid. The Court held that the statute 
imposed "an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
detrimental to maternal health. "As so viewed . . . the outright 
legislative proscription of saline fails as a reasonable regulation 
for the protection of maternal health. It comes into focus, 
instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to 
inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of 
abortions after the first 12 weeks." Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. at 7 8-7 9.
48Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Hunerwadel v. Baird 
was also on appeal from the same court. Jane Hunerwadel was given 
permission to intervene as a defendant and representative of all 
parents with daughters under eighteen, and either pregnant, or 
liable thereto. See also, Bellotti v. Baird. 428 U.S. 132 (1976), 
(Baird I) which first challenged the Massachusetts statute, but was 
vacated by the Supreme Court, which concluded that a U.S. District 
Court, which invalidated the parental consent statute, should have 
abstained and certified certain constitutional questions of the 
statute to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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right to seek an abortion,"49 since it required the minor 
to seek parental approval first before seeking a prompt 
court order to secure permission to obtain an abortion. 
According to the concept of liberty found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "every minor must have the opportunity —  if she 
so desires —  to go directly to a court without first con­
sulting or notifying her parents."50 The court must grant 
consent to the abortion if it is persuaded that the minor is 
mature, or if terminating the pregnancy is in her best 
interests.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but argued that the 
Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional on its face based 
upon the precedents laid down in Roe and Danforth. Since 
the statute stated that no underage female, no matter how 
mature and well-informed, may receive an abortion without 
the consent of either both parents or a judge, the minor's 
abortion decision was subject in every instance to an ab­
solute third-party veto.
49Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. at 646-647.
50Id. at 647. The Court sympathized with the right of parents 
to be informed about their children's activities . . .  in most 
circumstances. "The pregnant minor's options are much different 
from those facing a minor in other situations. . ." For example, 
pregnancy does not wait for a young girl to reach the legal age 
without seriously affecting her life. The consequences of 
pregnancy, moreover, "brings with it adult legal responsibility. .
. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the 
right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave 
and indelible." Id. at 642.
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It is inherent in the right to make the abortion deci­
sion that the right may be exercised without public 
scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the 
sovereign or other third parties.51
Justice White dissented, expressing the view that the 
Massachusetts statute was not unconstitutional in requiring 
parental consent when an unmarried woman under the age of 
eighteen seeks an abortion. Indeed, he approved of an 
absolute parental or judicial check in all circumstances. 
Justice Rehnquist, as well, indicated he was willing to 
reconsider the Danforth decision, but conceded to precedent 
until the opportunity to overturn the likes of Roe and 
Danforth should arise.
State legislatures became more zealous and more 
creative in enacting statutes restricting the choice of 
women to independently obtain an abortion, particularly 
underaged women, with the passage of time. Justice Powell, 
speaking for six members of the Court, addressed this con­
cern in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.52 
in his appeal not to stray from established precedent.
These cases come to us a decade after we held in Roe 
v. Wade . . . that the right of privacy, grounded in 
the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to terminate 
her pregnancy. Legislative responses to the Court's 
decision have required us on several occasions . . .  to 
define the limits of a State's authority to regulate 
the performance of abortions. And arguments continue to 
be made . . . that we erred in interpreting the Con-
51Id. at 655.
52Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 4 62 U.S. 416 
(1983) .
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stitution. Nonetheless, the doctrine of stare decisis, 
while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitu­
tional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in 
a society governed by the rule of law. We respect it 
today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade.53
The city of Akron imposed a number of restrictions on 
the abortion procedure with the enactment of 'Ordinance No. 
160-1978, Regulation of Abortions.' The first condition 
required that all abortions performed after the first tri­
mester of pregnancy be performed in hospitals accredited by 
the J.C.A.H. or the American Osteopathic Association. The 
Court reaffirmed its decision in Doe v. Bolton, asserting 
that this provision unnecessarily impeded the abortion 
procedure, since it imposed additional costs, travel, and 
health risks on the pregnant woman. Since recent medical 
evidence showed that second trimester abortions could be 
safely performed on an outpatient basis in appropriate 
nonhospital facilities, the grounds on which Akron based 
this provision was not considered compelling, but rather a 
means to make abortions more difficult to obtain.54
Second, the Court invalidated a parental consent or­
dinance which applied to women under the age of fifteen. In
53Id. at 419-420. Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined 
by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens.
54Justice Powell thought it was necessary for it to clarify its 
position on the trimester distinction established in Roe v . Wade. 
States took the cue that at thirteen weeks it was free to more 
stringently regulate the abortion procedure, without seriously 
considering how the regulation "reasonably relates to the preserva­
tion and protection of maternal health." JEd. at 163.
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compliance with Bellotti v. Baird, it was held that the 
statute did not establish a procedure by which a minor could 
avoid a parental veto of her abortion decision. In every 
case, the Court stated, the pregnant girl must be able to 
prove her informed consent, her maturity to make this deci­
sion, or that termination of pregnancy would be in her best 
interest to an impartial judge, before exposing her plight 
to the emotionally-charged response of her parents.
[I]t is clear that Akron may not make a blanket deter­
mination that all minors under the age of 15 are too 
immature to make this decision or that an abortion 
never may be in the minor's best interest without 
parental approval.55
The Akron ordinance also required that the woman seek­
ing an abortipn give "truly informed consent." That is, the 
attending physician had to explain to her the status of her 
pregnancy and the stage of development of the fetus, the 
potential date of viability, the physical and emotional 
complications that may occur as a result of the abortion, 
and a list of the agencies that offer assistance and infor­
mation regarding birth control, adoption, and childbirth.
The Court held that this requirement was not enacted as a 
measure to protect maternal health, and that it unduly 
burdened the woman's abortion decision.
[I]t is fair to say that much of the information re­
quired is designed not to inform the woman's consent 
but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether 
. . . much of the detailed description of "the anatomi­
cal and physiological characteristics of the particular
55Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, at 440.
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unborn child" . . . would involve, at best, speculation 
by the physician. And . . . the dubious statement that 
"abortion is a major surgical procedure," and proceeds 
to describe numerous possible physical and psychologi­
cal complications of abortion, is a "parade of hor­
ribles" intended to suggest that abortion is a par­
ticularly dangerous procedure.56
The Court also invalidated a requirement that the woman 
wait twenty-four hours after signing the consent form be­
cause there was no evidence that this waiting period would 
make abortions safe. Rather, it would impose additional 
costs, travel, and possible health risks upon the pregnant 
woman. Finally, the Court invalidated the provision that 
fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary 
manner," because the word "humane" was "impermissibly vague" 
for a statute which mandates criminal liability.57
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and White, waged a sharp dissent against the Court 
for invalidating legislative regulations that do not unduly 
burden the right to abortion. In fact, Justice O'Connor 
found that judicial involvement in an area in which know­
ledge and technology is so dynamic, is foolhardy for an 
institution which relies substantially upon precedent. 
Legislatures, she argues, are better able to react to the 
changes in medical technology, and should not, "as a matter 
of constitutional law, have to speculate about what con­
oid. at 444-445.
57For example, would a humane disposal require "some sort of 
'decent burial' of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation?" 
Id. at 451.
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stitutes "acceptable medical practice" at any given 
time.1158
An example of how the Court may have undermined a right 
deemed fundamental based on stare decisis is its trimester 
formulation. As medical technology progresses, the trimest­
er framework for regulating abortions becomes obsolete 
because the point at which a fetus can survive outside the 
mother's womb is moved back towards conception, while the 
point at which a state's interest in maternal health becomes 
compelling is moved forward towards childbirth. Demanding 
that a state follow the precedent set down in Roe is there­
fore futile.
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision 
course with itself. . . Moreover, it is clear that the 
trimester approach violates the fundamental aspiration 
of neutral principles "sufficiently absolute to give 
them roots throughout the community and continuity over 
significant periods of time."59
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City.
Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,60 was decided the same term as
58Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59Quoting Archibald Cox, Ibid. One hundred sixty-seven 
scientists and physicians, including eleven Nobel laureates, filed 
a brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. 3040 
(1989) (discussed below) attacking O'Connor's "collision course" 
rationale. "The earliest point of viability [outside the womb] has 
remained virtually unchanged at approximately 24 weeks," wrote the 
scientists. "Progress in science, therefore, has not made obsolete 
the trimester framework based on viability." See, George Hackett 
and Ann McDaniel, "All Eyes on Justice O'Connor," Newsweek. 1 May 
1989, 34-35.
60Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri. Inc. 
v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). See also, Simopoulos v. Virginia, 
462 U.S. 506 (1983), the Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring
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Akron. Four issues were decided in a judgment rendered by 
Justice Powell. First, following its decision in Doe and 
Akron, the Court held a provision requiring abortions be 
performed in a hospital after twelve weeks of pregnancy to 
be an unconstitutional obstacle for the pregnant woman. 
Second, the requirement that minors seek either parental 
consent or consent from the juvenile court before being able 
to obtain an abortion, was upheld as constitutional and 
consistent with their rulings in Bellotti and Akron. Third, 
a provision requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed was upheld by the Court as reasonably relating to 
a health-related state concern.61 And fourth, the condi­
tion that there be two physicians present during a post­
viability abortion was also upheld as rationally relating to 
a valid state objective. Since the first physician's prima­
ry concern is the life and health of the mother, a second
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals, 
since Virginia included "outpatient hospitials." Justice Powell, 
speaking for the Court, found that the state was reasonably 
exercising a legitimate interest in protecting the woman's health.
61The appellants argued that a pathology requirement involved 
additional expense. Missouri and several health professionals 
argued that a pathology examination is not only the norm for all 
surgically removed tissue to test for abnormalities that could 
indicate more serious problems, but also insures that clinics 
conform to ethical and/or accepted medical standards. Thus, Justice 
Powell stated, "[i]n weighing the balance between protection of a 
woman's health and the comparatively small additional cost of a 
pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution 
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to 
minimize to this extent the cost of abortions." Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 4 62 U.S. at 489.
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physician is necessary to provide for the life and well­
being of the fetus.62
The final case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a 
state statute for unconstitutionally infringing upon a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, demonstrated the 
allegiance of the Court to stare decisis. Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists63 
involved the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982;64 a 
sweeping list of restrictions which challenged some of the 
precedents laid down by the Court in prior decisions.
Appellees, an organization of obstetricians and gyne­
cologists and various individuals, challenged the statute 
alleging that the law violated the United States Consti­
tution, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania denied the plaintiffs' preliminary injunctive 
relief, concluding that a likelihood of success on the 
merits had not been established. On appeal, the United
“According to Roe v. Wade, supra, the state has a compelling 
interest in a third-trimester fetus. Appellants argue that this 
second-phvsician requirement interferes in the doctor-patient 
relationship. However, privacy is afforded, according to prece­
dent, during the first two trimesters of pregnancy: "[T]he State in 
promoting its interest in the potentiality of life may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother." .Id. at 164-165.
“Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
“Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3201 et seg. 
(1982).
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered a 
remand as to a provision of parental consent, and directly 
held several other provisions of the Abortion Control Act 
unconstitutional.65 Treating the resulting appeal as a 
petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the opinion of the lower court.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, 
and Stevens, indignantly reproved the intent of the Penn­
sylvania statute:
In the years since this Court's decision in Roe. States 
and municipalities have adopted a number of measures 
seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice 
of her physician, from exercising her freedom of 
choice.66
Blackmun accused these states and municipalities of 
finding any and every excuse, "under the guise of maternal 
health," to hinder a woman's abortion decision. The Court,
65The Court of Appeals held the following sections of the 
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional: a portion of sec. 3205,
relating to "informed consent." That is, the woman was to be in­
formed of a "parade of horribles," including the potential physical 
and psychological risks of her decision; sec. 3208, concerning 
"printed information" regarding the agencies that could assist her 
should she decide to carry the fetus to term; sec(s). 3210 (b) and 
(c) concerning postviability abortions, including a "standard of 
care" requirement and a second-physician requirement; and, sec. 
3211 (a) mandating a physician to report his basis for a finding of 
nonviability, and sec(s). 3214 (a) and (h) regarding the reporting 
of anonymous statistical information about the women obtaining 
abortions.
“Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne­
cologists. 476 U.S. at 759.
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thus, proceeded to invalidate the following provisions of 
the statute:
(1) Section 3205. An informed consent provision, the 
kind which was held unconstitutional in Akron, requiring 
that the physician relate a "litany of information" and a 
"parade of horribles."67 The information that was to be 
relayed to the pregnant woman included, (a) the name of the 
physician who would perform the abortion, (b) the possible 
detrimental psychological and physical effects resulting 
from an abortion, (c) the medical risks involved in the 
abortion procedure, (d) the assumed gestational age of the 
fetus, (e) the medical risks associated with carrying the 
fetus to term, (f) the available medical assistance benefits 
for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, and (g) 
the fact that the father would be liable to assist in the 
child's financial support, "even in instances where the 
father has offered to pay for the abortion."68;
(2) Section 3211 (a). A viability definition provi­
sion that required the physician to report the basis for his
“Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 4 62 U.S. at 
444-445. The state's purpose for imposing this provision, insisted 
the Court, was simply to discourage woman from obtaining an 
abortion.
“Section 3205 of the Abortion Control Act. Subsection (g) 
posed a particular problem in cases of rape or incest —  a rather 
insensitive requirement for a woman dealing with such a tragic 
experience. "This type of compelled information," concluded the 
Court, "is the antithesis of informed consent." Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 47 6 U.S. at 
764.
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determination that a fetus is not viable after the first 
trimester, since the state failed to show that it was ad­
vancing any legitimate interest;
(3) Section 3214 (a). Abortion reporting requirements
which must include,
identification of the performing and referring physi­
cians and the facility or agency;information as to the 
woman's political subdivision and State of residence, 
age, race, marital status, and number of prior pregnan­
cies; the date of her last menstrual period and the 
probable gestational age; the basis for any judgment 
that a medical emergency existed; the basis for any 
determination of nonviability; and the method of pay­
ment for the abortion.
While Section 3214 (e)(2) of the Act assures that these 
reports will not be available for the public record, there 
is a catch in that each report would be available for public 
inspection and copying for fifteen days after receiving the 
report, based on the guarantee that the identity of the 
women will not be disclosed. Moreover, Section 3214 (h) 
provides that a report of complications "shall be open to 
public inspection and copying." Such a requirement, de­
clared the Court, is only a disingenuous means to violate 
the right to privacy.
Pennsylvania's reporting requirements raise the spectre 
of public exposure and harassment of women who choose 
to exercise their personal, intensely private, right, 
with their physician, to end a pregnancy. Thus, they 
pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise 
of that right, and must be invalidated.69
(4) Section 3210 (b). A standard of care provision,
69Id. at 767-768.
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requiring a physician to provide the necessary degree of 
care to preserve the life and health of the post-viable 
fetus. The Court held, following the reasoning of the Court 
of Appeals, that the provision required a "trade-off" be­
tween the woman's health and fetal survival, whereas the 
primary consideration should have been with the health of 
the mother.70
(5) Section 3210 (c). A requirement that a second 
physician be present during an abortion when there is a 
possibility that the fetus is viable, even though there may 
be no medical emergency. Justice Blackmun held that since 
the Pennsylvania statute did not provide a medical emergency 
exception, whereby the woman's health would not be endanger­
ed by the delay in the arrival of the second physician (as 
Justice Powell qualified it in Ashcroft).71 the provision 
was invalid.
In invalidating these provisions, Justice Blackmun is 
remaining true to the belief that the right to privacy, 
which he helped to establish, is a fundamental constitution­
al guarantee, regardless of the criticism and controversy 
this right has confronted. His function as- a Supreme Court 
justice, as he sees it, is to uphold the law for minorities 
and majorities alike, and especially to remain objective in
70Id., at 768-769.
71Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft. 462 U.S. at 482-486.
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the face of religious or moral questions. In conclusion,
Justice Blackmun maintains,
[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more 
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity 
and autonomy, than a woman's decision —  with the 
guidance of her physician and within the limits speci- 
- fied in Roe —  whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's 
right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any 
other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a 
central part of the sphere of liberty that our law 
guarantees equally to all.72
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence in which 
he strongly supported the Court's affirmance of a right to 
privacy based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. Numerous precedents have been established by this 
very liberal clause, based on liberties recognized as funda­
mental by the Court, including liberties which have been 
recognized by the great dissenter in abortion cases —  Mr. 
Justice Byron White.73 Justice Stevens, baffled by the 
sudden change in the definition of liberty by Justice White, 
remarked, "I fail to see how a decision on child-bearing 
becomes 'less' important the day after conception than the
72Thornburqh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. at 772.
73For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, White 
stated "I find nothing in this record justifying the sweeping scope 
of this statute, with its telling effect on the freedom of married 
persons, and therefore conclude that it deprives such persons of 
liberty without due process of law." .Id. at 507 (White, J., 
concurring). Likewise, in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438, he 
concurred with the result: Just as in Griswold ". . . so here to 
sanction a medical restriction upon distribution [to married 
persons] of a contraceptive not proved hazardous to health would 
impair the exercise of the constitutional right." JEd. at 464-465 
(White, J., concurring).
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day before."74 If it is because of the moral issues in­
volved in the abortion decision which have wreaked the 
present political havoc, asserted Justice Stevens, then "the 
basic question is whether the "abortion decision" should be 
made by the individual or by the majority."75 In consider­
ing whose value judgments (i.e., the Court or the pro-life 
advocates) are being applied to whom (pro-life advocates or 
pregnant women), Justice Stevens concluded, "Justice White 
is quite wrong in suggesting that the Court is imposing 
value preferences on anyone else."76 On the contrary, in 
his view, the Court has preserved the freedom of individuals 
to determine value preferences for themselves.
The majority remain free to preach the evils of birth 
control and abortion and to persuade others to make 
correct decisions while the individual faced with the 
reality of a difficult choice having serious and per­
sonal consequences of major importance to her own 
future —  perhaps to the salvation of her immortal soul 
—  remains free to seek and to obtain sympathetic 
guidance from those who share her value preferences.77
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, 
declaring that it was time that the Court reverse its opin­
ion in Roe, embrace the "proper understanding" of the 
Constitution, and change its course from the "difficult and
74Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. at 776.
75Id. at 777.
76Id. at 778.
77Id. at 781.
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continuing venture into substantive due process."78
First, according to the dissenters, the Court is il-
logically following the rule of stare decisis, since this
principle of law is insubstantial without the rule of law to
sustain it. Justice White contended that
when governing legal standards are open to revision in 
every case, deciding cases becomes the mere exercise of 
judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable re­
sults .79
Second, since the Court has been consistently having to 
invalidate state statutes which have been attempting to 
place restrictions of abortions, it is clearly undermining 
the will of the people. The Constitution is a document of 
the people, and the right to abortion is not a part of the 
document. Since the Court is invalidating legislative acts 
which are, presumably, the will of the people, the dissent­
ers conjectured, then the Court is sabotaging the American 
system of government for an imaginary constitutional right.
Justice White consistently has accused the Court of 
imposing its own value preferences. In doing so, he argued, 
the Court is permitting potential life to be vacuumed away. 
His dissents do not persuade, however, that he is more 
abhorred by the Court exercising substantive due process, 
than its authorization of "the evil of abortion."80 It
78Quoting from his dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth. id. at 785-786.
79Id. at 787.
80Id. at 797.
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appears that this is an issue where value preferences cannot 
help but be imposed, even within the "objective" branch of 
the government. One either sides with Justice Stevens' 
point of view that the Court must protect choice at the 
grassroots level by constructing constitutional barriers, or 
with Justice White's point of view that choice must be 
protected at the political level by toppling judicial con­
straints. Both positions are equally ingrained in the 
American concept of ordered liberty; both positions equally 
incite emotional responses clothed in intellectual polemics. 
Up until Thornburgh, we saw Justice Stevens' view reign. 
However, in other cases, beginning with Maher v. Roe.81 
Justice White's view prevails. Round two of the right to 
privacy match has begun.
81Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), discussed in Chapter Four 
below.
CHAPTER FOUR
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
For today, the women of this nation 
still retain the liberty to control 
their destinies. But the signs are very 
ominous, and a chill wind blows.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
Dissenting opinion.
Previous chapters have reviewed the steady climb of the 
right to privacy as a constitutional protection, but that 
progress stops abruptly in the cases that will be discussed 
in this chapter. The conservative majority on the Supreme 
Court, given its interpretational prerogative, simply refus­
es to go beyond any of the 'substantive' rights to autono­
mous choice and/or opportunity, granted by preceding Courts. 
Indeed, the present Court has substantially limited the 
ability of persons to exercise rights previously recognized 
as constitutional.1 Thus, in several states, individuals 
are now left with a token right to privacy (particularly in 
regards to abortion rights) which hardly meets the prevalent
^hese cases will be discussed in further detail, in 
particular, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 
S.Ct. 3040 (1989), below.
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expectations.2
President Ronald Reagan's goal to direct the political 
philosophy of the Supreme Court towards greater judicial and 
social conservativism was furnished with three golden oppor­
tunities. First, in the summer of 1981 Justice Potter 
Stewart (a member of the Roe v. Wade majority) retired from 
the Court. He was replaced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
the first woman ever appointed to the Supreme Court and a 
conservative. As a former Arizona state court of appeals 
judge, she paid a great deal of attention to precedent and 
to legislative decisions. She also pays heed to the deci­
sions of state courts. With this type of 'hands-off' judi­
cial philosophy, in addition to her 'personal abhorrence' to 
abortion, she was the ideal candidate for President Reagan, 
earning him praise for his political savvy in appointing a 
woman.3
2A survey on the Supreme Court and the Constitution 
reveals that a majority of Americans believe that the right 
to privacy is an enumerated constitutional guarantee, and 
includes such protections as sexual and reproductive auton­
omy, and the right to choose euthanasia. See, "Poll finds 
belief in a Constitutional right to privacy," Las Vegas 
Review Journal. 19 February 1990, p. 6(A).
3See, on Justice O'Connor's personal history, Jerrold 
K. Footlick and David T. Friendly, "A Keen Mind, Fine Judg­
ment," Newsweek, 29 July 1981, 18-19, and Joseph Kane and 
Evan Thomas, "Brethren's First Sister," Time, 20 July 1981, 
8-12. Some right-wing conservatives and pro-life advocates 
disapproved of the appointment of a 'woman' who, they ar­
gued, co-sponsored measures making "all medically acceptable 
family planning methods and information" available to anyone 
who wanted it, when she served as an Arizona senator. They 
took this measure to include abortion. See, "Answers to 
Some Accusations," ibid., 11.
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Second, Chief Justice Burger (who also voted with the 
majority in Roe v. Wade) vacated his seat on the High Court 
in 1986 and arch-conservative Justice William H. Rehnquist 
(one of the two dissenters in Roe) was elevated to take his 
place. The position that opened for associate justice was 
filled by Antonin Scalia —  a staunch conservative and a 
Roman Catholic. Justice Scalia is a proponent of judicial 
self-restraint, stating "I am not comfortable with imposing 
my moral views on society."4 Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Scalia contended that the right to privacy was 
imprudently fabricated by judicial activists devoid of 
constitutional authorization. Justice Scalia, however, 
appears to be more ardent in his quest to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, proclaiming the cause that Justices Rehnquist and 
White once chiefly commanded.5
Finally, Justice Lewis F. Powell (still yet another 
member of the Roe majority) announced his retirement in
4Quoted during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. 
See, Ted Gest, "Scalia: No extremism spoken here," U.S.
News and World Report. 18 August 1986, 17.
5For example, in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, Inc.. 109 S.Ct 3040 (1989), he criticized the 
opinion of the Court (written by Rehnquist and joined by 
White, et al) for not explicitly overruling Roe: "The out­
come of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph 
of judicial statesmanship. It is not that, unless it is 
statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-award­
ed sovereignty over a field where it has little proper 
business since the answers to most of the cruel questions 
posed are political and not juridical..." .Id. at 3064 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg­
ment) .
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1987, After two unsuccessful attempts to nominate a conser­
vative Justice to take Powell's position, including Robert 
Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy was finally 
appointed to the bench. Described as a quiet and scholarly 
man, Justice Kennedy has proven to be very conservative in 
civil rights cases, supporting state authority over the 
rights of individuals in criminal cases.6 Moreover, Kennedy 
is Chief Justice Rehnquist's model strict-constructionist, 
voting with the Chief Justice consistently (90% of the 
time),7 whereas Justice Powell tended to waver on civil 
rights, individual liberties, and church/state issues.8
6For example, Justice Kennedy voted with the majority 
in the following criminal cases in the 1988-1989 term: 
Stanford v. Kentucky. Wilkins v. Missouri, Penrv v. Lvnaugh, 
held, in a 5-4 decision, that it is not "cruel and unusual" 
punishment to execute juveniles or the mentally retarded; 
United States v. Monsanto, Caplin & Drvsdale v. United 
States, held, in a 5-4 decision, that the government may 
seize assets defendants plan to use to pay attorneys' fees; 
and, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, held, 
in a 7-2 decision, that mandatory alcohol and drug testing 
of railroad workers, after a major accident and/or safety 
violation, are constitutional. See, Joan Biskupic, "Solid 
New Majority Evident As 1988-1989 Term Ends," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 47 (8 July 1989): 1694, 1696-1697.
7Joan Biskupic, "Justice Kennedy: The Fifth Vote," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 47 (8 July 1989):
1695.
8Neil Skene writes that Justice O'Connor, who during 
her first eight years laid low and generally voted with the 
conservatives, is finally coming into her own becoming the 
swing vote that Justice Powell once was. "O'Connor has 
become the pivot point for the court on a number of issues. 
Her votes with the other conservatives, like Powell's, are 
often accompanied by separate opinions that narrow the focus 
and the reach of the decision." See, Skene, "O'Connor 
Becoming The New Powell, " Congressional Quarterly Weekly
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The conservative Court majority is adjudicating as 
though it has some catching-up to do; as though to put the 
reins on reckless unenumerated constitutional guarantees (in 
particular the right to privacy). This was evident even 
before the Reagan appointees were seated on the bench. For 
example, the Court refused to extend the right to privacy to 
protect homosexuality. In Bowers v. Hardwick,9 the Court, 
in an opinion by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, upheld 
as constitutional a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.10
Respondent, Mr. Hardwick, was arrested while in the 
process of violating the Georgia statute in the privacy of 
his bedroom with an adult consensual partner. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
his conviction holding that the statute in question violated 
the constitutional principles of Griswold v. Connecticut,
Report 47 (30 September 1989): 2598.
9Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10Georgia Code Ann. Section 16-6-2 (1984) provides, in
part:
11 (a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he 
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex 
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . .
" (b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more 
than 20 years. . . "
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Eisenstadt v. Baird, Stanley v. Georgia,11 and Roe v. Wade, 
as well as the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals' decision for lacking constitutional sup­
port of a fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy.12 After all, announced Justice White, how could an 
activity be fundamental and be contrary to the longstanding 
laws of almost half of the states in America? Homosexuality 
does not rank as a fundamental right when viewing such 
rights as being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition.,l13
Moreover, according to Justice White, while rights
n In Stanley v. Georgja. 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court 
held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 
right of individuals to read and/or watch obscenity in the 
privacy of their own homes. Justice Marshall asserted: "If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State 
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own 
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men's minds." Id., at 
565-566.
12A couple, John and Mary Doe, were also plaintiffs in 
the action, challenging their right as a married, hetero­
sexual couple to engage in the actions the Georgia statute 
proscribes. The District Court held that they did not have 
standing since they did not sustain, nor were in any danger 
of sustaining, direct injury from the enforcement of the 
statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling. Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. note 2, at 188.
13Id. at 192, quoting Justice Powell in Moore v. East 
Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Justice White proceeds 
to amass all the archaic anti-sodomy laws which persevered 
to the present-day. See, id. note 5, at 192-194.
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protecting the privacy of marriage and family,14 the priva­
cy of procreative and contraceptive choice,15 and even 
rights protecting the privacy of choosing whether to termi­
nate a pregnancy have been recognized as fundamental,16 
contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, these cases 
have nothing in common with homosexual intimacy. "No con­
nection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one 
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demon­
strated."17 What Justice White's decision demonstrated, 
conclusively, was the frugality of strict-constructionism in 
recognizing substantive due process rights.
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of
14Lovinq v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), dealing with 
marriage; and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), and Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with 
child rearing and education.
15Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942), dealing with procreation; and Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972), with contraception.
16Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. Justice 
Blackmun, however, pointed out in his dissent that the Court 
has protected the autonomy of family relations not to impose 
"a preference for stereotypical households," but rather 
because it contributes to the happiness of individuals. Id. 
at 205. See also, Laurence Tribe, the attorney for the 
defendant, who argued that cases which protect contraceptive 
freedom, for example, are not merely guaranteeing a right to 
indulge in a particular pharmaceutical product, but rather 
the right to engage in sexual expression. Because of its 
highly personal nature, the government has no business 
intentionally imposing sanctions (in one case pregnancy, in 
Hardwick's case jail) to dissuade an activity it may find 
morally wrong. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law. 2d 
ed., above, 1423.
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our authority to discover new fundamental rights im­
bedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most 
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little 
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution.18
Finally, the respondent argued that the Georgia statute 
has no rational basis for its existence except for the fact 
that it is thought to be 'morally' objectionable to the 
majority of the electorate. Morality, Justice White con­
tested, should not be the hand that motivates the ax in due 
process claims. Prescribing a moral code is a permissible 
activity of state law, and morality alone could thus be the 
rational basis for state statutes which encroach upon some 
individual's rights, that is, if they are not explicitly or 
even implicitly protected by the Constitution.19
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall 
and Stevens, dissented, arguing that the real issue, the 
issue that the majority is evading, is "the right to be let 
alone."20 The dissenters charged the majority with focus-
18Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. at 194.
19Justice Powell concurred, although he stressed that 
subsection (b) of the Georgia statute, which provides for 
the punishment for engaging in homosexual sodomy, is a 
possible violation of the Eighth Amendment protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment. He stated, "[t]he 
Georgia statute at issue . . . authorizes a court to im­
prison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, 
consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for 
such conduct - certainly a sentence of long duration - would 
create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." .Id. at 197.
20Id. at 199, quoting Justice Brandeis' dissenting 
remark in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928).
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ing on the activities, for example homosexual sodomy,21 
rather than the principle being challenged: the right to 
harmless personal preferences and predilections. Justice 
White is clearly wrong, averred the dissent, when he argued 
that the dispute brought on by the respondent and past cases 
recognizing privacy are unrelated. This is undoubtedly a 
privacy issue since there is no activity more intimate than 
sexuality.
The fact that individuals define themselves in a sig­
nificant way through their intimate sexual relation­
ships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as 
ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting 
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a 
relationship will come from the freedom an individual 
has to 'choose' the form and nature of these intensely 
personal bonds.22
The Court loses sight of its objective when it fails to 
see that it is, in large part, a mediator and interpreter of 
what the concept of liberty means. If an activity as per­
sonal as sexual intimacy is not a liberty, one could argue 
that the whole lot of those rights that have been accepted 
as fundamental, are not. Laurence Tribe thus protests that
[s]ix decades of privacy precedents from Meyer v. 
Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma to Griswold v. 
Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, were dismissed in two 
brisk paragraphs as having no relevance to this issue, 
since those cases involved rights relating to "family,
21This emphasis on 'homosexual' sodomy posed the ques­
tion of an Equal Protection violation, considering the
general language of the statute. See, id. Part I and note 
2, at 200-203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22Id. at 205.
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marriage, or procreation."23
Indeed, that is the whole problem with proponents of 
strict constructionism. They look beyond the principles of 
what the concepts of liberty and freedom mean in the here- 
and-now society, and only see the unknowable intentions of 
the Framers of the Constitution.24 Ronald Dworkin main­
tains that what the literalists really see is just a mirage. 
He finds their intellectual basis, of denying the succes- 
sional culmination of fundamental principles that increase 
in society over time, as greatly wanting. Our Constitution, 
argues Dworkin, is a "charter of principle" and not "a 
collection of political settlements."25 Dworkin convinc­
ingly asserts:
Since their question-begging rhetoric about "judge-made 
law" and "new rights" rests on no reasoned intellectual 
basis, it provides even less discipline than the tradi­
tional interpretive method, because the latter does 
demand coherent and extended argument, not just name- 
calling.26
Hence, argues Dworkin, strict constructionists con­
veniently go about picking and choosing rights (e.g., the 
right to legally integrated education) that then magically
23Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1422.
“ See, Judith A. Baer, "The Fruitless Search for Origi­
nal Intent," Michael McCann and Gerald Houseman, eds., 
Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Law­
making (Glenview, 111.: Scott Foreman, 1989), 49-71.
25Ronald Dworkin, "The Great Abortion Case," New York 
Review of Books 36 (29 June 1989): 52.
“ Ibid.
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appear to gain constitutional legitimacy. This is aptly 
demonstrated by the Court's acceptance of contraceptive and 
procreative privacy as having a constitutional foundation, 
but excludes that right to sexual privacy. The conserva­
tives on the Court do not stop here, as the next section 
will show. They also disingenuously placed impassible 
constitutional barriers on the right to abortion, while 
simultaneously affirming (although reluctantly) the con­
stitutionality of abortion.
Limitations on the Right to Abortion
In Maher v. Roe,27 defendants brought suit against 
Maher, Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut, for 
denying Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions. They 
contended that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as well 
as the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and 
equal protection, require the state to subsidize nonthera­
peutic abortions, since Connecticut's policy effectively 
nullifies the right to reproductive privacy established in 
Roe v. Wade for indigent women who wish to obtain an abor­
tion. Connecticut's policy subsidizes childbirth, moreover, 
and thus violates the principle laid down in Roe that "abor-
27Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Beal v. 
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), which was decided the same term, 
and held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not 
require the funding of nontherapeutic abortion as a condi­
tion of participation in the Medicaid program which was 
established by that Act. Justice Powell, writing for the 
majority in Beal, based his decision on the language of 
Title XIX itself.
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tion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral 
arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply 
two alternative methods of pregnancy."28 Indigent women 
who wish to obtain an abortion are denied their due process 
rights to privacy in addition to equal protection since the 
state subsidizes those indigent women who choose to carry 
the fetus to term. The United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut invalidated the Connecticut policy 
of distinguishing between abortion and childbirth asserting 
that
[t]o sanction such a justification would be to permit 
discrimination against those seeking to exercise a 
constitutional right on the basis that the state simply 
does not approve of the exercise of that right.29
Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, and 
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, White, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens, reversed the District Court's 
ruling.30 Powell declared that the state need not consti­
tutionally subsidize the medical costs of indigents at all, 
and they are certainly under no obligation to subsidize 
nontherapeutic abortions. He dismissed the equal protection 
challenge advancing the position that indigent women seeking
28This was the interpretation of the District Court for 
the District of Connecticut in Roe v. Norton. 408 F. Supp. 
660, note 3, at 663.
29Id. at 664.
30The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state 
funding of nontherapeutic abortion. 522 F. 2d. 928 (1975) .
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an abortion do not constitute a suspect class: "this Court 
has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus­
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."31
The central question under the Equal Protection Clause 
then becomes whether Connecticut's policy of denying bene­
fits for abortion violates a right that has been deemed 
constitutionally fundamental. If it does, then the policy 
would be constitutionally invalid unless the state could 
show a compelling state interest. Past state provisions 
struck down by the Supreme Court were proven to be unduly 
burdensome to the woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy.32 
In this instance, wrote Powell, that is not the case. 
Connecticut
places no obstacles —  absolute or otherwise —  in the 
pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage 
as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on 
private sources for the service she desires.33
31Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. at 471.
32For example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) invali­
dated the sweeping Texas prohibition of abortions as being 
an impermissible interference with a woman's decision wheth­
er to terminate a pregnancy; Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) invalidated a 
spousal consent requirement as an impermissible interference 
of a woman's decision; Carev v. Population Services Interna­
tional, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) held that a requirement for a 
lawful abortion "is not unconstitutional unless it unduly 
burdens the right to seek an abortion." Maher v. Roe. 432 
U.S. at 472-473.
33Id. at 474. Justice Powell has accepted abortion as 
a Hobbesean negative liberty. Abortion, asserts the Court, 
is a 'hands-off' issue, available by virtue of the fact that 
it is pretermitted by the state. See text at pp. 33-34
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By resolving that the Connecticut regulation did not 
violate a fundamental interest, and that it was not dis­
criminating against a suspect class, the Court thus went on 
to determine whether the regulation was "rationally related" 
to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose. By subsidizing 
childbirth, and not nontherapeutic abortions, the regulation 
was explicitly encouraging childbirth. Even Roe recognized 
the state's interest in protecting potential life, declared 
the Court, therefore the regulation was held to be constitu­
tional .
The dissents were wrathful, particularly the dissent 
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall who accused the Court 
of insensitivity and ignorance.34 The Court's endeavor to 
avoid strict scrutiny, by employing mere rationality in­
stead, is an affront to the poverty-stricken women who will 
never be able to recover from their plight with additional, 
unwanted children.
above. This conception is the deficiency of labelling 
abortion rights as a right to privacy, asserts Rhonda 
Copelon. The right to privacy is a negative right which 
confers a right to be let alone (as opposed to a positive 
right of self-determination). "Not only does the negative 
right of privacy carry no corresponding state obligation to 
facilitate choice; the integrity of a woman's decision­
making process is not even protected against purposeful 
manipulation through the selective provision of state re­
sources, in this case, the funding of childbirth." Copelon, 
"Beyond the Liberal Idea of Privacy: Toward a Positive Right 
of Autonomy," in Michael McCann and Gerald Houseman, eds., 
Judging the Constitution. 302-303.
34The dissents in this case apply to Beal v. Doe. 432 
U.S. 438, see note 27 above, and Poelker v. Doe. 432 U.S.
519 (1977), discussed below.
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Absent day-care facilities, she will be forced into 
full-time child care for years to come; she will be 
unable to work so that her family can break out of the 
welfare system or the lowest income brackets. If she 
already has children, another infant to feed and clothe 
may well stretch the budget past the breaking point.
All chance to control the direction of her own life 
will have been lost.35
All of the dissenters (Justices Brennan, Marshall and 
Blackmun) agreed that a fundamental right has 'de facto' 
been denied to a specific class of women without the benefit 
of a compelling state interest. While Connecticut is not 
actually putting obstacles in the path of an indigent wo­
man's decision to choose abortion, it may just as well put a 
shark-infested moat around the abortion clinics and hospi­
tals with a sign reading "paying customers only."36
Another case decided that same term, Poelker v. Doe.37 
takes the Maher precedent a step further. The city of St. 
Louis, at the directive of its Mayor, Mr. Poelker, prohibit­
ed the performance of abortions in city hospitals except 
when there was a grave threat to maternal health. The
35Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. at 458-459 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).
36Justice Brennan quoted Justice Felix Frankfurter 
revealing an analogous example to the Connecticut statute:
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably 
resulting from a money hurdle erected by the State, would 
justify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item in 
his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the law. 
'The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well 
as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, 
and to steal bread'. . ."in Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 
12, 23 (1956) (concurring opinion) . .Id. at 483.
37Poelker v. Doe. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled 
that the city's policy was an unconstitutional equal protec­
tion violation of indigent women's rights, since the hospi­
tal publicly financed childbirth. Furthermore, it was addi­
tionally violative in that nonindigent women were able to 
obtain abortions in private hospitals. Following the deci­
sion in Maher v. Roe, the Court applied, per curiam, the 
same principles and reversed the lower court's ruling.38
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun, likewise objected on the same grounds as in Maher; 
the St. Louis regulation denies indigent pregnant women due 
process by effectively denying them services they cannot 
afford. However, there is the additional obstacle of pro­
hibiting the physicians, who work in public hospitals, from 
undertaking a minor operation that they would otherwise 
perform. Thus, in some communities, this would reduce the 
number of physicians who may perform abortions in a hospital 
setting, which could impose additional risks to the woman. 
Moreover, women from small communities, both rich and poor, 
would be burdened with additional travel and cost since they
38,lWe agree that the constitutional question presented 
here is identical in principle with that presented by a 
State's refusal to provide Medicaid benefits for abortions 
while providing them for childbirth. . . For the reasons set 
forth in our opinion in [Maher.] , we find no constitutional 
violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy 
choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for 
childbirth without providing corresponding services for 
nontherapeutic abortions." .Id. at 521.
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would be forced to travel elsewhere to obtain an abor­
tion.39 The reasoning of the Court is ironic, the dis­
senters pointed out, since the majority manipulated the 
rationale for governmental regulation of abortions provided 
for in Roe to the detriment of its actual purpose —  to 
protect maternal health. Finally, the dissenters accused 
the Court of regressing to the point in time when states 
could force women to bear children that they did not want.
The dissenters' fears were compounded when in Harris v. 
McRae,40 the Court upheld a federal statute which effec­
tively permitted states to force women to bear children that 
they could not or should not bear. The federal statute, 
known as the 'Hyde Amendment', put stipulations on state 
participation in the Medicaid program. The Amendment for 
fiscal year 1980 provided:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution 
shall be used to perform abortions except where the 
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus 
were carried to term; or except for such medical proce­
dures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when 
such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law 
enforcement agency or public health service.41
39This was found to be an unconstitutional burden in 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 4 62 U.S. 416, 
which invalidated a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining 
an abortion, because the requirement imposed undue costs, 
travel and possible health risks upon the pregnant woman.
40Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
41Pub. L. 96-123, sec. 109, 93 Stat. 926. The terms of 
the Amendment in fiscal year 1977 did not include the rape 
or incest exception, Pub. L. 94-439, sec. 209, 90 Stat.
1434. However, for the majority of fiscal year 1978, and 
all of fiscal year 1979, the rape and incest exception was
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The Hyde Amendment, so-called after conservative Repre­
sentative Henry Hyde, R-Ill., substantially revoked funding 
for abortions even when it would be medically prudent to do 
so.42 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, joined 
by Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Powell, and 
Rehnquist, upheld the Hyde Amendment after having answered 
two questions: statutory43 and constitutional.44
The statutory question asked whether states who partic­
ipate in the Medicaid program are required to fund those
included in addition to another exception which provided for 
"instances where severe and long-lasting physical health 
damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were 
carried to term when so determined by two physicians," Pub. 
L. 95-205, sec. 101, 91 Stat. 1460; Pub. L. 95-480, sec.
210, 92 Stat. 1586. The Court made note of the fact that 
all fiscal years of the Amendment will be generically refer­
red to as the 'Hyde Amendment.' JEd. note 4, at 303.
42For example, young women with diabetes are prone to 
blindness during pregnancy, due to a worsening of a diabetic 
retinopathy. In addition, juvenile diabetics have a propen­
sity to advance the diabetes faster, and their aggravated 
condition increases the risks of kidney problems, and vas­
cular problems of the extremities. Other complications of 
pregnancy include phlebitiu, varicose veins and thrombo­
phlebitis, to name a few. See, .id. note 5, at 353,
(Stevens, J., dissenting), citing affidavits from McRae v. 
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 670.
43The appellees contended that despite the Hyde Amend­
ment, a state must pay for medically necessary abortions 
since the Amendment is only a limitation on federal reim­
bursement for this procedure, and on the basis that Title 
XIX provides for states to subsidize the costs of all medic­
ally necessary procedures and cannot exclude an operation 
simply because abortion is involved.
44Appellees contended that the Hyde Amendment violates 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment and the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.
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medically necessary abortions without federal reimbursement. 
The Court held that states are not solely responsible for 
funding medically necessary abortions based on the concept 
of "cooperative federalism." Title XIX was created as a 
scheme, by federal and state governments, to bilaterally 
subsidize the costs of indigent health care. Since the 
federal program was amended, the states were limited accord­
ingly, and are thus relieved of the financial responsibility 
within the conditions provided for by the Hyde Amendment.
The constitutional question was answered in several 
parts. The first constitutional challenge was whether the 
Hyde Amendment violates the right of a woman to terminate 
her pregnancy, implicit in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Remaining steadfast to its "obstacle" 
analysis as professed in Maher, the Court reiterated its 
position that due process cannot be violated absent actual 
government obstruction of a desired constitutional right. 
Disregarding the critical difference between Maher and 
Harris, which literally involves life and liberty, Justice 
Stewart reasoned that
it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of 
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to 
the financial resources to avail herself of the full 
range of protected choices.45
Indigence, not government, is the culprit in this case. 
Thus the Court held that the Hyde Amendment did not violate
45Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
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the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The second constitutional challenge was whether or not 
the Hyde Amendment violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. The appellees charged that the Hyde Amend­
ment executes policy that is dangerously close to the tenets 
of the Roman Catholic Church: that is, the belief that 
ensoulment begins at conception therefore making abortion 
murder.46
Justice Stewart maintained that the Hyde Amendment did
not conflict with the Establishment Clause since
. . . it has a secular legislative purpose . . . its 
principle primary effect neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, and . . .  it does not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.47
v
Simply because the Hyde Amendment may resemble princi­
ples that belong to a particular faith does not indicate 
that it has adopted those tenets. Indeed, this would inval­
idate much of our commonplace legislation; "[t]hat the 
Judeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that 
a State or the Federal Government may not . . . enact laws
46The Roman Catholic Church has the strictest views on 
abortion, says Rabbi Aryeh Spero, prohibiting direct abor­
tion of a fetus even in cases where it may be necessary to 
save the mother's life. The Church does permit remedial 
procedures, e.g. radiation treatments for cancer patients, 
which may indirectly kill the fetus. See, Spero, "Therefore 
Choose Life: How the Great Faiths View Abortion," Policy 
Review 48 (Spring 1989): 38-44.
47Quoting from Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 
444 U.S. 646, 653. Maher v. Roe. 448 U.S. at 319.
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prohibiting larceny."48 The similarities, concluded the 
Court, are not sufficiently convincing.
The third constitutional challenge was whether the Hyde 
Amendment violates the Equal Protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment.49 Arguing that the Hyde Amendment allows 
subsidization of medically necessary procedures and not 
medically necessary abortions, the appellees charged that 
poor women are being discriminated against. Justice 
Stewart, however, once again resurrected the Maher precedent 
asserting that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect 
classification,"50 the differences between the two cases 
notwithstanding.
Finally, it was left to the Court to decide what, if 
any, was the legitimate governmental objective of the Hyde 
Amendment.51 Justice Stewart concluded that it was recog­
nized in Roe v. Wade that the state has an "important and 
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
48Ibid.
49See, Bolling v. Sharp. 347 U.S. 497 (1956). The 
Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
grants equal protection to individuals from discrimination 
by the federal government.
S0Harris v. McRae. 44 8 U.S. at 323.
51A legitimate governmental objective is a necessary 
component for sustaining statutory classifications in Fifth 
Amendment Equal Protection controversies that do not impinge 
upon fundamental Constitutional rights or suspect classifi­
cations .
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life."52 By subsidizing childbirth and not abortion, the 
state is simply and 'rationally' exercising its interest in 
potential life.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, found the Court's priori­
ties confounding. First, the state's interest in protecting 
potential life, in Roe, was never meant to threaten actual 
life. Second, protecting potential life becomes a realistic 
governmental factor in the third trimester only, and when 
potential life threatens actual maternal life, the latter's 
interest constitutionally prevails. Third, prior to the 
third trimester, the only governmental regulation allowed, 
in the context of the Roe decision, is to protect maternal 
health. The present decision, thus, clearly runs askew of 
the precedent it has attempted to emulate.53
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the Hyde 
Amendment failed to exercise impartiality —  a trait that 
all governments should display.
When the sovereign provides a special benefit or a 
special protection for a class of persons, it must 
define the membership in the class by neutral criteria; 
it may not make special exceptions for reasons that are 
constitutionally insufficient.54
52Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S., at 162. The Court reiterated 
this position in Beal v. Doe. 432 U.S., at 445-446, Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S., at 478-479, and Poelker v. Doe. 432 U.S. 519, 
520-521.
53Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. at 350-354 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
54Id. at 349.
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The Court's criterion in Harris was not neutral, and 
therefore the majority failed to live up to the objectivity 
requirements of the equal protection guarantees of the 
Constitution. There are two objectives that Title XIX was 
enacted to satisfy: financial need and medical need. When 
an indigent woman must obtain an abortion out of medical 
necessity, therefore, she should be eligible to receive 
governmental subsidization. After all, a medically neces­
sary procedure is a medically necessary procedure. That the 
Court refused to see this, in the words of Justice Stevens, 
"constitute[s] an unjustifiable, and indeed blatant, viola­
tion of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially."55
Justice Brennan, avowing that a due process violation 
had taken place, disclosed that just when a constitutional 
minority most needed the intervention of the judicial 
branch, they were abandoned. He charged the sponsors of the 
Hyde Amendment of attempting to impose the moral views of 
the political majority on individuals. Worse yet, stated 
Brennan, the Amendment targets its puritanical wrath on 
those least able to defend their rights to life and liberty 
—  the poor and powerless. The fact is, those people most 
in need of the subsidization of Medicaid are arbitrarily 
denied it, and are therefore denied a constitutionally 
recognized right to privacy. There need not be governmental 
obstacles to achieve this blatant disregard of rights, as
55Id. at 356-357.
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the legislature and the Court have demonstrated. "It mat­
ters not that in this instance the Government has used the 
carrot rather than the stick."56 A cunning manipulation of 
funds works just as well as prison bars for those that need 
the funds.57
Justice Marshall, taking the Equal Protection defen­
sive, contended that the Court was acting unconscionably in 
replacing strict scrutiny with mere rationality. Clearly, 
there is a definable group, poor, pregnant women, being 
denied a constitutional right: access to abortions. The 
fact that medically necessary abortions are being denied 
makes the issue one of callous indifference on the part of 
the Court, and cruelty on the part of the legislature.
Three years prior to Harris v. McRae. Justice Marshall 
made a prediction that appears to have come true. In Maher 
v. Roe, he warned that the decisions in Beal. Maher and 
Poelker would
be an invitation to public officials, already under 
extraordinary pressure from well-financed and carefully 
orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more such
56Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court has never 
failed to invalidate legislation granting or withholding 
funds that invariably leads to a violation of constitutional 
rights. E.g., in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968), 
the Supreme Court invalidated a state unemployment statute 
which would not pay unemployment insurance to a woman who 
had refused to work on Saturdays because of her religious 
beliefs. The statute required that recipients must accept 
any suitable employment. The Court held that the statute 
unconstitutionally infringed upon her First Amendment rights 
to the Free Exercise of religion. .Id. at 334-335.
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restrictions [on abortion subsidizations].58
The fact that the restrictions disregard the dire 
necessity of a simple and possibly life-saving operation, as 
in Harris v. McRae, indicates that the Court has gone astray 
of the promise of reproductive privacy that was offered in 
Roe v. Wade. While the language of "life and liberty" never 
rang clearer, the majority of the Supreme Court did not hear 
it, although the pro-life lobbyists did. Ever in search of 
a constitutional challenge to Roe v. Wade, and motivated by 
the new turn in the Court, the pro-life forces achieved a 
small but certain constitutional victory in the following 
Supreme Court decision.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services59 marks the 
first actual obstruction of Roe v. Wade by the Supreme 
Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist found, or rather created, 
his first opportunity to sabotage the trimester framework of 
Roe which delineated the stages and the extent that a state 
may enforce its interest in protecting maternal health and 
potential life. By undermining the trimester framework the 
Supreme Court rendered greater latitude to states to regu­
late, and perhaps even restrict, abortions prior to viabili­
ty. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices White and 
Kennedy joined, upheld Missouri Revised Statutes section
58Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 4 62.
59Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 
3040 (1989).
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188. 029, 60 which provides:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he 
has reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of 
twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician 
shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by 
using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and 
proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skill­
ful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar 
practice under the same or similar conditions. In 
making this determination of viability, the physician 
shall perform or cause to be performed such medical 
examinations and tests as are necessary to make a 
finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung matur­
ity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings 
and determination of viability in the medical record of 
the mother.
In upholding this provision, the Court reversed rulings 
of both the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit. The Court of Appeals found section
188.029, requiring viability tests be performed when a 
physician believes the fetus to be at twenty weeks gesta­
tional age, to be an unconstitutional burden, imposing 
greater expense and risk to both the pregnant woman and the 
fetus.61
60Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but criti­
cized the Court for' not overturning Roe v. Wade outright. 
Justice O'Connor also concurred in the result, finding that 
sec. 188.029 imposed no 'undue burden' on the right to 
abortion, and not for the reasons put forth by the plurali­
ty.
61851 F. 2d. 1071, at 1075. For example, an 'amniocen­
tesis' must be performed to determine lung maturity which 
can be dangerous to both the woman and the fetus. Indeed, 
the medical community does not assume that proper lung 
maturity occurs until at least the thirty-second week of 
pregnancy. Such tests as Missouri requires, thus, were 
ruled to be irrational and therefore unconstitutional.
Though fetal gestational age can be determined accurately by
14 6
Rehnquist, however, criticized the lower courts' inter­
pretations for being too literal; that is, both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals mistakenly read section
188.029 as an unwavering mandate which required a viability 
test for all women at approximately twenty weeks of pregnan­
cy regardless of the physician's better judgment. Thus, 
even though the second sentence of the provision states that 
at twenty weeks a physician "shall perform . . . such medi­
cal examinations and tests," Rehnquist accused the lower 
courts of creating 'constitutional difficulties' since they 
did not read the statute in view of the general intent of 
the statute.62 By virtue of the first sentence of section
188.029, which provides that the physician use his best 
professional judgment and skill, the Chief Justice held that 
the second sentence is not an irrational mandate at all, but 
rather a provision which simply creates a presumption of 
viability.63 Therefore, since the state may 'rationally'
ultrasound, which shows the size and external fetal develop­
ment, fetal survivability before twenty-four weeks is un­
likely, even with today's most sophisticated technology.
See, Gina Kolata, "Doctors' Tools Limited In Testing Fetal 
Viability," The New York Times, 4 July 1989, p. 10(A). See 
also, Joanne Silberner, "When the Law and Medicine Collide, " 
U.S. News and World Report, 7 July 1989, 23.
62Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S .Ct. at 
3054-3055.
“Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the plur­
ality' s opinion on two legal grounds: first, because it is 
settled practice of the Supreme Court to accept "the inter­
pretation of state law in which the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of 
the state-law issue without such guidance might have justi­
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direct the physician to check for viability at twenty 
weeks,64 then section 188.029 violates the strict trimester 
structure of Roe v. Wade by promoting its interest in pro­
tecting potential human life. Since section 188.029 is 
reasonably designed to protect potential human life and 
creates the presumption of viability at twenty weeks, the 
provision permissibly interferes with second trimester 
privacy established in Roe and its progeny.65 In the bal­
ance between viable potential life and second trimester
fied a different conclusion." Quoting, Bishop v. Wood, 426 
U.S. 341, 346 (1976); and second, because "[t]he fact that a 
particular application of the clear terms of a statute might 
be unconstitutional does not provide us with a justification 
for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute." Quoting, 
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558,
2575 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Webster v. Reproduc­
tive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at 3079-3080 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).
64William Webster, arguing on behalf of Missouri, main­
tained that the purpose of the statute was to protect pos­
sible viable fetuses. Physicians agree that there is a 
potential four-week margin of error in determining fetal 
gestational age when depending on the woman's recollection 
of her last menstrual period. However, this rule of error 
does not necessarily apply to ultrasound determinations of 
gestational age. See, Silberner, "When the Law and Medicine 
Collide," 23.
“Rehnquist cited the precedents established in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), (the privacy of the pregnant 
woman and her physician is protected up until the third 
trimester of pregnancy), Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 
(1979), (held that a determination of viability is solely a 
matter for the attending physician's judgment), and Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), 
(invalidated a city statute which required that all second 
trimester abortions be performed in hospitals), as examples 
of section 188.029's inconsistency with the trimester 
framework. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct 
at 3955-3056.
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privacy, proclaimed Rehnquist, the former must prevail and, 
therefore, the Roe framework cannot stand.66
Rehnquist proceeded to justify his disassemblage of 
Roe. First, he blamed Roe for having created a "Procrustean 
bed" in the area of constitutional law dealing with abor­
tion.67 A constitution whose language is cast in general 
terms is unable to adjudicate on as rigid a framework as 
Roe, particularly when dealing with a right not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution. Moreover, judges should not 
be an "'ex officio' medical board."68 These reasons con­
tribute to Rehnquist's position that the precedent estab­
lished in Roe v. Wade is bad constitutional law and should
66"That is a stunningly bad argument," asserts Ronald 
Dworkin. Roe never implied that the right to seek an abor­
tion was absolute and tucked deep within the narrow confines 
of the trimester structure in terms of weeks, days or hours. 
Roe simply protected a woman's decision to terminate a 
pregnancy up until viability. "Viability is usually placed 
at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even 
at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 160. Although 
Justice Blackmun arranged the regulation of abortions into a 
medically supported trimester framework, his opinion did not 
imply that the viable fetuses could be aborted at 20 weeks 
gestational age. Thus, it would seem that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is committing the 'constitutional difficulty' 
here: " . . .  Rehnquist offered his bad argument in an effort 
not to reconcile his decision with judicial precedent, as 
judges often do, but to show that his decision was 'incon­
sistent' with precedent, which is extraordinary. The con­
clusion is irresistible that he had determined in advance 
somehow to damage Roe v. Wade." Dworkin, "The Future of 
Abortion," The New York Review of Books 36 (28 September 
1989): 47.
67Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at
3056.
“Quoting Justice White, dissenting, in Planned Parent­
hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52, 99. Ibid.
f
149
be overturned.69
The Chief Justice also denounced the trimester frame­
work since he was unable to rationalize why the state's 
interest in potential life is compelling only after viabil­
ity and not before.70 As section 188.029 demonstrates, 
stated Rehnquist, the state's interest could very well be 
compelling during the second trimester of pregnancy.
It is true that the tests in question increase the 
expense of abortion, and regulate the discretion of the 
physician in determining the viability of the fetus. 
Since the tests will undoubtedly show in many cases 
that the fetus is not viable, the tests will have been 
performed for what were in fact second-trimester abor­
tions. But we are satisfied that the requirement of 
these tests permissibly furthers the state's interest 
in protecting potential human life, and we therefore
“Justice Blackmun made a significant rebuttal to the 
position that the Court should not promote judicial stipula­
tions. Rehnquist's disenchantment with judicial regulation 
would cause an ivory tower full of constitutional doctrines 
to come crashing down. E.g., 'actual malice' standards for 
proving libel, 'obscenity' standards, the 'rational-basis' 
test, or intermediate and strict scrutiny formulations for 
evaluating Equal Protection claims. "Like the Roe frame­
work, " explained Blackmun, "these tests or standards are 
not, and do not purport to be, rights protected by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are judge-made methods for 
evaluating and measuring the strength and scope of constitu­
tional rights of individuals against the competing interests 
of government." JEd. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As 
for the "web of legal rules" that have been the result of 
Roe. Blackmun pointed out that fine legal distinctions run 
rampant throughout the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, 
e.g., 'release-time' programs which accommodate religious 
public-school instruction and the Establishment Clause. Id. 
at 3071-3075.
70Justice Blackmun wanted to know why the plurality 
feels the state's interest is so compelling during a woman's 
entire pregnancy. In a decision that will have such an 
intrusive effect upon pregnant women, Blackmun believes the 
Court owes a constitutional explanation on why it takes this 
position. JEd. at 3075.
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believe section 188.029 to be constitutional.71
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the reasoning that the 
Chief Justice used in ruling on section 188.029. She 
thought that Rehnquist spoke prematurely and imprudently. 
Section 188.029, declared O'Connor, simply does not conflict 
with any of the Court's prior decisions, therefore, the 
plurality's repudiation of the Roe trimester framework was 
unnecessary.72 Thus, she attempted to demonstrate how the 
viability testing provision and the previous Court decisions 
are compatible: "No decision of this Court has held that
the State may not directly promote its interest in potential 
life when viability is possible."73
For example, in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.74 the Court struck down a 
statute requiring the presence of a second physician during 
a post-viability abortion only because the requirement did
71Id. at 3057.
72"The Court will not 'anticipate a question of consti­
tutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'" 
Quoting Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), quoting Liverpool, New York and 
Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 
U.S. 33, 39. Nor should the Court "formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is to be applied." 297 U.S., at 347. 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. at 3060- 
3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).
73Id. at 3062.
74Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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not provide for exceptions in emergency situations. 
Thornburgh does not deny the state's interest in protecting 
potential life at viability; it reaffirms regulations al­
though it recognizes maternal health to be of greater impor­
tance. Colautti v. Franklin75 is also consistent with and 
similar to the intent of section 188.029. Colautti main­
tained that neither the legislature nor the courts may 
determine that a single feature (e.g., weeks of gestation, 
fetal weight, etc.) ascertains viability, because the point 
of viability differs with each pregnancy. The Court reaf­
firmed the state's interest in potential life at viability. 
All the Court stressed was that "[v]iability is the critical 
point."76 This is consistent with section 188.029 since, 
as the plurality interpreted this provision, the second sen­
tence requires when not imprudent "those tests that are 
useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability."77 
The plurality also maintained that Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health78 was inconsistent with section
188.029, since it invalidated a city statute that required 
all second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals.
75Colautti v. Franklin. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
76Id. at 388-389.
77Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at
3055. Recited and emphasis added by Justice O'Connor, id. 
at 3062.
78Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 4 62
U.S. 416 (1983).
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In Akron, the Court held that the statute imposed an undue 
cost burden on women seeking an abortion during their second 
trimester of pregnancy. O'Connor pointed out that the 
requirements in section 188.029 and in Akron are not the 
same, since the latter provision unconstitutionally inter­
fered with a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy well 
before the compelling point of viability. Thus, Justice 
O'Connor concluded
that requiring the performance of examination and tests 
useful to determining whether a fetus is viable, when 
viability is possible, and when it would not be medi­
cally imprudent to do so, does not impose an undue 
burden on a woman's abortion decision. On this ground 
alone I would reject the suggestion that section
188.029 as interpreted is unconstitutional.79
O'Connor's judgment remained consistent to the position 
that a state maintains broad power to regulate the perfor­
mance of abortions, so long as it does not impose an undue 
burden on women seeking to terminate nonviable pregnancies. 
Accordingly, she did not find section 188.029 to be an undue 
burden. Thus, she did not think the plurality acted wisely 
or objectively in its overzealous assault on Roe v. Wade. 
"When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion 
statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe 
v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to 
do so carefully."80
79Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 10 9 S.Ct. at
3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80Id. at 3061.
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Not only did Rehnquist seek to invalidate Roe's trimes­
ter framework, he also broadened the principles put forth in 
Maher v. Roe. Poelker v. Doe and Harris v. McRae.81 Section 
188.210 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public employee within the 
scope of his employment to perform or assist an abor­
tion not necessary to save the life of the mother.
And, section 188.215 states that it is
unlawful for any public facility to be used for the 
purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not 
necessary to save the life of the mother.
Rehnquist found these provisions to be applicable to 
the precedents established in Maher. Poelker and McRae, and 
upheld the constitutionality of sections 188.210 and 188.215 
as further examples of the 'negative' liberty or right to 
procure an abortion.82 Thus, the Court affirmed the 
state's power to make value judgments in favor of child­
birth, provided that a state does not unduly abridge a 
woman's right to choose an abortion. Rehnquist wrote that
Missouri's refusal to allow public employees to perform 
abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman 
with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to 
operate any public hospitals at all.83
This assessment is untrue, contests Ronald Dworkin.
81The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White, 
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy on this part of his opinion.
82See Copelon, "Beyond the Liberal Idea of Privacy: 
Toward a Positive Right of Autonomy," text at note 33
above.
33Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at
3052.
"Public facilities," as defined by the Missouri statute, 
"includes any public institution, public facility, public 
equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or control­
led by this state or any agency or political subdivision 
thereof."84 Therefore, if a medical institution is pri­
vate, (for example the Truman Medical Center in Kansas 
City), and staffed by private doctors, and administered by 
private corporations, and if it is on public land (the 
Truman Medical Center is leased from a political subdivision 
of the state), then the Missouri statute would prohibit the 
performance of abortions at this facility.85 There is a 
drastic dissimilarity between Maher's indifference to the 
financial obstacles of indigent pregnant women, and the 
utilization of every political, social and economic power in 
the community to abridge the performance of abortions. In 
the former case, the state did not erect barriers opposing 
abortions by refusing to fund nontherapeutic abortions. 
However, the attempt to stretch the Maher principle to cases 
whereby all women's right to choose an abortion is severely 
restricted in a particular community is a desperate attempt 
to constitutionally undermine the performance of abortions
“Missouri Revised Statutes, section 188.200. See 
also, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, id. note 1, at 
3068, and Dworkin, "The Great Abortion Case," 53.
85In 1985, 97% of all hospital abortions in Missouri, 
performed at sixteen weeks or later, were performed at the 
Truman Medical Center. Dworkin, ibid.
155
altogether.86 It is clear, charged Justice Blackmun, that 
sections 188.210 and 188.215 do not leave pregnant women 
with the same range of choices than if the state chose not 
to operate public hospitals at all.87
The final provision of the Missouri Revised Statutes 
upheld by the Supreme Court is section 1.205, which provides 
in full:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in 
life, health and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have pro­
tectable interests in the life, health, and well-being 
of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state 
shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on 
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of develop­
ment, all the rights, privileges, and immunities avail­
able to other persons, citizens, and residents of this 
state, subject only to the Constitution of the United 
States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the 
United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to 
the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this 
state.
86For example, Dworkin explains, "[a] city cannot force 
newsstands in shopping centers built on public land to sell 
only papers it approves. It cannot force theaters it sup­
plies with water and power and police protection to perform 
only plays it likes." Ibid.
87,lThe difference is critical," according to Blackmun. 
"Even if the State may decline to subsidize or participate 
in the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, 
and even if a State may pursue its own abortion policies in 
distributing public benefits, it may not affirmatively 
constrict the availability of abortions by defining as 
'public' that which in all meaningful respects is private. 
With the certain knowledge that a substantial percentage of 
private health-care providers will fall under the public 
facility ban . . . [this] leaves the pregnant women with far 
fewer choices, or, for those too sick or too poor to travel, 
perhaps no choice at all." Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services. 109 S.Ct at 3068-3069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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3. As used in this section, the term 'unborn children' 
or 'unborn child' shall include all unborn child or 
[sic.] children or the offspring of human beings from 
the moment of conception until birth at every stage of 
biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as 
creating a cause of action against a woman for indi­
rectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly 
care for herself or by failing to follow any particular 
program of prenatal care.
This section was invalidated by the Court of Appeals 
for going against the dictum of the Supreme Court that "a 
State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to jus­
tify its regulation of abortions."88 However, Rehnquist 
reversed the interpretation of the lower court, and instead 
accepted the state's defense of its intention to remain 
'abortion neutral'.89 Missouri argued that section 1.205 
imposed no substantive restrictions on the performance of 
abortions. Thus, Rehnquist read the preamble as merely a 
value judgment, the kind of which was found to be constitu­
tionally permissible in Maher v. Roe.90 In any case, at­
88851 F.2d., at 1075-1076, quoting Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health. Inc.. 4 62 U.S. 416, 444 
(1983), citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S., at 159-162. The lower 
federal court maintained that "the state intended its abor­
tion regulations to be understood against the backdrop of 
its theory of life." Ibid. See also, Brief for Appellees, 
19-23, contending that section 1.205 is intended to direct 
the interpretation for other provisions of the Missouri Act, 
e.g., to prohibit doctors in public hospitals from prescrib­
ing IUDs or some forms of the Pill, both of which dispel 
impregnated ova. Ibid.
89Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined 
this part of the Chief Justice's opinion.
90,1 [T]he right [to an abortion] protects the woman from 
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide 
whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limita­
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tested the Chief Justice, the preamble, declaring that life 
begins at conception, may be read to indicate that the 
unborn are legally protected in tort and probate law. 
Rehnquist thus stipulated that until it can be shown that 
section 1.205 actually restricts abortions, it is too ab­
stract for the Court to pass on its constitutionality.91
Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the Court's 
opinion on several constitutional grounds. First, he 
claimed that the preamble in section 1.205 of the MRS vio­
lates the constitutional right of contraceptive privacy 
established in Griswold v. Connecticut. Eisenstadt v. Baird 
and Carey v. Population Services International.92 This is 
so because Missouri defines conception as "the fertilization 
of the ovum of the female by the sperm of the male regard­
less of whether implantation has occurred.93 Thus, section
tion on the authority of a State to make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion . . . "  Maher v. Roe. 432 
U.S. at 473-474.
91It is ironic, given Rehnquist's handling of section
188.029, that he quotes Tyler v. Judges of Court of 
Registration, stating that the Court "is not empowered to .
. . abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government 
of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot 
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the cases 
before it." 179 U.S. 405, 409 (1900), in Webster v. Repro­
ductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct at 3050.
92Id. at 3081. These contraceptive privacy precedents 
were derived from a long list of cases supporting personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family, see text at Chap­
ter Three above.
93Medical texts regard conception as the point when 
implantation actually occurs, approximately six days after 
fertilization. Id. at 3080-3081.
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1.205 is a potential threat to certain types of contracep­
tives that prevent implantation of fertilized ova, such as 
the Pill and the IUD, and which can, thus, interfere with a 
woman's contraceptive choices —  particularly if she is 
under the care of a physician working in a public hospital.
Second, Stevens challenged Missouri to explain the 
secular interest in enacting the preamble. The contention 
that life begins at the moment of conception is a religious 
conviction which thus violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.94 Since Missouri has made a "legisla­
tive finding without operative effect,1,95 that is, for not
furthering a secular social objective, except for the impo­
sition of Christian religious morality, then the preamble is 
unconstitutional.
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference
between the state interest in protecting the freshly
fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 
9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of 
birth. There can be no interest in protecting the 
newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental 
anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does 
not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, 
that interest is valid.96
94Indeed, a Missouri woman seeking contraceptive auton­
omy would fare better under legislation authored by St. 
Thomas Aquinas who believed that ensoulment did not occur 
until 40 days after fertilization for males and 80 days for 
females. Early abortions and abortifacients would, thus, be 
seen as merely the destruction of seed and not of man. See, 
Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State as amicus curiae. 13a, 17a, cited by Justice Stevens, 
id. at 3083.
"Stevens citing Brief for Appellants 22, .id. at 3085.
96Id. at 3084 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Webster ruling, however, made it clear that fetal 
developmental distinctions no longer matter as they were 
elucidated in Roe v. Wade. Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services has substantially weakened the right and ability of 
a woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, even in the 
earlier stages of pregnancy. In so doing, the Supreme Court 
has dispossessed many women in crisis situations of the full 
capacity to deal with their dire circumstances. For at 
least half of the population in many parts of the United 
States, self-determination —  a decidedly fundamental human 
and American right —  has become a ward of the state; all 
those intimate decisions denied, in the Court's mind, for 
the sake of democracy.97
However, now that the abortion issue is back in the 
political arena, it is difficult to see how democracy has 
been vindicated by such an emotional issue as abortion. If 
anything, the abortion battle has thwarted the democratic 
process. Single-issue politics, on both sides of the abor­
tion controversy, have taken over other important social and 
economic issues. Politicians are being courted by intense 
lobbying groups for their votes on more or less restrictive
97Rehnquist asserted: " . . .  [T]he goal of constitu­
tional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably 
'politically divisive' issues from the ambit of the legisla­
tive process, whereby the people, through their elected 
representatives deal with matters of concern to them. The 
goal of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the 
balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the 
reach of the democratic process and that which it does not." 
Id. at 3058.
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abortion legislation. Longstanding political careers are
now threatened by one's abortion position alone!
. . . American democracy will be made poorer by the 
corruption of single-issue politics. Political deci­
sions will be less sensitive to the complexities of the 
popular will, because ordinary voters are in a worse, 
not better, position to express their convictions and 
preferences across the range of political issues when 
politicians are forced to treat one issue as the only 
one that counts.98
Moral issues, such as religion or abortion, are very 
often the cause of violent factions within a community or 
country. While one half of the society is attempting to 
enforce its morality on the community, the other half be­
comes indignant at the former's intrusive evangelicalism 
and/or unwavering fanaticism. This is certainly the case 
with abortion. However, the Founding Fathers sought ways to 
insure that no member or group in a society would be com­
pelled, through governmental coercion, mob rule, or other­
wise, to abide by foreign or conflicting beliefs. Thus, 
they entrusted the judiciary to be the final arbiters on 
controversies where a political compromise would be impos­
sible or unfair. Alexander Hamilton sagaciously observed 
that
. . . it is not with a view to infractions of the 
Constitution only that the independence of the judges 
may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
98Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," 51. See also, Ted 
Gest, "The Abortion Furor," U.S. News and World Report. 17 
July 1989, 18-22, and, E.J. Dionne Jr., "On Both Sides, 
Advocates Predict a 50-State Battle, " The New York Times. 4 
July 1989, 1 (A) & 11(L).
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occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes 
extend no farther than to the injury of the private 
rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and 
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial 
magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the 
severity and confining the operation of such laws. . . 
Considerate men of every description ought to prize 
whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in 
the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be 
tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which 
he may be a gainer today. . .99
It is the opinion of many that Roe v. Wade was an
attempt to mitigate the interests of both personal privacy 
and governmental regulation in the formation of the trimes­
ter structure, thereby living up to the goals of accommoda­
tion and moderation in a democratic society.100 However,
the Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
has failed to uphold this uniquely American ideal.
"Alexander Hamilton, "Essay # 78, " The Federalist 
Papers, above.
100See, Frances Olsen, "Unraveling Compromise," Harvard 
Law Review 103 (November 1989): 105- 135.
CONCLUSION
As of this writing, two abortion cases are pending 
before the Supreme Court.1 Both cases involve parental 
consent statutes. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health,2 concerns the right of teen-age girls to obtain an 
abortion without involving their parents. A 1985 Ohio law, 
House Bill 319 of the Amended Ohio Revised Code Section 
2919.12, requires that physicians notify at least one parent 
before performing an abortion on a minor, unless a juvenile 
court has issued an order giving the minor permission to 
obtain an abortion. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, in Cleveland, declared the law unconsti-
1Another case, Turnock v. Ragsdale, No. 88-790, was
settled out of Court. Turnock involved and Illinois stat­
ute, Medical Practice Act 111 111. Rev. Stat., Sec. 16 (1), 
which required services performing abortions during the 
first three-months of pregnancy to meet standards similar to 
those required in full-care hospitals. Under the out-of- 
court agreement, however, a physician may perform an abor­
tion in his office, but must have similar surgical privileg­
es at a licensed state hospital in order to perform the 
procedure at an abortion clinic. Furthermore, the settle­
ment restricts licensed abortion clinics to using only local 
anesthesia when performing abortions. After the eighteenth 
week of pregnancy, abortions can only be performed in a 
hospital or general surgery clinic. See, Isabelle 
Wilkerson, "Illinois Case on Abortion Settled Prior to 
Supreme Court Hearing," New York Times, 23 November 1989, p. 
A1(N), A1(L).
2No. 88-805.
162
163
tutional, citing Supreme Court precedents which have limited 
states' ability to impose undue burdens on teen-agers seek­
ing abortions.3
Hodgson v. Minnesota. Minnesota v. Hodgson.4 imposes a 
parental consent requirement which is much more restrictive 
and, many argue, punitive than the Ohio statute. A Minne­
sota statute, Minn. Stat. Ann. Sections 144.343 (2)-(7), 
mandates that both parents be notified before a teen-age 
girl may obtain an abortion, unless she can prove to a court 
"in an expedited confidential proceeding either that she is 
'mature and capable of giving informed consent' or that the 
performance of an abortion would be in her best interest."5 
The parental consent requirement applies to situations of 
divorce or parental desertion without exception. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Paul, 
upheld the law in most respects.6 In a brief to the United
3854 F.2d. 852 (6th Cir. 1988). For example, Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52
(1976).Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
See, "Battlegrounds for the Next Term," New York Times. 4 
July 1989, p. 10 (L) .
4Twin appeals cases, No. 88-1125 and No. 88-1309, 
respectively.
5853 F .2d. 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), at 1453.
6The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the ruling 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, which held that the notice/bypass statute was 
unconstitutional, with directions that the District Court 
enter judgment that the notice/bypass statute is constitu­
tional. The District Court held that the two parent notifi­
cation statute failed to demonstrate that the state's inter­
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States Supreme Court, Minnesota's Solicitor General, Kenneth 
W. Starr, indicated not his concern for parental guidance in 
a delicate issue such as abortion, but rather the consti­
tutional legitimacy of abortion. "There is simply no credi­
ble foundation for the proposition that abortion is a funda­
mental right," asserted Starr.7 Affirming the fears of the 
Webster dissenters,8 Minnesota and other abortion-restric­
tive states intend to annihilate Roe v. Wade, and are pass­
ing legislation to achieve this objective.9 The Minnesota
est was in the best interest of protecting pregnant minors 
or for promoting family communication. Furthermore, the 
forty-eight hour waiting period requirement was found to be 
an unreasonable burden. Ibid.
7Linda Greenhouse, "A New Round: Justices to Hear Cases 
on Parental Notice, but the Wider Issue Again is Roe v. 
Wade," New York Times. 24 November 1989, pp. 1(A), 24(A).
8"It is impossible to read the plurality opinion . . . 
without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State 
to enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to 
assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of 
conception. All these laws will satisfy the plurality's non­
scrutiny, until sometime, a new regime of old dissenters and 
new appointees will declare what the plurality intends: that 
Roe is no longer good law." Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services. 109 S.Ct. at 3077-3078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9For example, the Idaho legislature passed the most 
restrictive abortion law of any state, making the procedure 
illegal except in cases of non-statutory rape reported in 
seven days, incest if the victim is younger than 18, severe 
fetal deformity or a threat to the mother's life or physical 
health. "Idaho Senate OKs stiff abortion law," Las Vegas 
Review Journal. 23 March 1990, p. 4(A). However, Governor 
Cecil Andrus vetoed the legislation. Likewise, Maryland 
legislators attempted to enact strict abortion measures in 
order to challenge Roe v. Wade, but it was killed in commit­
tee hearings. The United States territory of Guam was next 
to challenge the historic abortion case with the nation's 
strictest abortion law, but a federal judge temporarily 
blocked it after a class-action suit. "Maryland abortion
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brief targeted Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" analysis 
for measuring state restrictions on abortion, arguing that 
"the undue burden analysis begs the question at issue," that 
is, whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to 
abortion.10
Justice O'Connor, however, held her ground during oral 
arguments on the Minnesota law, questioning the state's 
unwillingness to provide for exceptions to the rule: "To get 
right to the heart of it," O'Connor said, addressing Minne­
sota's Chief Deputy Attorney General, John Tunheim, "the 
statute just doesn't provide any exceptions, although clear­
ly there are some circumstances where notice is not in the 
child's best interest." Pressing the issue, she asked, "how 
do you defend the state's interest?"11
Tunheim replied that "[t]here is no evidence that a 
noncustodial parent is not fit to be a parent," whereupon 
Justice Scalia, indirectly confronting O'Connor, injected 
his position that parents have a right to know about their
bill killed," Las Vegas Review Journal. 25 March 1990, p. 
10(A). Currently, a Louisiana bill, having passed the House 
of Representatives, is up in the Senate. The measure would 
provide up to ten years hard labor and/or fines up to 
$100,000 for those who perform abortions. "Harsh anti-abor­
tion bill OK'd," Las Vegas Review Journal. 15 June 1990, p. 
10 (A) .
10Greenhouse, "A New Round: Justices to Hear Cases on 
Parental Notice, but the Wider Issue again is Roe v. Wade." 
p. 24(A).
nLinda Greenhouse, "Oblique Clash Between 2 Justices 
Mirrors Tensions About Abortion," New York Times. 30 Novem­
ber 1989, pp. 1 (A) , 16 (B) .
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children's activities: "I had assumed that there is a paren­
tal interest as well as a filial interest." Tunheim agreed, 
contending that the state presumes both parents have their 
child's interest at heart.12
Justice O'Connor, in turn, rebutted, arguing "[t]hat 
may be true in general . . . but probably you would concede 
there might be circumstances where it is not in the best 
interests of the child to tell both parents of her problem 
and intention.1,13 Concessions is what Justice O'Connor's 
abortion position is all about, and what makes her the 
target justice in this no-win controversy. As her opinion 
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services demonstrates, she 
supports the states' rights to firmly regulate abortions 
while maintaining that women have a constitutional right to 
reproductive privacy. However, does O'Connor believe that 
all women share this right to reproductive privacy?14
12 Ibid.
13Ibid. (Emphasis added) .
14Justice O'Connor is expected to uphold Roe v. Wade, 
the decision granting reproductive privacy to women. "Care­
ful observers have thought that in her concurring opinion in 
[Webster] she seemed less opposed to guaranteeing women 
substantive rights to an abortion than she has on other 
occasions." Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," above, note 
3, at 47. See also, Donald Baer, "Now, the Court of less 
resort," U.S. News and World Report, 17 July 1989, 26-29. 
Moreover, considering her indirect clash with Justice Scalia 
during oral arguments on the Minnesota statute and her 
position on according concessions in those circumstances 
when notifying both parents would not be feasible, she will 
probably rule that "two-parent notification" is an undue 
burden, while perhaps not "single-parent notification." 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens will most
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Compromise was what Roe v. Wade was all about —  a 
balanced moral and political composite: thesis (protection 
of potential life) + antithesis (privacy and reproductive 
freedom of choice) = synthesis (Blackmun's trimester frame­
work rendering reasonable protection to both). A moral code 
is indeed a necessary and honorable characteristic for any 
society, but American society must also accommodate the 
interests of the individual. The entire political and 
philosophical structure of American society was based on the 
theories of men like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke who recog­
nized that the individual is antecedent to the state, and 
all political power, therefore, must emanate from the indi­
vidual in order for the social alliance to work. Thus, the 
free and rational individual must be free to determine his 
own moral code and religious beliefs and likewise tolerate 
the beliefs of all others lest there be a moral battle of 
each against all.
This thesis attempted to show how privacy and all the 
protections surrounding such a liberty are harmonious, and 
fulfill and enhance the American ideal of individual free­
dom. Individuals live in society, but the principles of the 
United States Constitution guard against encroachments by 
that society, and all the divergent passions and beliefs 
that enflame the spirit at the risk of consuming individual
certainly uphold Roe v. Wade and grant teen-agers reproduc­
tive privacy in the cases presently pending before the 
Supreme Court.
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autonomy. Hence, freedom of choice and self-determination 
fulfill Thomas Jefferson's promise of "life, liberty and 
happiness." Attaining those high ideals is a continual 
process of compromise and commitment to constitutional 
principles. By heeding the lessons of history and the 
dictates of reason over passion, one realizes that the right 
to privacy does indeed help to realize the promise of in­
dependence, of happiness, and of freedom.
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